Basics of Presuppositionalism. What is a Presupposition, exactly?

One of the most voiced criticisms of presuppositionalism is that it "assumes what it is trying to prove." In other words, some say, it is a "circular" argument. These seem to stem from the mistaken belief that a presupposition is something that is merely assumed, either a non-proveable assumption, or something akin to an axiom. 

Let's take each of these starting with the "assumption" claim.  

First, presuppositions are not taken to be synonymous with "merely assumed."  As used in presuppositionalism -- as Greg Bahnsen emphasized -- presuppositions are the basic, non-negotiable claims of a worldview. Also, a presupposition is a necessary belief to account for a "state of affairs."  Neither of these carry the notion of "unprovable assumptions."   In fact the characterization as a "necessary belief" carries with it the idea that such a presupposition is necessary because of the impossibility of the contrary, i.e. to deny it proves it by leading to self-contradiction.  That is the essence of proof used in TAG (the "transcendental argument for God").

We note that the charge of circularity used by opponents is a case of special pleading on their part.  They argue as if their worldview is not guilty of the "sin" of circularity.  Yet their argumentation is circular in the most vicious sort of way.  The most glaring example is the belief in the existence of an unproved disembodied universal abstract logic existing someplace in a materialist cosmos (or just as incoherent a platonic "heaven").  As Bahnsen pointed out it is unprovable on the basis of their presuppositions, citing the example: "How could one prove 'modus ponens' without using 'modus ponens'?"  One can't.  In other words, one has "modus ponens" because of "modus ponens"  -- one can't get more tightly circular than that.

To elaborate, here is a more immediate example from linguistics that illustrates the use of presuppositions in the presuppositional approach of Van Til: "Have you stopped beating your wife?" That question presupposes that the person did in fact engage in wife beating. That is the necessary presupposition that renders the question meaningful. This does not mean the presupposition is true or false. Also, note in this case the presupposition is not of the unprovable variety. In fact, the truth of the presupposition is potentially testable by empirical investigation. 

Above I mentioned that some treat a presupposition as an axiom. Unfortunately, that view was espoused by Gordon H. Clark in his version of presuppositionalism.  I agree with Van Til and Greg Bahnsen that Gordon H. Clark's version of presuppositionalism is fatally flawed¹.  His defense of Christian theism had to ultimately rest on the "axiom of Scripture." This essentially reduced Clark's system to fideism. As Bahnsen summarized: "Clark ultimately left Christianity without a rational defense."²      Clark's system leaned heavily to rationalism and deductive proofs when it came to the positive defense of Christianity. He was vehemently opposed to empirical evidence -- deeming it not a path to any knowledge. So much so that he claimed that science has no cognitive content regarding nature.  Only deductivism provided knowledge. These faults are serious, and actually are self destructive of Clark's system.³   One should be aware of the difference between Van Til's and Clark's  versions of presuppositionalism and not confuse the two.

---

1 See Chapter 8.5, p.662 in "Van Til's Apologetic" by Greg Bahnsen for the critiques of Gordon H. Clark.^↩
2 p.672 in "Van Til's Apologetic" by Greg Bahnsen.^↩
3  N.B. Clark's writings are not devoid of value. His history of philosophy "Thales to Dewey" is an excellent text that thoroughly dismantles atheistic thought as being contradictory in all of its historical systems.^↩ 

More Nagelisms

I was perusing blogs awhile back (actually a few years!) when I came upon this quote from Nagel's Mind and Cosmos. Rather than consulting my notes it is just easier to re-quote it here.

First, that the non-teleological and timeless laws of physics--those governing the ultimate elements of the physical universe, whatever they are--are not fully deterministic. Given the physical state of the universe at any moment, the laws of physics would have to leave open a range of alternative successor states, presumably with a probability distribution over them. Second, among those possible futures there will be some that are more eligible than others as possible steps on the way to the formation of more complex systems, and ultimately of the kinds of replicating systems characteristic of life. The existence of teleology requires that successor states in this subset have a significantly higher probability than is entailed by the laws of physics alone--simply because they are on the path toward a certain outcome. Teleological laws would assign higher probability to steps on paths in state space that have a higher "velocity" toward certain outcomes. They would be laws of the self-organization of matter, essentially--or of whatever is more basic than matter. (pp. 92-3)

This is a good summary of Nagel's attempts to reintroduce teleology into the natural universe. Nagel realizes that neo-Darwinism is a fatally flawed theory. The gist of the argument is that naturalism has to reintroduce final causes. Blind chance and mechanistic evolution don't get it. Mixed up in the argument is the typical atheist reliance on chance and probability. The motions of matter are not deterministic.

Okay, for the sake of argument, let's grant that. As theists we deny that the source of "probability" is what the atheist claims it to be -- an ultimate irrational residue of lawlessness. A world in which things happen for "no reason!" But back to the technical issues.

The probability distributions of quantum field theory can be computed with some very precise results for things like scattering amplitudes,half-lives, branching ratios and the like. These probability "amplitudes" are all functions of the basic properties of the physical systems being modeled. And, here's the point: the amplitudes have no teleological aspect. All of physics exhibits non-teleology. The future state(s) of the universe are solely determined by the present state, past and future are irrelevant. This principle falls out rather neatly from the principle of least action -- a very general principle from which all equations of motion can be derived given a Hamiltonian (think, "energy") or Lagrangian function that depends on the constituents of the system and their configurations. Moreover Nagel's plan is to require "... that successor states in this subset [those favoring replicating life] have a significantly higher probability than is entailed by the laws of physics alone--simply because they are on the path toward a certain outcome."

The nail in this coffin is that Nagel imagines some non-physical laws that must alter half-lives, branching ratios and so on, along the way.  After all, according to the atheist myth of macro evolution, the journey to replicating life is via small steps with compounded probabilities. We ought to be able to see such evidence in pre-biotic chemical reactions.  

Embracing such non-physical laws is to accept a new dualism and to abandon the pillar of monism in the atheist's philosophy. Paradoxically, the positing of extra-physical (should we say supernatural!) properties seems not to worry Nagel's new born "naturalism." 

An Agnostic asserts: "Humans are not random objects like asteroids." I ask, " Are you sure?"

It has been awhile. Off busy with other activities. I had typically tried to write longer entries. The following short commentary is due to a comment found on social media a couple of years ago by an avowed agnostic who stated:

"Humans can and do agree amongst themselves what constitutes acceptable behaviour for the greater good of all. That's what distinguishes us from random objects like asteroids. Individual bad people including tyrants may depart from those standards just as they may break other human laws such as relating to fraud or democratic procedures."

This assertion, typical of evolutionary atheists and agnostics, was made in the context of the issue of morality. This person was arguing for conventional morals. But, of course, conventional morals are not true morals. Conventions are arbitrary and not absolute. This is moral relativism all in all. Different strokes for different folks.

But the main point is that, in this quote, we have yet another case of the unbeliever's contradictory presuppositions of his rational freedom and freedom from the causal matrix of quantum field theory in a reality of material monism. He claims humans are not "random objects!" Is he sure? Can he prove this assertion is consistent with his metaphysical presuppositions?

He can't. It is a mere assertion and contradictory to material monism. As a bundle of material he is just a configuration of quantum fields and, ipso facto, "a random object!" On his presuppositions he actually is no different than asteroids, or any other material object in the universe. He would be nothing but a clump of matter responding to the equal and opposite reactions from other clumps of matter in the rest of the universe. The same actions and reactions that have been going on for eternity in his mythology. And, of course, none of these actions and reactions are evil, and none are good.

Mr. Atheist, We Are Not All on an Epistemological Titanic

All worldviews have equal burden of proof. The frequent claim of atheists that Christian theism asserts something positive, i.e. the Triune God, while atheism (contrary to that) does not assert anything positive and has no burden of proof is false. Atheism positively asserts an incoherent plurality of unrelated brute facts which cannot account for themselves or for any fact of human experience whatsoever, be it knowledge, truth, morality, individual rational freedom, immaterial objects, etc. The list goes on and on.

The atheist, by his own contradictory presuppositions, is reduced to the absurdity of absolute skepticism -- all along challenging the Christian to account for knowledge based on the atheist's skepticism.¹ The God of Christian theism does account for knowledge. That answer is intelligible and the atheist can understand that answer. The only objection the atheist has is he does not like that answer.

Contrary to the atheist we are not all on an epistemological Titanic. Only the atheist is on that ship.

