Basics of Presuppositionalism. What is a Presupposition, exactly?

One of the most voiced criticisms of presuppositionalism is that it "assumes what it is trying to prove." In other words, some say, it is a "circular" argument. These seem to stem from the mistaken belief that a presupposition is something that is merely assumed, either a non-proveable assumption, or something akin to an axiom. 

Let's take each of these starting with the "assumption" claim.  

First, presuppositions are not taken to be synonymous with "merely assumed."  As used in presuppositionalism -- as Greg Bahnsen emphasized -- presuppositions are the basic, non-negotiable claims of a worldview. Also, a presupposition is a necessary belief to account for a "state of affairs."  Neither of these carry the notion of "unprovable assumptions."   In fact the characterization as a "necessary belief" carries with it the idea that such a presupposition is necessary because of the impossibility of the contrary, i.e. to deny it proves it by leading to self-contradiction.  That is the essence of proof used in TAG (the "transcendental argument for God").

We note that the charge of circularity used by opponents is a case of special pleading on their part.  They argue as if their worldview is not guilty of the "sin" of circularity.  Yet their argumentation is circular in the most vicious sort of way.  The most glaring example is the belief in the existence of an unproved disembodied universal abstract logic existing someplace in a materialist cosmos (or just as incoherent a platonic "heaven").  As Bahnsen pointed out it is unprovable on the basis of their presuppositions, citing the example: "How could one prove 'modus ponens' without using 'modus ponens'?"  One can't.  In other words, one has "modus ponens" because of "modus ponens"  -- one can't get more tightly circular than that.

To elaborate, here is a more immediate example from linguistics that illustrates the use of presuppositions in the presuppositional approach of Van Til: "Have you stopped beating your wife?" That question presupposes that the person did in fact engage in wife beating. That is the necessary presupposition that renders the question meaningful. This does not mean the presupposition is true or false. Also, note in this case the presupposition is not of the unprovable variety. In fact, the truth of the presupposition is potentially testable by empirical investigation. 

Above I mentioned that some treat a presupposition as an axiom. Unfortunately, that view was espoused by Gordon H. Clark in his version of presuppositionalism.  I agree with Van Til and Greg Bahnsen that Gordon H. Clark's version of presuppositionalism is fatally flawed¹.  His defense of Christian theism had to ultimately rest on the "axiom of Scripture." This essentially reduced Clark's system to fideism. As Bahnsen summarized: "Clark ultimately left Christianity without a rational defense."²      Clark's system leaned heavily to rationalism and deductive proofs when it came to the positive defense of Christianity. He was vehemently opposed to empirical evidence -- deeming it not a path to any knowledge. So much so that he claimed that science has no cognitive content regarding nature.  Only deductivism provided knowledge. These faults are serious, and actually are self destructive of Clark's system.³   One should be aware of the difference between Van Til's and Clark's  versions of presuppositionalism and not confuse the two.

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1 See Chapter 8.5, p.662 in "Van Til's Apologetic" by Greg Bahnsen for the critiques of Gordon H. Clark.^↩
2 p.672 in "Van Til's Apologetic" by Greg Bahnsen.^↩
3  N.B. Clark's writings are not devoid of value. His history of philosophy "Thales to Dewey" is an excellent text that thoroughly dismantles atheistic thought as being contradictory in all of its historical systems.^↩ 

The Impossible Hour Glass (and other impossibilities)

Though a critic of presuppositional apologetics (for very wrong reasons discussed here), Christian apologist William Lane Craig has recognized the power of transcendental arguments.  Craig has been employing the Kalam cosmological argument for a number of years, which can be formulated transcendentally, thus: the physical impossibility of an infinite physical past implies a non-physical, supernatural transcendent cause of time.  In Christian Theism the cause is the eternal and personal Triune God who created the universe.

A weakness of Craig's approach is that he allows the argument to get sidetracked on what are irrelevant discussions of abstract mathematical time (with all sorts of atheist Platonistic presuppositions), when the issue only concerns physical time. 

