Myth of Neutrality and a Prejudicial Challenge.

A reader responded to my previous blog on Anti-theism and challenged me to show how I know that God exists without relying on the Bible.  It has been stated many times that such a proof is provided by the negative portion ("God exists because of the impossibility of the contrary") of the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG).  However, we have mentioned that, as Christians, we defend Christianity as a whole; not a truncated metaphysical theism (or Deism).  The God referred to in TAG is the Triune God of Christianity -- not a merely generic deity.

But first, we need to consider the nature of the unbeliever's challenge.

Such a challenge typically stems from metaphysical and epistemological biases -- i.e.,  unargued presuppositions.  The challenge is certainly intellectually anti-Christian. It may be motivated by a false belief that the Bible is contradictory and unreliable or falsely assumes that Christians adhere to the Bible as an arbitrary authority in blind faith.  But beyond that, it presupposes an unspecified method and some coordinate standard of knowledge by which the proof (or proof of anything)  would be judged. Based on remarks of typical unbelievers, perhaps by "show" he means deductive argumentation. 

Of course, it is well known that deductive arguments only produce what is already contained in their premises.  (In other words, the conclusion is already contained in the asserted premises. That is why the conclusion is necessitated by the premises.) Or, he could mean "show" by the "scientific method" since he once intimated that only science produces "knowledge."  TAG (being a transcendental argument) is not properly an empirical (inductive) nor a deductive argument (as those are understood by the opponents of theism) and thus would seem to be disallowed by assumption and stipulation as producing knowledge of the sort acceptable to the respondent's presupposed epistemology - a biased non-neutral theory of knowledge that is antithetical to the Christian theory of knowledge and thus precludes Christianity.¹  So the correspondent's attempt to impose an assumed non-Christian methodology is illegitimate. But not all things are known by way of inductive empiricism (sense perception) or deductive syllogisms (as understood by anti-theistic philosophies).²  Perhaps he merely means (ambiguously) provide some presumably neutral "reasoning." One can fairly ask: What are the non-Christian assumptions behind this putative "neutral reasoning"?

Unbelievers merely presuppose "reason" without a ground.   For them reason is conceivably just one more brute fact in a mindless and infinite sea of other unrelated brute facts.  None of these brute facts are necessarily dependent on God, of course.  Since it presupposes that human reason and rules of logic can exist apart from God it is, de facto, an atheist theory of knowledge. Such is blatantly not a neutral stance. The question is, ipso facto, a visible display of the "myth of neutrality" (or what Greg Bahnsen has called the "pretended neutrality fallacy"). In this regard, the unbeliever's underlying epistemology is patently non-neutral -- it is an atheist epistemology. An unbeliever views himself as the self-sufficient autonomous man; a man produced out of a sea of chance, by way of materialistic evolutionary processes, yet, nonetheless, now free from that very "chance" and using an ultimate and immaterial "eternal logic" to judge what can or cannot be the case. To an agnostic, maybe some sort of "god" may exist, but such a "god" is irrelevant to their use of reason and appeal to abstract logic. Again, that stance, in effect, presupposes atheism.

We again point out that on atheist (and agnostic) metaphysical presuppositions, there is no "reason for reasoning."   Human minds, consciousness, rational autonomy, abstract immaterial concepts, truth and knowledge, in general, would not exist in the world of material monism  -- where all that exists is matter moving according to physical causality. There is no justification for the atheist's appeal to induction and assumptions of causality (uniformity of nature), and no account of deductive logic or rational volitional minds springing from matter-in-motion.  In general, there is no philosophically sound account of (merely presupposed) autonomous "reason" that comports with atheist metaphysical presuppositions. If man is produced by necessity and chance, and there is nothing that transcends the material, then how can man be autonomous? If man was created by chance and necessity, he still is controlled by chance and necessity.³ The necessity and chance of atheist monism (of all varieties) is antithetical to human autonomy. In the atheist universe all events are ultimately the result of chance and are acausal -- this is metaphysical irrationalism. In spite of these metaphysical presuppositions, the atheist attempts to build his "rational" house on an infinite sea of irrational chance. Since this ultimacy of the irrational provides no explanation or justification for either inductive reasoning or the universal validity of logic, it is futile, on their terms, to use these methods as the basis of any "explanation." Thus, on the atheist's presuppositions, not only would  "reason" not exist --  nothing would be provable and nothing would be knowable.  The conclusion is that the atheist knows nothing. Atheism resolves itself in an ultimate and irremediable skepticism. These are some of the many refutations of atheism (and, a fortiori, of agnosticism). But let us proceed.