---

1 By assuming everyone must be in the same epistemological situation the atheist has ascribed to the fallacy of pretended neutrality. That assumption is question begging. ^↩

The Amazing Autonomous Material Mind?

When defending Christian theism via the presuppositional method, we many times visit the various byways and side-roads of all of human experience. These visitations are to show that the presuppositions of the unbeliever are not consistent with the facts of human experience -- that the unbeliever is a self-contradiction (Prov. 26:5, "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit."). Needless to say, it is, by the nature of the case, inefficient to explicate every implication of particular problems in the materialist worldview in every conversation.

In recent conversations the discussion became focused on the issue of the cogency and existence of immaterial entities in the purely materialistic and immanent reality of atheism. The discussion was focused on the example of the mind being not composed of material. This issue is THE big problem for modern materialist philosophers of "mind." These atheist philosophers have been thrashing about and stewing in their own juices for a century, at least.

The idea that the mind is no more than the brain has infected society to an alarming degree, of late, and seems to be an accepted article of faith by many. Many unsophisticated man-in-the-street atheists believe it is plausible -- in spite of the fact that such a view undermines much, if not all, of their other beliefs (and thereby secretly involving themselves in unacknowledged, hidden self-contradictions).

I have been asked: "Why couldn't the mind be material?" One would hope that sometimes people would "do their homework!" For one, the properties of a purely material "mind" are not the properties that most unbelievers ascribe to themselves -- as being free rational beings. Or, on the other hand, how immaterial entities such as abstractions, mathematics, laws of logic are intelligible and exist in a reality of pure matter. Another conundrum is how aggregates of matter become conscious and self-aware, the problem of personal identity and such -- all from determining physical causes. No materialist theory of consciousness -- what consciousness is and how it "emerges" from matter -- is forthcoming. Be that as it may, we have endeavored in the pages of this blog to delineate the concomitant conclusions of the atheist presuppositions. Typical assumptions of the atheist are:

(1) Only material exists within our "universe"¹;
(2) The uniformity of nature. Nature is uniform in time -- the regularity of the laws of nature, the same in the past, present and future²;
(3) All states of the material universe are governed by material laws;
(4) Humans are purely material systems produced by chance and the laws of matter (consequence of (1),(2) and (3));
(5) Therefore, humans are purely material;
(6) Consequently, the mind and the material brain must be the same, or, rather, "mental" states are no more than particular material configurations (states) of the brain;
(7) Therefore, all "mental" states are the results (effects) of material processes, and consequently, "thoughts" are effects and "epiphenomena" -- illusions with no causal agency;
(8) However, humans are autonomous!

It should be apparent to most that (8) is contrary to (1) through (7). However it is not apparent to those who are willing(!) adherents of the irrationality of "modern" thought, and nonetheless, believe in the existence of their amazing autonomous material mind!³

---

1 I put universe in quotes since the modern (atheist) view is that our observable universe is a detached quantum bubble -- the result of a quantum fluctuation in a larger "bulk" spacetime. Our "universe" is just one among a huge number of universes (multiverse theory). For the atheist, this larger "bulk" is considered eternal, uncreated and a brute fact. Regardless, the issue of minds within our "universe" is independent of that theory, as to the atheist only matter exists within our "universe."^↩
2 The unifromity of nature (a phrase coined by Hume) is the principle that the laws of nature in operation today are the same as those in the past and also the future. The principle is basic to the notion of causation and the necessary presupposition for science "to work." It is foundational to the principle of scientific induction. An atheist that would deny the uniformity of nature would see his entire "scientific" worldview crash to the ground.^↩
3 When the self-avowed material monist secretly believes (8) he is, in fact, an inconsistent crypto-dualist, cf. Van Til on the antitheses and An Atheist's Miracle.^↩

Another Futile Atheist Argument

Proverbs 17:28 Even a fool is counted wise when he holds his peace...

 

This meme, posted by an atheist whom we will identify as DJ, popped up on my social media when a friend commented on it. It is another example of the shallow thought of atheists -- a shallowness that results in illogical reasoning and self-contradiction. It is this utter shallowness of the "man-on-the-street" atheist that catches himself in self contradictions.

 

 Proverbs 26:5 Answer a fool according to his folly, Lest he be wise in his own eyes. 

 

First, the meme assumes there is such a thing as "good" and "evil." But "good" and "evil" do not exist in the purely material universe of atheism. All there is are mere chunks of matter undergoing temporal transformations according to the laws of physics. The only laws in a material universe are the underlying laws of physics. There are no moral laws. To put it another way, there is no such thing as "good" solutions of the laws of physics (e.g. a solution of the wave-function of the universe) or "evil" solutions. As has been often stated, there is no "ought" in physics, only what "is." If there are two future solutions, "X" and "Y," of the wave-equation, there is no physical reason the solution "ought" to be "X" rather than "Y;" and vice versa. This meme has to presuppose the existence of good and evil -- but to do so is to assume something that does not exist in the atheist universe; it has to assume theism. Such is the atheist's self-contradiction.

Second, this particular atheist, DJ, once commented in a prior exchange on social media, that the only things that are "real" are those testable by science and accessible via sense perception¹ .  This is a big problem for DJ.   I asked him if he had ever seen, tasted, heard, smelled or touched a "moral law."   Of course he had not; and, understandably, he offered no reply.   He was caught in his own trap. Moral laws are not empirically accessible, they are not natural and they are not discoverable in rocks, electric circuits, or test tubes via the scientific method.  By his own standard, "good" and "evil" are not real.

---

1 The view that knowledge is only obtained through sense perception ("experience") is radical empiricism. I addressed part of this prior exchange in the post "Village Atheism and Magical Configurations of Matter".^↩

Feckless Arguments: Atheist and otherwise. Heidegger redux redux: Fallacy of Special Pleading.

One of the things that impressed me when I first read Van Til was the intellectual rigor of the presuppositional defense of Christian theism. Greg Bahnsen repeatedly emphasized the objective truth of Christian theism and the surety of its proof via the transcendental argument outlined by Van Til.

An example of this intellectual rigor is shown by the fact that presuppositional apologetics rejects the so-called traditional "proofs," such as the ontological, cosmological and teleological proofs; since, as they are traditionally formulated they employ fallacies of reasoning. These are examples of fallacious arguments by Christians. Atheists equally employ fallacious arguments, which we will address below.

As for the traditional Christian "proofs," consider the cosmological argument, also known as the argument from causality. A naive presentation of the cosmological argument, in schematic, goes something like the following:

(A) Everything has a cause;
(B) the universe has a cause;
(C) therefore, that cause is God.

Of course, if premise A is a universal metaphysical principle, then God, too, has a cause; while if God has no cause, then premise A is not true. As formulated, this is an example of special pleading. It is intellectually embarrassing.

So then a better formulation is

(A) Every effect has a cause;
(B) the universe (which had a beginning) is an effect;
(C) therefore, that cause is God.

This version is less silly than the prior argument -- but is still fallacious. As Bahnsen has pointed out, it commits the fallacy of composition. It argues that since every effect within the universe has a cause then the universe as a whole has a cause. That is a fallacy. It also argues from immanent physical causation to a transcendent non-physical cause; again a fallacious jump. The sophisticated atheist believes (irrationally, of course) that physical reality as a whole is not an effect; it had no cause -- it is a brute fact. The fact that scientific evidence shows our universe (including time) had a beginning only means to an atheist that this universe is an effect that had a beginning as a "bubble" in some greater physical reality. Of course, such an atheist evasion smacks of the infinite regress that when it comes to "bubbles" it is "turtles all the way down!"

Such are the problems and lack of intellectual rigor of the so-called traditional cosmological argument -- including equally feckless rebuttals by atheists.

A presuppositional counter to the traditional cosmological argument is that the very idea of causation makes no sense outside of Christian theism. In fact, on the atheist ground, there is no justification of causality in general, or induction specifically. The problems of causality and induction described by Hume and Russell have been unanswered by atheist philosophy to this day.

On the other side we have an example from the anti-theistic camp in the question of Heidegger that I discussed here.

This interlocutor went from an initial "challenge" of :"Rather than asking about the existence of God, one should ask why there is something rather than nothing." Then, by including God in the abstract class of "something," flipped back, in a later exchange, to the same initial question of "Why God rather than nothing?" This, no doubt, is an example of "circular objections."