These issues are discussed in the book, Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology,  a debate between Craig and atheist Quentin Smith.  Quentin Smith’s rejoinder to Craig was to appeal to mathematical concepts – in fact, amazingly, he essentially asserts Cantorian set theory is somehow normative of physical time.

Arguing for infinite physical time using abstract mental mathematical constructions is a non sequitur.  What man can imagine has no probative force on reality – particularly physical reality.  So then, since for a material monist, physical “stuff”  is the only thing that exists, formulating the argument in terms of physical time is all that is required.  After all, physical time is part of the “real stuff” out of which all else must emerge.  The fact that human brains can conceive of Cantorian set theory has no more relevance to the discussion than the concept of unicorns has to equine biology.  J.P. Moreland is close to what I am to present with the following physical gedanken experiment ("thought experiment").     Please, concentrate as you read and put on your "thinking caps" for this "thought experiment."

Consider an ordinary hourglass.  Being a physical instrument, this is a direct correspondent to physical time.       

Consider the grains of sand as physical events.  The  throat of the hour glass is the present instant of time or "now."   The sand in the throat, of course, is measuring the transpiring events -- the events being "actualized."  The sand in the bottom and top chambers is, respectively, past and future events.  All of the sand in the bottom represents actualized events.  The sand in the top represents the events to come but not yet actualized.

Of course any humanly constructed hourglass has finite sand.  But now, consider an hourglass with an infinite top globe.   The sand in the top being the yet future events.  There will always be future events (if one wants to object and make the top finite, i.e., physical time exhaustible, then the argument is already conceded).  There will never be an instant when all of the sand has passed through the throat, and this is due to the fact that future events are never totally actualized.

The sand in the bottom of the glass, of course, is the collection of actualized events.  Which brings us to the point.

Now let us suppose that there is an infinite amount of sand in the bottom.  The sand then represents an infinite sequence of actualized events.  And this is the situation that atheists, such as Smith, claim is both possible and what is actually the case, based on abstract mathematics.  But this is physically impossible for the following reason.

If we would flip the hourglass, we still have an hourglass with infinite sand in the top and bottom – only that the past has been interchanged with the future.  And just as the future before the flip was inexhaustible, so then the past that is now at the top will be inexhaustible -- all of the sand granules will never make it to the bottom.  They will never be re-actualized.  Yet those who assert the existence of an  infinite physical past, such as Smith, et al., claim that the past sand did in fact pass through the throat -- that they had been actualized.  This is impossible by the symmetry of the case.  The un-actualized and inexhaustible infinite future physical time precludes the existence of an actualized and exhausted infinite physical past.  So then, just as infinite future physical time is not exhaustible and cannot be totally actualized , a past infinite actualized physical time is likewise impossible.  This argument is based solely on pure physical principles, and thus physicalism itself is incompatible with the eternity of past physical time that the atheist asserts.  This completes the reductio ad absurdum. The past eternity of physical time and a material universe is impossible, and once again we see the self-refuting presuppositions of atheist physical materialism.

Addendum.  Perhaps another argument will appeal more to fans of science fiction. That is to recast the argument into a time travel thought experiment. (The attentive reader has probably already noted that the argument above, in which past and future were flipped, is already a type of  “time travel.” )         

For the time travel argument, suppose we have constructed a physical time machine (in a physicalist’s purely material universe, what other kind can there be?  No Platonic mathematics allowed!)  We can use our machine to travel forward or backward in time.  We get in and press “forward!”  As in H.G. Wells' classic “The Time Machine” we watch the future of the universe unfold in fast forward. We accelerate – faster and faster.  But no matter how fast we travel, we never exhaust the future.  Now we decide to go backward in time.  Again, we press “reverse” and accelerate faster and faster.  Still, even as we accelerate faster and faster, just as we would never experience all of the events of the future, we will never reach all of the events of the supposed infinite past.  Yet, we are a physical temporal process actualizing or experiencing events in reverse order at a rate exceedingly surpassing the actual rate at which they were supposedly first actualized.  This is contradictory. The supposed physically actualized infinite temporal past of the atheist is impossible.  An eternal physical universe in physical time is impossible.  The source of natural time thus requires a supernatural Creator who transcends physical time.  The Creator must be volitional to choose to create the physical temporal universe and thereby He is personal. Only a personal eternal creator can be the source of physical time.