So then, as Christian apologists, we defend the objective truth of the totality of Christian theism.  Our positive argument takes Christian theism as a complete and coherent system, a total worldview,  that is defended as a whole.  That whole is based on, and thus includes, God's revelation and Christ testified to in the historical record in the Bible.  We don't defend a theism without Christ.   We defend Christian theism. This defense includes the Biblical doctrines of the Trinity, the deity of Christ, the virgin birth, Christ's death and bodily resurrection, and Christ's atonement for sin, and the redemption of sinners.

The respondent's challenge is somewhat akin to challenging a geometer to prove the theorems of Euclidean geometry without using Euclid's axioms.⁴  That would be rather silly.   In the same way, the respondent's attempt to impose such a demand on Christians is, likewise, silly.   The challenge is based on a presupposed anti-theistic standard of truth ("epistemic authority"), a standard that is based on a viciously circular philosophy and that is not self-verifying.  It is a prejudicial, merely assumed and unproven standard, consequently, that standard is not normative.⁵  Further it is an epistemology that does not comport with the anti-theist's (whether atheist or agnostic) presupposed metaphysics.  (In fact, as has been repeatedly shown, such merely asserted epistemological claims, such as "only science yields knowledge," are self-refuting.)  At any rate, it is a truth that one cannot argue deductively from a false (inconsistent) system to a true (consistent) one, or from one system to its contrary.⁶  (This is one reason why one must argue transcendentally.)

Further, the God Who we know exists is not just a mere abstract concept ("the god of the philosophers") but the God of Christianity, the personal Triune God revealed in the Bible.  The respondent's challenge imposes an unbelieving and non self-verifying epistemological framework (his "rules of the game") to assess Christian truth.  It is an invalid invitation for Christians to step outside of our circle of authority and join him within his circle of authority. This challenge should be filed under, "Deducing Christian Theism from Atheism," right next to the file on "Squaring the Circle."  As Scripture states: "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him." (Prov 26:4).

In short, the challenge is: "I'll presuppose my worldview, but you can't presuppose yours!"  But then, as Van Til has remarked, we treat the unbeliever better than he is willing to treat us.  As Presuppositionalists, we do not impose any like demand on unbelievers.  Rather, we challenge them to explicate and show the consistency of their worldview (metaphysics, epistemology and ethics) on their presuppositions.

So then, how do we know the Triune Christian God exists?

We know that the Triune Christian God exists because of the impossibility of the contrary.   Positively, that the God of Christian theism -- revealed in the Bible and the creation --  is the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of human experience.  This is the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) in a nutshell, and we argue via transcendental critiques of the unbeliever's worldview that show their presuppositions are self-contradictory.  This is necessary because of the radical and total antithesis of the opposing worldviews.   In Christianity, every man and every fact is dependent on God.  In atheism autonomous man is independent of God and no fact is dependent on God.  So then there is no neutral ground, no neutral epistemology and certainly completely antithetical metaphysics.  (The respondent's challenge is evidence of this. The challenge rejects Christian epistemology and embraces a groundless atheist epistemology and standards of truth.)

As Christians we do not engage in special pleading for Christian theism. 

  

For the sake of argument, we allow atheists to stand on their own ground to attempt to demonstrate the internal coherence of their worldview.   Every version of atheism (whether monist or pluralist) fails, on its own presuppositions.  They are self-contradictory and therefore false.

We allow the agnostics to stand on their own ground to attempt to demonstrate the internal coherence of their worldview.  Every version of agnosticism fails on its own presuppositions.