Of course the Christian answer is that God is eternal and self existent. But the question, "why God rather than nothing?" is itself an example of special pleading. It poses the question within a presupposed metaphysics of absolute "causality" and "possibility." For an anti-theist, everything, God included, and yes, even "nothing" (reified into a "something") are equal participants in the "arena of possibility." This type of atheist query inspires no more confidence than the original cosmological arguments given above.

It seems that to the atheist nothing is eternal and self existent unless it is the eternal principle of universal causation.¹ As such, the question is another example of the fallacy of special pleading.

---

1 Note that such reasoning merely assumes some abstract notion of causation. To the monist the only causation is physical causation, so the implication of such a question is that God must be a material, physical being produced by physics also. In other words, God, like man, is a creature created by nature! -- again, yet more question begging.^↩

Myth of Neutrality and a Prejudicial Challenge.

A reader responded to my previous blog on Anti-theism and challenged me to show how I know that God exists without relying on the Bible.  It has been stated many times that such a proof is provided by the negative portion ("God exists because of the impossibility of the contrary") of the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG).  However, we have mentioned that, as Christians, we defend Christianity as a whole; not a truncated metaphysical theism (or Deism).  The God referred to in TAG is the Triune God of Christianity -- not a merely generic deity.

But first, we need to consider the nature of the unbeliever's challenge.

Such a challenge typically stems from metaphysical and epistemological biases -- i.e.,  unargued presuppositions.  The challenge is certainly intellectually anti-Christian. It may be motivated by a false belief that the Bible is contradictory and unreliable or falsely assumes that Christians adhere to the Bible as an arbitrary authority in blind faith.  But beyond that, it presupposes an unspecified method and some coordinate standard of knowledge by which the proof (or proof of anything)  would be judged. Based on remarks of typical unbelievers, perhaps by "show" he means deductive argumentation. 

Of course, it is well known that deductive arguments only produce what is already contained in their premises.  (In other words, the conclusion is already contained in the asserted premises. That is why the conclusion is necessitated by the premises.) Or, he could mean "show" by the "scientific method" since he once intimated that only science produces "knowledge."  TAG (being a transcendental argument) is not properly an empirical (inductive) nor a deductive argument (as those are understood by the opponents of theism) and thus would seem to be disallowed by assumption and stipulation as producing knowledge of the sort acceptable to the respondent's presupposed epistemology - a biased non-neutral theory of knowledge that is antithetical to the Christian theory of knowledge and thus precludes Christianity.¹  So the correspondent's attempt to impose an assumed non-Christian methodology is illegitimate. But not all things are known by way of inductive empiricism (sense perception) or deductive syllogisms (as understood by anti-theistic philosophies).²  Perhaps he merely means (ambiguously) provide some presumably neutral "reasoning." One can fairly ask: What are the non-Christian assumptions behind this putative "neutral reasoning"?

Unbelievers merely presuppose "reason" without a ground.   For them reason is conceivably just one more brute fact in a mindless and infinite sea of other unrelated brute facts.  None of these brute facts are necessarily dependent on God, of course.  Since it presupposes that human reason and rules of logic can exist apart from God it is, de facto, an atheist theory of knowledge. Such is blatantly not a neutral stance. The question is, ipso facto, a visible display of the "myth of neutrality" (or what Greg Bahnsen has called the "pretended neutrality fallacy"). In this regard, the unbeliever's underlying epistemology is patently non-neutral -- it is an atheist epistemology. An unbeliever views himself as the self-sufficient autonomous man; a man produced out of a sea of chance, by way of materialistic evolutionary processes, yet, nonetheless, now free from that very "chance" and using an ultimate and immaterial "eternal logic" to judge what can or cannot be the case. To an agnostic, maybe some sort of "god" may exist, but such a "god" is irrelevant to their use of reason and appeal to abstract logic. Again, that stance, in effect, presupposes atheism.

We again point out that on atheist (and agnostic) metaphysical presuppositions, there is no "reason for reasoning."   Human minds, consciousness, rational autonomy, abstract immaterial concepts, truth and knowledge, in general, would not exist in the world of material monism  -- where all that exists is matter moving according to physical causality. There is no justification for the atheist's appeal to induction and assumptions of causality (uniformity of nature), and no account of deductive logic or rational volitional minds springing from matter-in-motion.  In general, there is no philosophically sound account of (merely presupposed) autonomous "reason" that comports with atheist metaphysical presuppositions. If man is produced by necessity and chance, and there is nothing that transcends the material, then how can man be autonomous? If man was created by chance and necessity, he still is controlled by chance and necessity.³ The necessity and chance of atheist monism (of all varieties) is antithetical to human autonomy. In the atheist universe all events are ultimately the result of chance and are acausal -- this is metaphysical irrationalism. In spite of these metaphysical presuppositions, the atheist attempts to build his "rational" house on an infinite sea of irrational chance. Since this ultimacy of the irrational provides no explanation or justification for either inductive reasoning or the universal validity of logic, it is futile, on their terms, to use these methods as the basis of any "explanation." Thus, on the atheist's presuppositions, not only would  "reason" not exist --  nothing would be provable and nothing would be knowable.  The conclusion is that the atheist knows nothing. Atheism resolves itself in an ultimate and irremediable skepticism. These are some of the many refutations of atheism (and, a fortiori, of agnosticism). But let us proceed.

So then, as Christian apologists, we defend the objective truth of the totality of Christian theism.  Our positive argument takes Christian theism as a complete and coherent system, a total worldview,  that is defended as a whole.  That whole is based on, and thus includes, God's revelation and Christ testified to in the historical record in the Bible.  We don't defend a theism without Christ.   We defend Christian theism. This defense includes the Biblical doctrines of the Trinity, the deity of Christ, the virgin birth, Christ's death and bodily resurrection, and Christ's atonement for sin, and the redemption of sinners.

The respondent's challenge is somewhat akin to challenging a geometer to prove the theorems of Euclidean geometry without using Euclid's axioms.⁴  That would be rather silly.   In the same way, the respondent's attempt to impose such a demand on Christians is, likewise, silly.   The challenge is based on a presupposed anti-theistic standard of truth ("epistemic authority"), a standard that is based on a viciously circular philosophy and that is not self-verifying.  It is a prejudicial, merely assumed and unproven standard, consequently, that standard is not normative.⁵  Further it is an epistemology that does not comport with the anti-theist's (whether atheist or agnostic) presupposed metaphysics.  (In fact, as has been repeatedly shown, such merely asserted epistemological claims, such as "only science yields knowledge," are self-refuting.)  At any rate, it is a truth that one cannot argue deductively from a false (inconsistent) system to a true (consistent) one, or from one system to its contrary.⁶  (This is one reason why one must argue transcendentally.)

Further, the God Who we know exists is not just a mere abstract concept ("the god of the philosophers") but the God of Christianity, the personal Triune God revealed in the Bible.  The respondent's challenge imposes an unbelieving and non self-verifying epistemological framework (his "rules of the game") to assess Christian truth.  It is an invalid invitation for Christians to step outside of our circle of authority and join him within his circle of authority. This challenge should be filed under, "Deducing Christian Theism from Atheism," right next to the file on "Squaring the Circle."  As Scripture states: "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him." (Prov 26:4).

In short, the challenge is: "I'll presuppose my worldview, but you can't presuppose yours!"  But then, as Van Til has remarked, we treat the unbeliever better than he is willing to treat us.  As Presuppositionalists, we do not impose any like demand on unbelievers.  Rather, we challenge them to explicate and show the consistency of their worldview (metaphysics, epistemology and ethics) on their presuppositions.

So then, how do we know the Triune Christian God exists?

We know that the Triune Christian God exists because of the impossibility of the contrary.   Positively, that the God of Christian theism -- revealed in the Bible and the creation --  is the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of human experience.  This is the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) in a nutshell, and we argue via transcendental critiques of the unbeliever's worldview that show their presuppositions are self-contradictory.  This is necessary because of the radical and total antithesis of the opposing worldviews.   In Christianity, every man and every fact is dependent on God.  In atheism autonomous man is independent of God and no fact is dependent on God.  So then there is no neutral ground, no neutral epistemology and certainly completely antithetical metaphysics.  (The respondent's challenge is evidence of this. The challenge rejects Christian epistemology and embraces a groundless atheist epistemology and standards of truth.)

As Christians we do not engage in special pleading for Christian theism. 