Postscript.

At the risk of multiplying examples, as a nod to the Academy Award-winning photography in George Pal's 1961 "The Time Machine," I'll add the the "Impossible Motion Picture Camera." 

For this example, imagine a motion picture camera that is recording some small patch of the universe.  The camera records all events that have been actualized in that patch of the universe -- by construction this an infinite sequence of physically actualized events.  However, if we play the purported film in reverse, even at arbitrarily large reverse speeds,  2x, 4x, 32x . . ., we can never re-actualize the recorded supposedly actualized events.  Again reaching a reductio ad absurdum.  Thus, the purported camera and the infinite physical past do not exist.   The conclusion is the same.  An infinite physical past is impossible.  Only a personal transcendent eternal Creator can be the source of physical time.

P.S. By the way, there is no such thing as a time machine!

Philosophical Houses of Glass

As the saying goes, "People living in circular philosophies should not toss circular objections" -- or something like that.

A frequent charge against Presuppositional Apologetics is that it is a circular argument -- it presupposes Christian theism in order to prove Christian theism. 

This objection comes from atheists -- who live in an irrational and circular philosophy -- but, amazingly, also comes from Christians. 

This objection has been put forward by "Classical" Christian apologist Professor William Lane Craig.  Craig writes in Five Views on Apologetics (p. 232-3):

"As commonly understood, Presuppositionalism is guilty of a logical howler: it commits the informal fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, for it advocates presupposing the truth of Christian theism in order to prove Christian theism…A Christian theist himself will deny that question-begging arguments prove anything…But at the heart of presuppositionalism lies an argument, often not clearly understood or articulated, which is very powerful. This is an epistemological transcendental argument…"

C.L. Bolt, on Choosing Hats has posted an analysis of William Lane Craig's objections to presuppositionalism (quoted above) in his post, William Lane Craig's Inconsistent Objections to Presuppositional Argument.  In summary, C.L. Bolt points out the glaring inconsistency of Craig's objection: Craig claims on one hand that TAG has never been "spelled out" adequately but then asserts that TAG is circular ("guilty of a logical howler"). 

To add to the perplexity, in Craig's criticism above, he pays a somewhat begrudging compliment to presuppositionalism, viz.

"But at the heart of presuppositionalism lies an argument, often not clearly understood or articulated, which is very powerful. This is an epistemological transcendental argument…"

So then, apparently TAG has been spelled out sufficiently for Craig to recognize the power of TAG.  If TAG is powerful, then one wonders how it is committing a "logical howler!"  Craig cannot have his cake and eat it too, as another famous saying goes.

But there is a deeper hidden inconsistency in Craig's objections. When Craig says presuppositionalism is guilty of a "logical howler" we should ask, "To what logic is he appealing?"  If he is presupposing logic as constituted in man by God, then he is presupposing Christian theism and is guilty of the same "logical howler."  If he is not, then he is presupposing "neutral" logic --  in that case Craig is presupposing atheist logic, contrary to his Christian profession  --   either way Craig's assertion is incoherent.   Of course, we know this because presuppositionalism, contra Craig's "classical" apologetic, is consistently Christian.  On the other hand, Craig's "classical" apologetic is blatantly anti-theistic.  As Van Til repeatedly illustrated in his writings, Craig's apologetic adopts the unbeliever's standards of objectivity and the unbeliever's commitment to his autonomous reasoning as the ultimate authority.  So then, Craig is not only arguing in a vicious circle, he is arguing from within the unbeliever's viciously circular presuppositions. 