In all of the above cases, this fair challenge to unbelievers, to present the coherence and intelligibility of their worldview on their presuppositions has never been answered.   They are all false systems.  Their answers, when examined critically, resort to question begging and special pleading.   In addition, their philosophies all result ultimately in skepticism, provide no foundation for ethics, undermine truth, and render knowledge impossible -- on their account, it is not possible for them to know anything.  It therefore devolves to the Christian apologist to question the unbelievers and to stand on the unbeliever's ground, for the sake of argument, to show the contradictions of their presuppositions.   Each instance of these internal critiques, which is argued ad seriatim, is part and parcel of TAG. This conforms to Proverbs 26:5, "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit."

As far as other non-atheistic philosophies (such as pantheism, eastern mysticism etc.) and non-Christian religions (e.g. Judaism, Islam), the apologetic procedure is methodologically the same.  Each is internally incoherent, destroys the possibility of knowledge and is self-contradictory based on its own presuppositions.  As Christian apologists, we do not impose external standards upon them; rather we critique them on their own ground.

In the end then, we present and defend the truth of Christianity as revealed in God's Word.   The God that we know exists is not an abstract "god," not a mere "god of the philosophers," but the eternal, personal God, who revealed himself in the world and in His Word.   The God who manifested himself in the flesh in the person of Jesus Christ, who died and rose again to redeem sinners.  That is the God of the Bible.  The God of the historical record preserved in the Bible.  We defend Christian theism as a whole -- a complete worldview that is non-contradictory, is consistent, and accounts for all human experience.  This conforms to Prov. 26:4, "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him."

In short, only Christian theism is consistent; nothing else is. Those who reject the Bible choose to believe the absurd in its place.

In closing, unbelievers who reject the Bible, no doubt, view themselves as "innocent truth seekers" within an ultimately random and meaningless reality.  They believe their unbelief has no moral consequences.  They are mistaken.  They are culpable in their unbelief and ignorance . Their every thought is enmity to God (Rom. 8:7). They are lost, sinful rebels in God's created universe and in need of a Savior.   Among other sins, they are earning their death every day by the sin of unbelief.

Romans 6:23 For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.  

John 3:18-19 He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.  19 And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil.

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1 The stipulation to use an anti-Christian epistemology is to commit the fallacy of special pleading. As Bahnsen states in Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended, "There is no way to use non-Christian language and logic to arrive at Christian utterances, conclusions, and behavior.” The unbeliever needs to justify his epistemology before demanding it as the standard.  ^↩
2 For example, neither the inductive method nor the deductive method are known by way of induction or deduction. That would be a viciously circular argument (for example, one could only deductively argue for modus ponens by use of modus ponens). Thus, on the unbeliever's presuppositions, induction and deduction are just assumed by faith and cannot be said to be known. Further, the unbeliever being an "epistemological loafer" willfully ignores the ground for these in his worldview. They are taken as brute unexplained facts, and hence are not known -- this is the anti-metaphysical bias of modern "science." So, when considered in this light, the challenge to show how I know is self-defeating and impotent on the unbeliever's viewpoint (his "theory of knowledge"). It is in this regard that Van Til stated that unless God exists nothing is provable. ^↩
3 To deny this is to smuggle in a principle of "discontinuity," contrary to the atheist's faith commitment to a presumed "uniformity of nature." On the other hand, the unbeliever maintains allegiance to his "uniformity of nature" to deny Christian miracles (cf. An Atheist's Miracle). ^↩
4 In comparing Biblical Christianity to Euclidean geometry the point of contact I am making is that they are both systems of thought and that the Bible is integral and necessary to the complete system of Christian theism as are the Euclidean axioms to that complete system. I am not suggesting that the Bible is taken as a mere axiom.^↩
5 On this point it is worth paraphrasing Greg Bahnsen's challenge to the unbeliever to explicate how they know that their claimed standard is the right standard. The unbeliever has the following options: (1) He can admit that his standard of evaluation has no justification. In this case, his position is arbitrary and irrational; (2) he can argue that his standard is established by some standard outside of itself. In this case he is admitting that a new standard is more ultimate, contradicting his previously claimed "ultimate" standard. Finally, he can keep seeking a more ultimate standard. In this case he is trapped in an infinite regress with the result that his standard is unknown and unknowable, and thus futile; or (3) he can point to a truly ultimate, intelligible and self-verifying standard that explains all else, in that it is the ultimate standard beyond which no appeal can be made (as in Christianity which points to God, Hebrews 6:13). The point is that the respondent's challenge is groundless. [cf. Pushing the Antithesis, pp. 121,2] ^↩
6 In Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended, Greg Bahnsen states it this way: “There is no way to use non-Christian language and logic to arrive at Christian utterances, conclusions, and behavior.” ^↩