  

For the sake of argument, we allow atheists to stand on their own ground to attempt to demonstrate the internal coherence of their worldview.   Every version of atheism (whether monist or pluralist) fails, on its own presuppositions.  They are self-contradictory and therefore false.

We allow the agnostics to stand on their own ground to attempt to demonstrate the internal coherence of their worldview.  Every version of agnosticism fails on its own presuppositions.

In all of the above cases, this fair challenge to unbelievers, to present the coherence and intelligibility of their worldview on their presuppositions has never been answered.   They are all false systems.  Their answers, when examined critically, resort to question begging and special pleading.   In addition, their philosophies all result ultimately in skepticism, provide no foundation for ethics, undermine truth, and render knowledge impossible -- on their account, it is not possible for them to know anything.  It therefore devolves to the Christian apologist to question the unbelievers and to stand on the unbeliever's ground, for the sake of argument, to show the contradictions of their presuppositions.   Each instance of these internal critiques, which is argued ad seriatim, is part and parcel of TAG. This conforms to Proverbs 26:5, "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit."

As far as other non-atheistic philosophies (such as pantheism, eastern mysticism etc.) and non-Christian religions (e.g. Judaism, Islam), the apologetic procedure is methodologically the same.  Each is internally incoherent, destroys the possibility of knowledge and is self-contradictory based on its own presuppositions.  As Christian apologists, we do not impose external standards upon them; rather we critique them on their own ground.

In the end then, we present and defend the truth of Christianity as revealed in God's Word.   The God that we know exists is not an abstract "god," not a mere "god of the philosophers," but the eternal, personal God, who revealed himself in the world and in His Word.   The God who manifested himself in the flesh in the person of Jesus Christ, who died and rose again to redeem sinners.  That is the God of the Bible.  The God of the historical record preserved in the Bible.  We defend Christian theism as a whole -- a complete worldview that is non-contradictory, is consistent, and accounts for all human experience.  This conforms to Prov. 26:4, "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him."

In short, only Christian theism is consistent; nothing else is. Those who reject the Bible choose to believe the absurd in its place.

In closing, unbelievers who reject the Bible, no doubt, view themselves as "innocent truth seekers" within an ultimately random and meaningless reality.  They believe their unbelief has no moral consequences.  They are mistaken.  They are culpable in their unbelief and ignorance . Their every thought is enmity to God (Rom. 8:7). They are lost, sinful rebels in God's created universe and in need of a Savior.   Among other sins, they are earning their death every day by the sin of unbelief.

Romans 6:23 For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.  

John 3:18-19 He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.  19 And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil.

---

1 The stipulation to use an anti-Christian epistemology is to commit the fallacy of special pleading. As Bahnsen states in Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended, "There is no way to use non-Christian language and logic to arrive at Christian utterances, conclusions, and behavior.” The unbeliever needs to justify his epistemology before demanding it as the standard.  ^↩
2 For example, neither the inductive method nor the deductive method are known by way of induction or deduction. That would be a viciously circular argument (for example, one could only deductively argue for modus ponens by use of modus ponens). Thus, on the unbeliever's presuppositions, induction and deduction are just assumed by faith and cannot be said to be known. Further, the unbeliever being an "epistemological loafer" willfully ignores the ground for these in his worldview. They are taken as brute unexplained facts, and hence are not known -- this is the anti-metaphysical bias of modern "science." So, when considered in this light, the challenge to show how I know is self-defeating and impotent on the unbeliever's viewpoint (his "theory of knowledge"). It is in this regard that Van Til stated that unless God exists nothing is provable. ^↩
3 To deny this is to smuggle in a principle of "discontinuity," contrary to the atheist's faith commitment to a presumed "uniformity of nature." On the other hand, the unbeliever maintains allegiance to his "uniformity of nature" to deny Christian miracles (cf. An Atheist's Miracle). ^↩
4 In comparing Biblical Christianity to Euclidean geometry the point of contact I am making is that they are both systems of thought and that the Bible is integral and necessary to the complete system of Christian theism as are the Euclidean axioms to that complete system. I am not suggesting that the Bible is taken as a mere axiom.^↩
5 On this point it is worth paraphrasing Greg Bahnsen's challenge to the unbeliever to explicate how they know that their claimed standard is the right standard. The unbeliever has the following options: (1) He can admit that his standard of evaluation has no justification. In this case, his position is arbitrary and irrational; (2) he can argue that his standard is established by some standard outside of itself. In this case he is admitting that a new standard is more ultimate, contradicting his previously claimed "ultimate" standard. Finally, he can keep seeking a more ultimate standard. In this case he is trapped in an infinite regress with the result that his standard is unknown and unknowable, and thus futile; or (3) he can point to a truly ultimate, intelligible and self-verifying standard that explains all else, in that it is the ultimate standard beyond which no appeal can be made (as in Christianity which points to God, Hebrews 6:13). The point is that the respondent's challenge is groundless. [cf. Pushing the Antithesis, pp. 121,2] ^↩
6 In Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended, Greg Bahnsen states it this way: “There is no way to use non-Christian language and logic to arrive at Christian utterances, conclusions, and behavior.” ^↩

Presuppositionalism Resource: Download PDF files of Van Til's Writings

The website Presuppositionalism 101 provides a valuable literary trove of  PDF files of books by Van Til.

Van Til is the father of the rigorous presuppositional approach to defending Christian Theism.  His approach is thoroughly Christian and scriptural based. If you haven't read some of these due to general availability, I encourage you to take the time to do so. Reading Van Til in his own words is rewarding and profitable!
 

Humanism Made Silly by a Humanist

A few months back I came upon this humanist propaganda video. Of course, Humanism is a subjective dogma of atheists. What is funny is that it contains the refutation of Humanism within the narrative. Watch the video.



Did you catch it? In particular, note the self-defeating relativism at 1:15. The self-defeating claim is that there is no single "meaning" of human life. We all create our own, "different strokes for different folks!" Of course, this means there is no meaning. The video (presupposing an objective morality of the "decent folks") then presents a smorgasbord of benign activities that one of the "decent folks" might choose to be "happy." It is a rather self-serving selection! Cherry picking comes to mind. The reference to "drawing," in particular, evoked me to laughing ridicule.

"How can I be happy?" That's an implicit endorsement of a supposed benevolent epicureanism, hedonism, or egoism -- select a "meaning," take your pick. It's all relative. Individual happiness is the supreme goal. Individual happiness is a matter of individual tastes and a matter of personal opinion. That admission raises the following questions.

Conspicuously absent from the activities are such things as sexual promiscuity; marital infidelity; pedophilia; women murdering their unborn children for the sake of future "happiness;" Hitler Youth; Islamic terrorism and so on. All these are activities that make their practitioners happy and their lives "meaningful" according to their subjective tastes conditioned by external influences. No doubt "decent" humanists will reject some of these as acceptable practices. But they have no objective reason to reject any. In the amoral humanist universe, all "standards" are subjective and arbitrary. The video essentially admits as much.

Of course, the humanist will object to the mention of Hitler youth and terrorists (abortionists probably not), since the greatest "value" to a humanist is Humanity. But then, "Humanity" is a rather meaningless term. Its vagueness can be used as a cloak and justification for eugenics, ethnic cleansing and other activities whose goal is the "greater good" of Mankind "on the whole" according to arbitrary principles. Who is to dictate what is "best" for the "universal man," for humanity in the whole? Totalitarianism comes to mind -- the individual is expendable for the sake of "Humanity" in the whole. Of course, the benign benevolent humanism of the video (which leans to a libertarian view with potential anarchistic tendencies) conveniently ignores such philosophical problems that undermine its own foundations. It presumes an objective morality that Humanism cannot provide. To the extent that a Humanist adheres to true morals, he does so by borrowing them from the objective morality of Christian theism.

In summary, if "meaning" and happiness are subject to individual preference (shaped by influences external to the person, according to the video) then nothing is off limits according to Humanism -- including those who reject Humanism as the basis of a "meaning" of life. Humanism is a bankrupt philosophy with no foundations. The video admits as much when it says: "Humanists do not see any obvious purpose to the universe, but that it is a natural phenomenon with no design behind it." The base ingredients of Humanism -- mere chunks of the universe interacting with other chunks of the universe within a Godless and amoral evolutionary universe ruled by "chance" -- provide no ground for any of Humanism's unargued presuppositions.