Bahnsen has addressed this false charge of circular argument repeatedly.  Let me conclude with Greg Bahnsen's, succinct analysis from Pushing the Antithesis (p.123-5).  Here is a corrected quote (omitted text is enclosed in brackets):

"Before moving to our next response against the anti-metaphysical bias, you should be aware of a possible response that the unbeliever will bring against you.  He will complain that you are engaging in circular reasoning or the informal logical fallacy of begging the question.  That is, since we assert that God is self-verifying, we are assuming God in order to prove God.  However, we should note in response to this objection:
  (1)  We are not engaged in special pleading for the Christian worldview.  We are simply asking which system makes human experience intelligible.  For sake of argument, we will grant the unbeliever his system with whatever foundations he adopts in order to see if it can justify its truth claims.  But then he will have to grant us ours (for sake of argument) to see if we can justify our truth claims.  By the very nature of our God as the self-existing, eternal Creator, our worldview self-justifies its starting point.  (We will later explain this two-step procedure of worldview critique.)
(2) All systems must ultimately involve some circularity in reasoning.  For instance, when you argue for the legitimacy of the laws of logic, you must employ the laws of logic.  How else can you justify laws of logic?  This is a transcendental issue, an issue that lies outside of the temporal, changing realm of sense experience.  Laws of logic do not change: they are universal, invariant, abstract principles.
(3) "Circularity" in one's philosophical system is just another name for 'consistency' in outlook throughout one's system.  That is, one's starting point and final conclusion cohere with each other.  Here it is more fully explained:

The "circularity" of a transcendental argument is not at all the same as the fallacious 'circularity' of an argument in which the conclusion is a restatement (in one form or another) of one of its premises.  Rather, it is the circularity involved in a coherent theory (where all the parts are consistent with or assume each other) and which is required when one reasons about a precondition for reasoning.  [Because autonomous philosophy does not provide the preconditions for rationality or reasoning,] its "circles" are destructive of human thought--i.e. "vicious" and futile endeavors.

(4) The unbeliever has no defensible standard whereby he can judge the Christian position.  His argument either ends up in infinite regress (making it impossible to prove), has no justification (rendering it subjective), or engages in an unjustifiable same-plane circularity (causing it to be fallacious).  Without a self-verifying standard, he has no epistemological way out.  And only the Christian worldview has such a self-verifying standard.

Remarks on Transcendental Arguments

Choosing Hats posted a link to a new web site discussing transcendental argument (TAs).  That posting, which can be found here, has prompted me to add my proverbial 2 cents to the discussion.

In reflecting on TAG (Transcendental Argument for God) and its use over the years, I have come to realize that many are unable to recognize a transcendental argument.  There are probably several reasons for this, but one reason may be that most people who have exposure to logic are reared on the classic syllogistic form. TAs are not properly syllogistic and thus cannot be written as such.  (Though syllogistic schema have been employed.)
 
Transcendental arguments have a self-reflective property.  Typically, they consist of statements for which the speaker is under pain of self contradiction when uttered.  Some perennial examples are the so-called liar's paradox: "I always lie."  That statement, if true, would necessarily be false, and so it must be false.  The person speaking such is a liar -- just not a constant one!  Another example, pronounced a few months ago by my favorite agnostic, is: "There are no answers to Big Questions." That statement is an answer to a "Big Question," and thus self-refuting.   Finally, Descartes' dictum, "I think, therefore I am" is, in my mind, more forceful when stated transcendentally as,"I don't exist" --  a blatant self-contradiction.

The above TAs I will call "first-order" transcendental arguments, since they consist of statements that are directly self-referencing and self-refuting.   This type of argument is sometimes called "retortion."   TAs were recognized as destructing the very foundations of Logical Positivism which scoffed at "metaphysical" inquiry (one should raise an eyebrow immediately) and tried to base its epistemology (without metaphysics!) on the premise that all truth is either empirical or logically derived (i.e., tautology).   All else was metaphysical nonsense. The problem, of course, is that the foundational premise of Logical Positivism is neither a tautology nor an empirical truth.  Thus, Logical Positivism is metaphysical nonsense of the very sort they decried.  