Reasoning by Presupposition: The Bahnsen-Smith Debate

I was perusing the apologetic blogs a few months back when I came across a comment by an atheist who claimed Christians never refer to the Bahnsen-Smith debate (although that interchange was more a moderated conversation than a debate). Well, that claim is not true. To rebut that claim, here is a link to the audio of that debate. A transcript of the audio can be found here. Another post of the dialog can be found here. This dialog is well worth studying to understand Bahnsen's use of the presuppositional apologetic. Apparently, that atheist thought Smith bested Bahnsen in that encounter. Incredible! Such an opinion, as we will see below, betrays superficiality and an unstudied philosophic naivete. Smith,and a caller-in named Max, clearly had no clue as to what hit them. Bahnsen's irenic answers rebutted all of Smith's claims.

One particular point, that has prompted the title of this article, was when Max charged that Bahnsen merely presupposed God.  Of course, it is not the case that we merely do so (as if, the presupposition of Christianity is a fideistic and unargued assumption). Bahnsen's reply that atheists presuppose atheism was priceless.  This is a perennial blind spot of atheists -- they think they are devoid of presuppositions and are staunch advocates of non-circular reasoning. Nothing could be further from the truth.  Atheists, in fact, argue presupposing atheism (consequently, this atheist's charge against Christians commits the fallacy of special pleading, sometimes called "the double standard fallacy"). However, the fact that both sides have presuppositions does not reduce the debate to a stand off. Not all presuppositions are "created equal." The problem for the atheists is that they have a multitude of unintelligible contradictory assumptions and viciously circular arguments, none of which are mutually coherent, and none which they can make good. This fact renders the atheist's presupposition(s) false and destroys his pretense to knowledge of any sort. This fact is evident in the many debates of presuppositionalists with atheists. Some atheists will even admit (on the basis of their assumptions, of course!) there is no certain knowledge or express doubt that knowledge is possible (not realizing the inherent self contradiction in such claims -- since they must know something in order for their language to intelligibly express their doubt. To put it ironically: "Why should anyone listen to someone who believes he doesn't know what he's saying?") On the other hand, the Christian presupposition is intelligible and provides the necessary grounds for knowledge and for the intelligibility of all of human experience. So again, there is no "stand off."

Here are a few more of the high points in the dialog:

• Max claimed reason is "natural!"  Another priceless moment.  Bahnsen pressed the point that abstract entities are not natural.¹  All Max said by way of "rebuttal" was a repeated "Oh boy!"  Bahnsen challenged atheists to live according to their presuppositions -- something they never do.
• Smith assimilated physical causation and logical laws (logical "law of identity" for instance).  Bahnsen succinctly pointed out that such is a major philosophical error.²  For starters, matter does not move according to abstract laws of rational thought (logic) -- matter obeys inviolable physical laws based on the properties of matter. The material universe is completely oblivious to abstract laws of logic. Laws of logic are standards of rational thought -- laws that can be violated by flawed reasoning.  As we have mentioned repeatedly, laws of logic presuppose minds with rational freedom (independent of material causation) and mental causal efficacy -- something totally antithetical to a universe composed solely of matter moving according to chance and causally inviolable physical laws. (In the materialist universe the only causality is, de facto, physical.) To put it another way, laws of logic are necessary and non-contingent; on the other hand, the physical world is contingent and the laws of physics are not necessary. (If they were, empirical science and experiment would be unnecessary.) This is usually stated succinctly by the phrase "logic says nothing about the contingent world." We should also point out that physicists can construct a multitude of consistent theoretical models of the material universe with existing and hypothetical entities, differing mathematical structures, different causal interactions, different values of fundamental constants, and so on. All of which show that the actual physical reality in which we live is not necessitated by logic. To summarize, logic and physics are categorially distinct. Contra Smith, logic cannot be reduced to physics.
• Smith trotted out the tired and fallacious "Euthyphro dilemma" to counter Christian moral claims.  Bahnsen succinctly rebuffed Smith by pointing out that Christian moral claims are rooted in the character of God Himself.  In Christian theism, God is ne plus ultra³. There is no "super-reality" above God; no laws above God.⁴  