The video ends with "That's Humanism!" What it shows is that Humanism is intellectually foolishness. How appropriate that it was narrated by a comedian, Stephen Fry.

The Swindle of Emergentism

The inaugural post for Scripta Scientificae pro Christiana Apologeticum is now available. You can read it here: "The Swindle of Emergentism".

Village Atheism and Magical Configurations of Matter.

A discussion on social media yielded this claim by a village atheist:

"...but when I die, just like you, I will be nothing more than space dust and all the molecules of matter..."

Such statements are wide-spread and betray the philosophical naivety and unexamined assumptions of the typical village atheist.

Do you see the incoherence of this claim of an atheist material monist? He says he "...will be nothing more." This atheist's language betrays his belief that he is currently something more than molecules.

However, on the material monist view and his assumption of the uniformity of nature he was, is and will always be nothing more than matter. To be perfectly clear, according to material monism, this atheist is at present nothing more than molecules. This is a matter of logical consistency. The atheist's faith commitment to the uniformity of nature requires this conclusion. Of course, it is true that his current configuration of molecules is different than those of a dispersed configuration of those molecules, and as such, they exhibit different properties than the dispersed molecules. This is no more puzzling than Hydrogen molecules and Oxygen molecules having different properties than water when they are combined chemically to produce H₂O. But such properties, sometimes termed "emergent," are not autonomous properties.¹ All of the properties of water are reducible to the underlying laws of matter by way of the equations of quantum mechanics. The behavior of water is determined by the underlying quantum mechanical properties of the ultimate material constituents (the quantum fields which we have discussed here). This is the case for all configurational properties of matter, they are all reducible to the underlying physics. In fact, according to material monism and the uniformity of nature they must be. This is the scientific ideal of atheistic science -- all of reality must ultimately come within the purview of physical causal laws. After all, it is called material monism, right? Reality is closed with respect to matter and its motions via physical causes. According to the myth of macro-evolution, the physical processes that produced the stars, galaxies, solar systems, planets then ultimately life, then conscious life along with the human intellect, are necessarily, by continuity, the same processes producing the present behaviors of particular molecular configurations called "man." Any "mental" properties of this particular configuration of molecules are determined by the dance of the quantum fields, not the other way around. So much for free rational thought. Ironically, these philosophies and theories are the products of self-styled atheist "free thinkers!"

This atheist, like all village atheists, maintains the mutually incoherent assumptions of human autonomy, uniformity of nature (their principle of necessity) and the ultimate chance character of reality. These are uncritically examined presuppositions of the typical unbeliever. To maintain human autonomy in the face of material monism is to believe that humans are magical configurations of matter. In a solely material universe human autonomy would not exist. Nonetheless, village atheist Richard Dawkins unabashedly believes in atheist miracles.² "Consistent" atheists like Provine, Rosenberg and Harris (as discussed here, here and here) can clearly see the logical conclusion of their faith in material monism and the uniformity of nature and thereby deny human rational autonomy -- even though it reduces their epistemology and ethics to absurdity. It follows from their presupposition that they know nothing, despite their claim to "scientific" knowledge, and they acknowledge the total amoral character of reality.

---

1 Philosopher John Searle's favorite example of emergent properties is digestion. He correctly points out that digestion is not a property of elementary particles. However, it is obvious that such an emergent biological property is not autonomous and is reducible to bio-chemistry, then to physics and quantum mechanics. To deny that would be to destroy the continuity of nature and the entire atheist reductionist "scientific" enterprise. Reductionism is a necessary corollary of material monism. And bottom-up physical causation is the only causation in town.^↩
2 Discussed here. Dawkins, by maintaining human autonomy, is apparently unaware that he has implicitly thrown out the uniformity of nature. Hence, human autonomy to Dawkins is an irrational miracle.^↩

Mind and Cosmos: Nagel's Unprincipled Principles, Part 2. Who's Afraid of Dualism?

In my previous blog, I mentioned the mysteriousness of the photon-electron interaction. It is an example of a purely physical interaction, and thus deemed to be "unproblematic" by a material monist. As we will see, this material monist view is unwarranted.

Last time we ended with this graphic.

That graph shows a purely physical interaction. It depicts a physical electron ("e") interacting with a physical photon (wavy line) -- matter interacting with matter. It would seem there are no difficulties there, right? Nothing like that mysterious mind-matter interaction "problem?" Wrong! Merely saying this is matter interacting with matter is a mere linguistic swindle of the material monist. As we have mentioned, modern material monism is attributive monism -- all of this matter "stuff" is not as similar as calling it all matter seems to imply. The many fields of quantum field theory (QFT) all have varying and differing attributes (charge, spin, mass, etc.) -- hence the term attributive monism. It's a jungle out there! The vocabulary of modern physics speaks of particle species and the particle zoo.

In the "innocent era" of pre-quantum theory, people viewed matter as all that "hard" stuff. Material interaction is no more mysterious than the collision of billiard balls -- what's so hard about that? Well, that simplistic picture which still seems to infect the thinking of the naive material monist isn't what is going on.

Even this simplistic and "common sense" view of causality was roundly criticized by Hume, who correctly noted that one could not observe such causation but only the "constant conjunction" of events.  That conditions of "such and such" were invariably followed by "such and such."

But there is more. Physics says nothing about why there is such an interaction between electrons and light or what is going on at that vertex. In fact, it doesn't even say when such an interaction takes place -- it only computes probabilities that such particle events transpire.¹ Yet, the basic interactions are mediated by something far less "solid." The basic ontology of the physical universe is the fields! And these fields are everywhere and "in contact" at every point (provided they mutually interact; more on this below.) These fields are not what one would call solid and impenetrable. Every school kid has experience with fields -- case in point, iron filings being moved about by magnetic fields! Stuff like that "spooky" magnetic field is what the physical universe is. So the universe is more spirit-like than matter-like than most believe -- more ethereal than solid.

In spite of the modern field theoretic view of the material universe, as mentioned above, proponents of material monism seem to entertain  an antiquated and superficial muddle-minded notion of material causation. This is the old atomistic and mechanistic physics where causation is something similar to the collision of billiard balls -- solid things impacting solid things and recoiling along with attendant conservation laws of energy and momentum. Causal interaction through contact.² This false perception is, no doubt, encouraged by the observations of particles -- they being viewed as tiny solid granular bodies.

Examples of such muddle-mindedness in regard to physical causation are evident in the writings of (dare I say all?) most modern atheist philosophers of mind.

In addition to Nagel, another example is Jaegwon Kim, who wrote: "For substance dualism, it is, at bottom, the extreme heterogeneity of minds and bodies that makes causal relations between them prima facie problematic." (emph. added)³ There are a lot of unwarranted assumptions and question begging in such an assertion. It certainly betrays an ignorance of modern physics. The assumption that matter itself is "homogeneous" in kind is certainly false. Matter is not homogeneous in spite of the fact that it is called matter, and it is not a pure monism in spite of being called material monism.  Contra Kim and others, matter too is extremely heterogeneous. To elaborate, I return to our figure of my prior blog. This figure is supposed to be credible to the monist. But it shows two heterogeneous types of matter interacting - a photon (a massless, neutral, spin one boson) and an electron (a massive, electrically charged, spin 1/2 fermion).

The complete (omitting only gravitation) set of fields (and associated particles) is shown in the following diagram found in the Wikipedia entry on the Standard Model. The diagram shows the particle view of a quantum field.  The blue lines show the interactions between the fields/particles.  Fields not connected by a blue line do not interact directly; they can only interact indirectly.  So in particular -- and quite amazingly -- electrons (the "e" within the lepton box) do not interact with other electrons except indirectly by an "exchange of photons."  (Note: There is no blue line that loops from the electron "e" back to itself.) So much for "like stuff" interacting with "like stuff!"   The only fields that have self interactions (other than gravity) are the fields with nonlinear free field equations. These are the gluons, Higgs boson, and weak bosons (indicated by the closed blue loops). One should note: all fields of QFT are "co-located;" they mutually exist at every space-time point (i.e. at every spatial location and for all time).⁴ Yet, amazingly, the leptonic and quark fields though everywhere co-located are oblivious of each other (note: there is no blue line between the leptons and quarks)! That is a rather embarrassing situation for the philosopher who argues for material monism. On the basis of the material monist principle, it would seem the monist should assert that all matter must interact with all other matter. The absence of direct lepton-lepton interactions (for one among others) should be a mystery to them. But such questions seem not to worry their limited epiphenomenal "minds."