Let's consider TAG.  In a nutshell, TAG is the statement that "There is no God" is self-refuting.  This is not direct retortion since it is not directly self-refuting, but the unbeliever carries a host of beliefs that would only be true in the Christian worldview, and thus when he utters "there is no God," he should abandon any of his beliefs that are only true in Christianity.  Some examples of those beliefs would be morality, the invariant laws of logic, justice, human independence from physical determination, and so on.  The list is long.  The unbeliever's worldview is ontologically, epistemological and ethically self-contradictory.  Since the unbeliever holds to contradictory thought, his worldview is irrational.

The fact that the unbeliever adheres to belief in the concepts mentioned above is another aspect of transcendental arguments: the idea of the stolen concept.

The unbeliever rails against God using beliefs -- such as morality -- that would not exist in the atheist world.  The claim that Christianity holds to beliefs that are immoral is an old line of attack, and one which Bertrand Russell attempted in "Why I Am Not a Christian."   It is a fallacious and self-defeating argument which also has been continued by some of the "new atheists," such as Christopher Hitchens, who attempt to use the concept of "evil" to deny God.  These arguments fail because "evil" would not even exist in an atheistic world, for there would be no such thing (!). As Bahnsen pointed out against Russell's "Why I Am Not a Christian" (and which holds equally against Hitchens et al.):

     "On what basis, then, could Russell issue his moral evaluations and judgments? In terms of what view of reality and knowledge did he assume that there was anything like an objective criterion of morality by which to find Christ, Christians, and the church lacking? 

       Russell was embarrassingly arbitrary in this regard. He just took it for granted, as an unargued philosophical bias, that there was a moral standard to apply, and that he could presume to be the spokesman and judge who applies it." [Always Ready, p.156]

In fact, I recently corresponded with an agnostic who railed against God because he thought it seemed "unjust" that God would send a "good" atheist to hell.  His example was an atheist who did all sorts of "good" but only failed to believe in Christ.  That example is, of course, a specious argument since it conveniently ignores the issue of the evil acts of the hypothetical perfect atheist.  But regardless of that glaring oversight, the question that must be pressed is where does an agnostic's idea or standard of absolute "good," "evil" and "justice" come from?  There simply is no such thing in the atheistic world -- they are "stolen" concepts (or as Van Til said, "the borrowed capital of Christian theism") and thus that argument fails!

Then we have the case of Prof. William Provine, a material monist, who thinks he is "rationally" asserting that there is no human free will. Provine, as I previously pointed out, is consistent with his material monism when he reasons that human beings -- being no more than physical systems propelled by inviolable physical forces --  cannot be autonomous.  Yet, rationality presupposes freedom to be guided by violable laws of logic.   We have the picture of irrational physical forces compelling  "free" and "rational" actions -- actions that Provine has claimed are not possible!  Thus, Provine is self-refuting by way of a TA.  

I recently discovered that Epicurus stated the original transcendental refutation of Provine many years ago. Epicurus stated that one cannot rationally deny free will, since rationality (i.e., adherence to laws of logic) presupposes free will.  The argument as stated on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( link) is:

"Transcendental arguments can be characterized as demonstrations that the skeptic’s articulation of her own position is self-defeating in some way. These arguments imply that the skeptic cannot even coherently articulate a given position. Epicurus is reported to have argued that, without free choice, one assents to propositions only because one is determined to do so. Without free choice, then, it would be impossible to rationally assent to any proposition—that is, to assent to it because one has good reasons to think it is true, rather than because one must. The proposition that one has no free choice is thus self-stultifying, in that, if true, it cannot be warranted. This reasoning implies the following argument:

    (1) I am able to rationally assent to the proposition that there is no free choice.
    (2) I could not rationally assent to any proposition if there were no free choice.
    (3) Hence, there is free choice."

"That which cannot be true, must be false," and that is exactly what atheism is!  It asserts an impossibility.  It is a world that fails ontologically, ethically, and epistemologically. It is a world without rationality, ethics, or human freedom, yet the atheist presupposes such must be.  And since atheism is impossible, then agnosticism, too, is untenable.  The agnostic should immediately abandon his skepticism regarding God, since the skeptical agnostic essentially asserts that God's existence is unknowable and, thereby, it is possible that there is no God.  We might wonder just what metaphysical law of "possibility" exists that would demand such! If the only possibilities are dictated by the physics of material monism, then one has a most baldly vicious circular argument.