In summary, Bahnsen  began the dialog by engaging Smith on the three fundamental areas of philosophy: (1) What exists? What is real? What are the constituents of reality? (Metaphysics/ontology); (2) How does one know what one knows? (Epistemology) and (3) How should we lead our lives? (Ethics).  Beyond Smith's philosophical naivete and reasoning errors, Smith, like all atheists, did not even begin to provide intelligible answers, based on his godless reality, in any of these areas. Smith's materialist atheism is: (1) metaphysical irrationalism (espousing the ultimate chance nature of reality); (2) provides no self-attesting theory of knowledge (rendering knowledge impossible, and thereby, Smith has no ground from which to criticize anyhthing); and (3) provides no basis for the existence of absolute morality or ethical truth (morality is not a property of material systems).  All through the debate, Smith argued in vicious circles and merely assumed the existence of human rational freedom (which is incompatible with the assumption of material monism), logic, moral laws, abstractions, conceptual reasoning -- all of which inexplicably spring out of chance and physical (material) causation (or, alternatively as in platonistic pluralism, are an incoherent plurality of independent and ultimate brute entities suspended in the "void").  As Bahnsen pointed out, all of these are problems in Smith's atheist universe, but not for Christianity. (In fact, Smith is assuming facts that are borrowed from Christian theism.) Smith's atheist presuppositions thus have been shown to be incoherent and self-contradictory on the atheist's own ground, while the Christian presupposition and Christianity is vindicated.  

Postscript

During the call-in section, Smith responded to a question regarding the Bible. Smith responded, "Well, I mean there are some decent things in the Bible, sure. There are some elegantly expressed moral maxims, that sort of thing." (emph. added.) Bahnsen, probably due to lack of time, didn't respond to this but the reply to this sort of remark is: "On what standard does Smith rely to determine morals?" Would he claim that standard is absolute and knowable? On Smith's view the moral statements of Christ would be no more authoritative than those of any other; merely subjective opinion and non-absolute. The fact that Smith likes some of them is not a basis for absolute morality. Some people like Coke, others Pepsi. Smith, like all unbelievers, is his own ultimate, and arbitrary, standard.