[graphic from Wikipedia]

So then, the material monist can no more explain or account for material interaction (and amazingly the absence of interactions between different types of matter) among the various fields than a dualist can explain mind-body interactions. The complaint of Nagel, Kim and all material monists against dualism is superficial and is yet another example of atheist special pleading.⁵ As the saying goes, "That which is a problem for everyone is a problem for no one." So then, the monist's reason for accepting "monism" is based on a false principle that does not support their belief.

In closing, we should note that the diagram represents the "god" of the materialist. For the atheist, this immutable and eternal complex plurality of fields is a brute fact and accounts for all of reality. That is a most fantastic and incredible belief. It claims that human autonomy, rationality and morality are mere accidental configurations of these fields. It should be obvious to all not in the grips of irrational ideology that any such "emergent" properties are determined solely by the dance of these fields. Every future (probabilistic) state of the fields is determined by the current state via partial differential equations. Equations in which the only elements are quantities describing the configurations of the fields, and nothing more enters the equations. So much for human autonomy.

As Christians we know that this intricately plural and elegant unified structure of material reality is designed by God. The material creation does not account for all of reality -- it in no way accounts for the souls, spirits and minds, human rational autonomy, abstract entities and morality. These are things for which no material monist has supplied anything close to intelligible accounts. As detailed here, Nagel's attempt is superficial and fails utterly. In fact, the so called underpinnings of the material monist principles are found to be wanting philosophically and scientifically (engaging in unanalyzed question begging and special pleading).

---

1 For example, quantum transition amplitudes typically involve integrals in which the time of the interaction is taken to be any time from the remote past to the remote future. Usually the integration over time is specified using the mathematical fiction of negative infinity to positive infinity.^↩
2 Newtonian gravity and early electromagnetic theories first introduced the rather scandalous concept of unmediated action at a distance. That concept slowly gave way to the concept of physical fields and the first steps towards modern physics. See the Wikipedia entry action at a distance.^↩
3 Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, Westview 1998, p.133.^↩
4 This feature of the fields is contrary to the old concept of matter as having the property of impenetrability or that which cannot occupy the same space at the same time. In modern physics, the closest property to this idea is the Pauli exclusion principle which only applies to like fermions. Even in this case two electrons can be in the same location as long as their other properties differ (such as one being "spin up" and the other "spin down." From the Wikipedia entry: "This effect is partly responsible for the everyday observation in the macroscopic world that two solid objects cannot be in the same place at the same time." ^↩
5 It is special pleading since material interactions are also mysterious. So the rejection of dualism because it is mysterious applies equally to materialism. The supposed foundation of the entire material monist philosophy is built on a fallacy.^↩

Reasoning by Presupposition: The Bahnsen-Smith Debate

I was perusing the apologetic blogs a few months back when I came across a comment by an atheist who claimed Christians never refer to the Bahnsen-Smith debate (although that interchange was more a moderated conversation than a debate). Well, that claim is not true. To rebut that claim, here is a link to the audio of that debate. A transcript of the audio can be found here. Another post of the dialog can be found here. This dialog is well worth studying to understand Bahnsen's use of the presuppositional apologetic. Apparently, that atheist thought Smith bested Bahnsen in that encounter. Incredible! Such an opinion, as we will see below, betrays superficiality and an unstudied philosophic naivete. Smith,and a caller-in named Max, clearly had no clue as to what hit them. Bahnsen's irenic answers rebutted all of Smith's claims.

One particular point, that has prompted the title of this article, was when Max charged that Bahnsen merely presupposed God.  Of course, it is not the case that we merely do so (as if, the presupposition of Christianity is a fideistic and unargued assumption). Bahnsen's reply that atheists presuppose atheism was priceless.  This is a perennial blind spot of atheists -- they think they are devoid of presuppositions and are staunch advocates of non-circular reasoning. Nothing could be further from the truth.  Atheists, in fact, argue presupposing atheism (consequently, this atheist's charge against Christians commits the fallacy of special pleading, sometimes called "the double standard fallacy"). However, the fact that both sides have presuppositions does not reduce the debate to a stand off. Not all presuppositions are "created equal." The problem for the atheists is that they have a multitude of unintelligible contradictory assumptions and viciously circular arguments, none of which are mutually coherent, and none which they can make good. This fact renders the atheist's presupposition(s) false and destroys his pretense to knowledge of any sort. This fact is evident in the many debates of presuppositionalists with atheists. Some atheists will even admit (on the basis of their assumptions, of course!) there is no certain knowledge or express doubt that knowledge is possible (not realizing the inherent self contradiction in such claims -- since they must know something in order for their language to intelligibly express their doubt. To put it ironically: "Why should anyone listen to someone who believes he doesn't know what he's saying?") On the other hand, the Christian presupposition is intelligible and provides the necessary grounds for knowledge and for the intelligibility of all of human experience. So again, there is no "stand off."

Here are a few more of the high points in the dialog:

• Max claimed reason is "natural!"  Another priceless moment.  Bahnsen pressed the point that abstract entities are not natural.¹  All Max said by way of "rebuttal" was a repeated "Oh boy!"  Bahnsen challenged atheists to live according to their presuppositions -- something they never do.
• Smith assimilated physical causation and logical laws (logical "law of identity" for instance).  Bahnsen succinctly pointed out that such is a major philosophical error.²  For starters, matter does not move according to abstract laws of rational thought (logic) -- matter obeys inviolable physical laws based on the properties of matter. The material universe is completely oblivious to abstract laws of logic. Laws of logic are standards of rational thought -- laws that can be violated by flawed reasoning.  As we have mentioned repeatedly, laws of logic presuppose minds with rational freedom (independent of material causation) and mental causal efficacy -- something totally antithetical to a universe composed solely of matter moving according to chance and causally inviolable physical laws. (In the materialist universe the only causality is, de facto, physical.) To put it another way, laws of logic are necessary and non-contingent; on the other hand, the physical world is contingent and the laws of physics are not necessary. (If they were, empirical science and experiment would be unnecessary.) This is usually stated succinctly by the phrase "logic says nothing about the contingent world." We should also point out that physicists can construct a multitude of consistent theoretical models of the material universe with existing and hypothetical entities, differing mathematical structures, different causal interactions, different values of fundamental constants, and so on. All of which show that the actual physical reality in which we live is not necessitated by logic. To summarize, logic and physics are categorially distinct. Contra Smith, logic cannot be reduced to physics.
• Smith trotted out the tired and fallacious "Euthyphro dilemma" to counter Christian moral claims.  Bahnsen succinctly rebuffed Smith by pointing out that Christian moral claims are rooted in the character of God Himself.  In Christian theism, God is ne plus ultra³. There is no "super-reality" above God; no laws above God.⁴  

In summary, Bahnsen  began the dialog by engaging Smith on the three fundamental areas of philosophy: (1) What exists? What is real? What are the constituents of reality? (Metaphysics/ontology); (2) How does one know what one knows? (Epistemology) and (3) How should we lead our lives? (Ethics).  Beyond Smith's philosophical naivete and reasoning errors, Smith, like all atheists, did not even begin to provide intelligible answers, based on his godless reality, in any of these areas. Smith's materialist atheism is: (1) metaphysical irrationalism (espousing the ultimate chance nature of reality); (2) provides no self-attesting theory of knowledge (rendering knowledge impossible, and thereby, Smith has no ground from which to criticize anyhthing); and (3) provides no basis for the existence of absolute morality or ethical truth (morality is not a property of material systems).  All through the debate, Smith argued in vicious circles and merely assumed the existence of human rational freedom (which is incompatible with the assumption of material monism), logic, moral laws, abstractions, conceptual reasoning -- all of which inexplicably spring out of chance and physical (material) causation (or, alternatively as in platonistic pluralism, are an incoherent plurality of independent and ultimate brute entities suspended in the "void").  As Bahnsen pointed out, all of these are problems in Smith's atheist universe, but not for Christianity. (In fact, Smith is assuming facts that are borrowed from Christian theism.) Smith's atheist presuppositions thus have been shown to be incoherent and self-contradictory on the atheist's own ground, while the Christian presupposition and Christianity is vindicated.  