We also have the skeptic.  The global skeptic claims "nothing is knowable," and as shown above, he has been summarily defeated by a first-order transcendental argument. "I don't know anything" is refuted by the unintelligibility of the utterance.  So, what we really have is the relentless unbeliever who doubts everything except the power of his autonomous reason from which he launches his skeptical attacks.  He ought to wonder why his own reason is immune (!), and if he will admit that it is not, he ought to wonder why he busies himself with his skeptical arguments against Christian theism, all the while acting as if "his" reason is the ultimate authority!  In the last case, we see another person who should shut his mouth.  The fact that he does not is a testimony to foolish pride of the agnostic's heart and his reliance on his supposed self-sufficient autonomy.

In summary, all unbelievers have a prideful, irrational adherence to the power of their own autonomy and their autonomous reason. But such autonomous rationality would not exist in a reality wherein all acts are no more than the compelled effects of ultimate irrational quantum mechanical chance events. According to the atheist, man himself is nothing more than a manifestation of that ultimate irrationality and, thereby, the metaphysical equivalent of "sock puppets."

An Atheist's Miracle

The miraculous is the suspension or violation of natural laws.    For Christians,  miracles are the result of the supernatural agency of God.  It should go without saying that atheists of the material monist variety -- for which all that exists are material systems obeying natural laws -- deny miracles.  Prominent examples are Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and the recently discussed William Provine.

Here, we want to examine the atheism of Richard Dawkins.   Dawkins describes himself as a "dyed-in-the-wool monist."  A monist believes there are no "minds," just physical brains, and much like a computer, there are "brain states."  Man, being a purely physical system, must always be subject to purely natural laws.  The brain, too, is a physical system, controlled by the underlying natural laws -- thought being a mere passive epiphenomenon, with no causal agency.   It is a theorem of this worldview then, that man, as such,  cannot be free from natural laws, and, thus, there can be no human freedom.   William Provine can see this easily (as he has said), and -- as an almost-consistent naturalist --  asserts the absence of "free will." To deny this conclusion is to accept a supernatural suspension of natural law -- a miracle -- which Provine, consistent with his unadulterated material monism, rejects.

Which brings us to Richard Dawkins, who says:

"I am very comfortable with the idea that we can override biology with free will. Indeed, I encourage people all the time to do it."  (Counterbalance Foundation Interview) 

What we have here is an unabashed atheist miracle.  After millennia of being subject to physical causation, a physical system called "man" evolved by natural law and then spontaneously broke the shackles of natural law, violated the natural laws, thereby becoming henceforth "free."   Man's brain also became "free" to employ abstract (non-physical) logical principles and to reason.  This is an absurd and irrational miracle.   Dawkins can override biology at will and encourage others to do so, too.   Quite a miracle -- a physical system violating physical laws every second of every day.

Christian miracles are intelligible since God, the rational Being who created and upholds natural law, can intercede according to His will.  Likewise, Christians as dualists (man has both a material body and an immaterial soul), deny man is causally determined by physics.  So then, belief in Christian miracles is rational. . .Dawkins' belief in his atheist miracle of "free will" is irrational.

Richard Dawkins describes Christians as "dyed-in-the-wool-faith-heads" who are "immune to argument." He could not be more wrong -- Dawkins the self-styled "dyed-in-the-wool monist " with a belief that a natural system called man can override biology (which is just physics, after all)  is the one immune to reason.  Dawkins' faith in his atheist creed makes him a "dyed-in-the-wool-faith-head."  He will accept an irrational atheist "miracle," but deny the rational Christian miracles.

And to think Dawkins subtitled his website "...Reason and Science,  A Clear-Thinking Oasis."  Contrary to that slogan, Richard Dawkins is a most muddle-minded irrational "scientist," and that is saying a lot.