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1 Abstract entities, such as the laws of logic, are immaterial and not extended in space. As, such they are not empirically accessible; they are not natural objects perceived by the senses. For example, the law of deduction called "modus ponens" cannot be seen with the eyes. The question of the reality of abstract entities (especially universal and invariant concepts such as mathematics and logic) and conceptual knowledge lies at the root of the well known failures of rationalism, on the one hand, and empiricism, on the other, to provide a foundation for human knowledge. Both schools ended in skepticism regarding human knowledge. One should also consider that the modern phrase "logical empirical method" merely linguistically conjoins the two philosophical schools and thereby glosses the problems of both without solution, yet admits the distinction between the abstract and the natural. Stated in other terms, this dichotomy is also the distinction of deduction (necessary truths of reason) versus induction (contingent truths derived from generalizations of particular sense data). Bahnsen's point is that the atheist "universe" provides no intelligible account for either reason (human rational autonomy and conscious thought independent of material causation, existence and reality of universal laws of logic, etc.) or empirical knowledge/induction (given the atheist's commitment to ultimate chance and the irrational nature of the universe as embodied in quantum mechanics). On the atheist view, there is no bridging of the gap between the immaterial transcendent and unchanging truths of, say, logic or arithmetic, and the immanent and ever changing world of material flux. The problem that the atheist has with providing a justification of induction is well known -- it is a principle that cannot be deduced nor inductively derived (which is vicious circular reasoning and question begging). On the other hand, the transcendent God of Christian theism provides the intelligible answer to both deduction/reason (man is created in the image of God, the ultimate rational being and the source of man's reason -- behind the mind of man is the mind of the eternal God) and induction (God has created and faithfully sustains the cosmos ("...in Christ all things consist." Colossians 1:16-7). Further the existence of universal abstract entities, in that they are the contents of thought, are not eternal self-existent things existing in a mind-independent platonic world of ideas, but rather, the thoughts of the eternal God. They are real; and man, as the rational image of God, is to "think God's thoughts after Him," as Van Til has said. ^↩
2 Smith fallaciously used the example of the "Law of Identity" as "support" for his claim. Rather than the law of identity, one might think that the material conditional of logic ("if P then Q") would provide a more plausible support. However, it is generally known that the material conditional does not represent the concept of causality. See, for example, Paradoxes of Material Implication (in particular, see the example of switches in a series circuit in the section on "Simplification"), Material Conditional; and Causality (section titled, "Causality contrasted with conditionals"). Incredibly, Rudolph Carnap (a logical positivist) makes the philosophical error of representing causal laws via the material conditional in chapters 1 and 20 of An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. ^↩
3 Latin, literally,"no more beyond." ^↩
4 Amazingly, Michael Martin also fatuously uses a version of the "Euthyphro dilemma" in his flawed TANG ("Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God").  The Euthyphro dilemma presupposes a mythological platonic reality of ultimate abstract moral laws to which all the "gods" and man are equally subject (and of which laws they somehow have knowledge) -- as such, it is contrary to the claim of Christian theism that God is ultimate.  Thus Martin's counter does not apply -- it is a straw man. It is a logical fallacy of the most egregious type to assume the truth of "not A" to refute "A." TANG as a refutation of TAG is an utter failure. TANG is not even analogous to TAG. To be analogous, TANG would need to show: (1) that the Christian conception of God is contradictory and (2) that atheism (whether materialist or platonic pluralism) provides the necessary and coherent conditions for all of human experience -- including intelligible accounts of possibility of knowledge and existence of moral absolutes.  This, of course, is something that neither Martin nor millennia of failed atheist philosophy and science has done.  In short,  TANG is not a transcendental argument and Michael Martin does not understand transcendental argumentation (at least, he fails to understand TAG).  ^↩

More on TAG

A correspondent has asked, "Is 'logic' a premise of TAG (The Transcendental Argument for God)?"¹

This question underscores the typical unbeliever's inability to grasp the issues in the debate between totally antithetical worldviews. It also suggests a general unfamiliarity with transcendental argumentation -- as it construes TAG as a deductive argument, and it seems to lapse into a standard "deductivist" view of proof, so prevalent among many unbelievers.

First, TAG is not formally a deductive argument. Deductive arguments necessarily presuppose logic. Without logic, deductive arguments could not even get off the ground. So, the answer is, no, logic per se is not a premise of TAG.² In the presuppositional defense of Christianity, we do not presuppose a merely abstract and autonomous logic, nor do we posit it as a premise of a deductive argument leading to a conclusion of a God of indeterminate character or an abstract "God of the philosophers."

Second, when it comes to the issues of the existence of logic, abstract objects, and conceptual reasoning, in general, the point of TAG is that the godless reality of atheism, on the basis of its own metaphysical presuppositions, cannot account for their existence. For instance, the existence of logic and material monism are contradictory. Laws of matter and the ultimacy of chance do not produce mentally free, conscious beings who are capable of abstract thought. Materialism cannot account for the existence of immaterial abstract entities of any type (be it logic, mathematics, or moral laws).³ The existence of logic, then, is a problem, and failure, of the atheist worldview. As I have written before, atheists cannot give a "reason for reason." As such, atheists have no metaphysical ground for their presupposition of logic. Atheists, being "epistemological loafers" as Van Til put it, will not acknowledge this. Even in the face of continued prodding, they continue to use a merely assumed autonomous logic and reason, that is, just "take it for granted." But that is question begging and an intellectually empty response. Yet, on the other hand, they will assert that man and his mind was produced by (and thereby, still ruled by) ultimately random material processes. Atheism -- by asserting the autonomy of man (and thereby, the ultimacy of the human mind) along with the ultimately chance nature of temporal facts -- is self-contradictory. Atheism provides no grounds for any of its beliefs (articles of faith, as it were); it can only be adhered to by a willful intellectual blindness.

The positive presupposition of TAG is the existence of the Triune God of Christianity who has revealed Himself in the Bible, in nature, and within man himself. God is the metaphysical ground from which all human experience is intelligible. Logic (and other abstract objects) is not a problem for the Christian theist. Behind man's reasoning is the mind of God.