Postscript

During the call-in section, Smith responded to a question regarding the Bible. Smith responded, "Well, I mean there are some decent things in the Bible, sure. There are some elegantly expressed moral maxims, that sort of thing." (emph. added.) Bahnsen, probably due to lack of time, didn't respond to this but the reply to this sort of remark is: "On what standard does Smith rely to determine morals?" Would he claim that standard is absolute and knowable? On Smith's view the moral statements of Christ would be no more authoritative than those of any other; merely subjective opinion and non-absolute. The fact that Smith likes some of them is not a basis for absolute morality. Some people like Coke, others Pepsi. Smith, like all unbelievers, is his own ultimate, and arbitrary, standard.

---

1 Abstract entities, such as the laws of logic, are immaterial and not extended in space. As, such they are not empirically accessible; they are not natural objects perceived by the senses. For example, the law of deduction called "modus ponens" cannot be seen with the eyes. The question of the reality of abstract entities (especially universal and invariant concepts such as mathematics and logic) and conceptual knowledge lies at the root of the well known failures of rationalism, on the one hand, and empiricism, on the other, to provide a foundation for human knowledge. Both schools ended in skepticism regarding human knowledge. One should also consider that the modern phrase "logical empirical method" merely linguistically conjoins the two philosophical schools and thereby glosses the problems of both without solution, yet admits the distinction between the abstract and the natural. Stated in other terms, this dichotomy is also the distinction of deduction (necessary truths of reason) versus induction (contingent truths derived from generalizations of particular sense data). Bahnsen's point is that the atheist "universe" provides no intelligible account for either reason (human rational autonomy and conscious thought independent of material causation, existence and reality of universal laws of logic, etc.) or empirical knowledge/induction (given the atheist's commitment to ultimate chance and the irrational nature of the universe as embodied in quantum mechanics). On the atheist view, there is no bridging of the gap between the immaterial transcendent and unchanging truths of, say, logic or arithmetic, and the immanent and ever changing world of material flux. The problem that the atheist has with providing a justification of induction is well known -- it is a principle that cannot be deduced nor inductively derived (which is vicious circular reasoning and question begging). On the other hand, the transcendent God of Christian theism provides the intelligible answer to both deduction/reason (man is created in the image of God, the ultimate rational being and the source of man's reason -- behind the mind of man is the mind of the eternal God) and induction (God has created and faithfully sustains the cosmos ("...in Christ all things consist." Colossians 1:16-7). Further the existence of universal abstract entities, in that they are the contents of thought, are not eternal self-existent things existing in a mind-independent platonic world of ideas, but rather, the thoughts of the eternal God. They are real; and man, as the rational image of God, is to "think God's thoughts after Him," as Van Til has said. ^↩
2 Smith fallaciously used the example of the "Law of Identity" as "support" for his claim. Rather than the law of identity, one might think that the material conditional of logic ("if P then Q") would provide a more plausible support. However, it is generally known that the material conditional does not represent the concept of causality. See, for example, Paradoxes of Material Implication (in particular, see the example of switches in a series circuit in the section on "Simplification"), Material Conditional; and Causality (section titled, "Causality contrasted with conditionals"). Incredibly, Rudolph Carnap (a logical positivist) makes the philosophical error of representing causal laws via the material conditional in chapters 1 and 20 of An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. ^↩
3 Latin, literally,"no more beyond." ^↩
4 Amazingly, Michael Martin also fatuously uses a version of the "Euthyphro dilemma" in his flawed TANG ("Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God").  The Euthyphro dilemma presupposes a mythological platonic reality of ultimate abstract moral laws to which all the "gods" and man are equally subject (and of which laws they somehow have knowledge) -- as such, it is contrary to the claim of Christian theism that God is ultimate.  Thus Martin's counter does not apply -- it is a straw man. It is a logical fallacy of the most egregious type to assume the truth of "not A" to refute "A." TANG as a refutation of TAG is an utter failure. TANG is not even analogous to TAG. To be analogous, TANG would need to show: (1) that the Christian conception of God is contradictory and (2) that atheism (whether materialist or platonic pluralism) provides the necessary and coherent conditions for all of human experience -- including intelligible accounts of possibility of knowledge and existence of moral absolutes.  This, of course, is something that neither Martin nor millennia of failed atheist philosophy and science has done.  In short,  TANG is not a transcendental argument and Michael Martin does not understand transcendental argumentation (at least, he fails to understand TAG).  ^↩

Mind & Cosmos: Nagel's Unprincipled Principles

Having finally read Nagel's Mind and Cosmos -- previously discussed briefly here -- I had planned to write a more thorough and complete analysis of it. Other more important duties have precluded that goal. So instead, I plan to write a few shorter articles covering various problems in Nagel's philosophy. Here, belatedly, is my first installment of the promised analysis.

---

Nagel's motivation for his philosophy of neutral monism is that material monism provides no basis for key characteristics of human experience, such as mind and consciousness. With this correct assessment, Christian theists will agree -- although we extend the list of features to include invariant abstract objects (such as mathematics and logic) and absolute moral laws. (Nagel's version of neutral monism¹ provides no metaphysical foundation for these either.)

Nagel rejects, therefore, materialism but he equally rejects theism. He wants to invent a "middle ground;" though he doesn't get near a putative "middle." Instead, what he posits is just a new version of attributive monism in which all "matter" (with its many usual physical attributes such as mass, charge, spin and so on) is also endowed with mental attributes. This is just as reductionistic as old-fashioned monism. It's a monism differing in degree, not kind.

Nagel asserts that dualism is not a serious option since it posits an inscrutable and a mysterious (at least more so to "naturalists") interaction between mind and body. To this end, then, Nagel resorts to postulating that all material of the cosmos has a property of mind attached. Every piece of stuff in the cosmos is intrinsically "mental" in some sense, in addition to being material.

This theory is tantamount to adding (in physicist terminology) a "psychic" quantum number to every quantum field. Of course such a psychic interaction has never been observed in particle-scattering experiments. Also, Nagel doesn't touch the issue of the quantity of psychic stuff attached to all matter. To be compatible with quantum field theory, there is a multitude of technical and mathematical issues that Nagel doesn't even begin to address. I won't delve into this in anymore detail at this point, but that alone deprives Nagel's theory of any shred of scientific credibility. Nagel, by mere verbal wishful thinking, expands on his "solution." Nagel postulates that though each particle is not conscious, one can hope to produce conscious brains by assembling enough of this psychically endowed stuff in sufficiently complex arrangements. A major defect of this theory is that the "mind" so produced is a composite of psychically endowed fields, and as such, still subject to bottom-up causation. All of the properties and "twitching" of this composite brain are the result of the interactions of the basic fields/particles. Such a mind is still physically determined. Thus, human rational freedom still does not exist. Such a theory is thereby a contradiction of most atheists' assumption of human autonomy. One can easily write the form of the equation that such a brain, and consequently the attached "mind," must satisfy. One does not need to know the exact details of the functional dependence of this composite mind on its constituents to draw the conclusion that such a brain is causally closed with respect to the underlying matter. Such an "emergent" mind is to the brain as pressure is to molecular motion - and, thus, has no causal autonomy. Case closed.

These, in brief, are some of the problems with Nagel's philosophy, but in a following blog I will look at the contradictory nature of Nagel's superficial rejection of dualism and proposing neutral monism. Nagel's principle, mentioned above, is that dualism is too mysterious and "unexplained" and that monism (and in particular his neutral monism that purports to explain "mind" and mental interactions) is not mysterious. But is it? Hardly. For a hint at what is coming, some might want to ask the question regarding the graphics below: "What exactly is going on at this electron-photon interaction?" (The straight red line is an electron of charge "e" and the black wavy line is an emitted (or absorbed) photon. The diagram represents the fundamental interaction of electrons and light.)

Continue to part 2.

---

1 Neutral monism asserts that the ultimate constituents of reality are neither material (as in material monism) nor mental (as in idealism) but a neutral third kind of "stuff." For more details see Neutral Monism at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ^↩

Companion Blog

I'm starting a new blog, Scripta Scientificae pro Christiana Apologeticum, where I'll occasionally post technical writings on the physics and mathematics that bear on presuppositional Christian Apologetics. First off, I'll be giving a more technical discussion on Lawrence Krauss' schlock philosophy and physics which I discussed in Heideggerian Nonsense Redux. For those with a scientific background and mathematical skills, stay tuned.

More on TAG

A correspondent has asked, "Is 'logic' a premise of TAG (The Transcendental Argument for God)?"¹

This question underscores the typical unbeliever's inability to grasp the issues in the debate between totally antithetical worldviews. It also suggests a general unfamiliarity with transcendental argumentation -- as it construes TAG as a deductive argument, and it seems to lapse into a standard "deductivist" view of proof, so prevalent among many unbelievers.

First, TAG is not formally a deductive argument. Deductive arguments necessarily presuppose logic. Without logic, deductive arguments could not even get off the ground. So, the answer is, no, logic per se is not a premise of TAG.² In the presuppositional defense of Christianity, we do not presuppose a merely abstract and autonomous logic, nor do we posit it as a premise of a deductive argument leading to a conclusion of a God of indeterminate character or an abstract "God of the philosophers."

Second, when it comes to the issues of the existence of logic, abstract objects, and conceptual reasoning, in general, the point of TAG is that the godless reality of atheism, on the basis of its own metaphysical presuppositions, cannot account for their existence. For instance, the existence of logic and material monism are contradictory. Laws of matter and the ultimacy of chance do not produce mentally free, conscious beings who are capable of abstract thought. Materialism cannot account for the existence of immaterial abstract entities of any type (be it logic, mathematics, or moral laws).³ The existence of logic, then, is a problem, and failure, of the atheist worldview. As I have written before, atheists cannot give a "reason for reason." As such, atheists have no metaphysical ground for their presupposition of logic. Atheists, being "epistemological loafers" as Van Til put it, will not acknowledge this. Even in the face of continued prodding, they continue to use a merely assumed autonomous logic and reason, that is, just "take it for granted." But that is question begging and an intellectually empty response. Yet, on the other hand, they will assert that man and his mind was produced by (and thereby, still ruled by) ultimately random material processes. Atheism -- by asserting the autonomy of man (and thereby, the ultimacy of the human mind) along with the ultimately chance nature of temporal facts -- is self-contradictory. Atheism provides no grounds for any of its beliefs (articles of faith, as it were); it can only be adhered to by a willful intellectual blindness.

The positive presupposition of TAG is the existence of the Triune God of Christianity who has revealed Himself in the Bible, in nature, and within man himself. God is the metaphysical ground from which all human experience is intelligible. Logic (and other abstract objects) is not a problem for the Christian theist. Behind man's reasoning is the mind of God.

To reiterate the point: logic is a problem for atheists and agnostics; it is no problem for the Christian theist.

In response to the correspondent's question, I pointed out the following as an example of presuppositions: The laws of logic are laws of rational thought; as such logic presupposes a thinking mind. In Christian theism, that ultimate mind is the mind of the eternal and personal God. Though this may be wrongly interpreted as if it were a deductive argument, it is not. It is an illustration of a presupposition that underlies and is the metaphysical ground of human logic.

The correspondent responded with the question, "Why can't that mind be mine?" Indeed, that is the question for him to answer based on a presumed godless reality! Many questions come to mind. For example, where or from what did his mind originate? Did immaterial minds irrationally spring forth de novo from matter in motion (If indeed there be minds as opposed to mere physically determined material brains)? Was there a first mind? Or, is there an infinite past of finite individual minds begetting new minds, (coming into being at birth, then vanishing into nothingness at death)? Is his mind ultimate? If not, what produced his mind? Is his mind free from physical determination (i.e., does he have rational freedom and volition)? How many unrelated (material and perhaps non-material) causal principles does the unbeliever invent to account for the existence of minds? Are those causal properties, along with matter and minds, of which they are properties, eternal, uncreated, ultimate constituents of reality?  In addition, for a materialist the question is (a) how all the biochemistry going on in every human skull (different processes in different locations) gives rise to objective non-material abstractions, such as logic, or, if not a materialist, (b) from whence all these contingent minds emerged equipped with innate and invariant logic. Those are just a few problems for starters.

Again, the question remains for atheists and agnostics to answer on the foundation of their metaphysical presuppositions. Answers that millennia of atheist philosophies have failed to supply.

I've already given the Christian answer: Mind is not his alone. The ultimate mind is the mind of the eternal God of Christian theism.

---

1 The historical connection of logic to TAG stems from Greg Bahnsen's use of the presuppositional apologetic in his debate with atheist Gordon Stein where Stein couldn't support the existence of, or use and reliability of, logic on the basis of his materialism. This was a defining moment for public awareness of presuppositionalism. In a way, it is a bit unfortunate that the debate paved the way for some, including Christians, to think that the existence of logic is the only or main element of TAG (thereby focusing attention mainly on logic in conjunction with TAG). But such is not the case. TAGs challenge to unbelief is that it cannot make sense (on its own presuppositions) of any fact of human experience. Thus, one can start with logic, or language, or mathematics or moral laws (among others) to expose the unbeliever's internal contradictions and refute the unbeliever's worldview or total view of reality. ^↩

2 What is at issue in the debate between Christians and unbelievers is not merely "logic," but the conception of logic that each participant in the debate holds. Logical reasoning is necessary -- for both parties -- in the encounter of belief with unbelief. When we reason with unbelievers we, of course, employ our God-given capacity for logical thinking. The unbeliever will likewise employ logic in the debate while all along denying God. However, the unbeliever typically does not question his capacity to reason, nor ask what is the metaphysical ground of the human ability to think and reason according to abstract laws of logic. The "logic" to which the unbeliever appeals (and which is his ultimate authority) is an autonomous "logic" that exists in a void. So an appeal to a common conception of "logic" is illusory. The totally antithetical conceptions of logic (among a host of other things) are at the core of the debate. Van Til addresses this issue:

"It appears then that if there is to be any intelligible encounter between the Christian and the non-Christian, it must be in terms of the two mutually exclusive visions that each entertains. To appeal to the law of contradiction and/or to facts or to a combination of these apart from the relation that these sustain to the totality-vision of either, the believer or the unbeliever, is to beat the air. It is well to say that he who would reason must presuppose the validity of the laws of logic. But if we say nothing more basic than this, then we are still beating the air. The ultimate question deals with the foundation of the validity of the laws of logic. We have not reached bottom until we have seen that every logical activity in which any man engages is in the service of his totality-vision." (Emph. added) Cornelius Van Til, The Case for Calvinism. The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Philadelphia, 1964. (Quoted from The Works of Cornelius Van Til, Logos Digital Edition).

As to the question of logic in the debate between totally antithetical worldviews Bahnsen writes:

"The antithesis (in principle) between the philosophical systems of unbelievers and the philosophical system of believers is so broad and basic that it even affects the way they deal with central philosophical notions like logic, possibility, and objectivity (to mention but a few). This observation should not be misunderstood. The presuppositionalist does not say that Christians and non-Christians inevitably accept and operate with completely different, specific laws of logic in their practical exercises of reasoning. Yet they do clearly disagree with each other concerning the nature, source, and authority of the laws of logic. Both worldviews may endorse and utilize the disjunctive syllogism or De Morgan's theorems, but when we inquire into what they are talking about, the evidence that is appropriate or persuasive for their claims (about syllogisms, theorems, etc.), or the necessity of the truths about logic, we get radically different answers -- which almost always betray differing convictions regarding metaphysics." (Greg Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis, The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Philadelphia, 1998. p. 280)^↩

3 It is true that there are some atheists who are not material monists -- but they are few and far between. There are idealistic monists (mind is the fundamental stuff of reality) and there are others usually referred to as "pluralists" who believe in a plurality of co-ultimate things (Roger Penrose, for example). But, in the case of the pluralists, merely asserting the existence of minds and a plurality of immaterial "platonic" entities with no coherent unity among them is question begging and provides no intelligible ground for human knowledge. In addition to being no answer to the problem of the one and the many, no atheist has given the account of what bridges the gap between the particulars of the atheist's material world with its basic chance characteristics and their eternal unchanging realm of universal "platonic" entities. As mentioned above, the existence of human minds in this worldview is also a major problem -- especially on the macro evolutionary account that human minds are no more than material brains assembled by (and thereby still controlled by) random physical processes. The dual atheist principles of human autonomy and the ultimacy of chance are contradictory.

The many problems of a platonistic conception of reality are well known, which explains why few advocate it, and won't be dealt with here. As to the idealists, which were more in vogue during Van Til's time, Van Til's writings, in particular A Survey of Christian Epistemology, provide a wealth of information on the internal contradictions of the idealists. ^↩