To reiterate the point: logic is a problem for atheists and agnostics; it is no problem for the Christian theist.

In response to the correspondent's question, I pointed out the following as an example of presuppositions: The laws of logic are laws of rational thought; as such logic presupposes a thinking mind. In Christian theism, that ultimate mind is the mind of the eternal and personal God. Though this may be wrongly interpreted as if it were a deductive argument, it is not. It is an illustration of a presupposition that underlies and is the metaphysical ground of human logic.

The correspondent responded with the question, "Why can't that mind be mine?" Indeed, that is the question for him to answer based on a presumed godless reality! Many questions come to mind. For example, where or from what did his mind originate? Did immaterial minds irrationally spring forth de novo from matter in motion (If indeed there be minds as opposed to mere physically determined material brains)? Was there a first mind? Or, is there an infinite past of finite individual minds begetting new minds, (coming into being at birth, then vanishing into nothingness at death)? Is his mind ultimate? If not, what produced his mind? Is his mind free from physical determination (i.e., does he have rational freedom and volition)? How many unrelated (material and perhaps non-material) causal principles does the unbeliever invent to account for the existence of minds? Are those causal properties, along with matter and minds, of which they are properties, eternal, uncreated, ultimate constituents of reality?  In addition, for a materialist the question is (a) how all the biochemistry going on in every human skull (different processes in different locations) gives rise to objective non-material abstractions, such as logic, or, if not a materialist, (b) from whence all these contingent minds emerged equipped with innate and invariant logic. Those are just a few problems for starters.

Again, the question remains for atheists and agnostics to answer on the foundation of their metaphysical presuppositions. Answers that millennia of atheist philosophies have failed to supply.

I've already given the Christian answer: Mind is not his alone. The ultimate mind is the mind of the eternal God of Christian theism.

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1 The historical connection of logic to TAG stems from Greg Bahnsen's use of the presuppositional apologetic in his debate with atheist Gordon Stein where Stein couldn't support the existence of, or use and reliability of, logic on the basis of his materialism. This was a defining moment for public awareness of presuppositionalism. In a way, it is a bit unfortunate that the debate paved the way for some, including Christians, to think that the existence of logic is the only or main element of TAG (thereby focusing attention mainly on logic in conjunction with TAG). But such is not the case. TAGs challenge to unbelief is that it cannot make sense (on its own presuppositions) of any fact of human experience. Thus, one can start with logic, or language, or mathematics or moral laws (among others) to expose the unbeliever's internal contradictions and refute the unbeliever's worldview or total view of reality. ^↩

2 What is at issue in the debate between Christians and unbelievers is not merely "logic," but the conception of logic that each participant in the debate holds. Logical reasoning is necessary -- for both parties -- in the encounter of belief with unbelief. When we reason with unbelievers we, of course, employ our God-given capacity for logical thinking. The unbeliever will likewise employ logic in the debate while all along denying God. However, the unbeliever typically does not question his capacity to reason, nor ask what is the metaphysical ground of the human ability to think and reason according to abstract laws of logic. The "logic" to which the unbeliever appeals (and which is his ultimate authority) is an autonomous "logic" that exists in a void. So an appeal to a common conception of "logic" is illusory. The totally antithetical conceptions of logic (among a host of other things) are at the core of the debate. Van Til addresses this issue:

"It appears then that if there is to be any intelligible encounter between the Christian and the non-Christian, it must be in terms of the two mutually exclusive visions that each entertains. To appeal to the law of contradiction and/or to facts or to a combination of these apart from the relation that these sustain to the totality-vision of either, the believer or the unbeliever, is to beat the air. It is well to say that he who would reason must presuppose the validity of the laws of logic. But if we say nothing more basic than this, then we are still beating the air. The ultimate question deals with the foundation of the validity of the laws of logic. We have not reached bottom until we have seen that every logical activity in which any man engages is in the service of his totality-vision." (Emph. added) Cornelius Van Til, The Case for Calvinism. The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Philadelphia, 1964. (Quoted from The Works of Cornelius Van Til, Logos Digital Edition).

As to the question of logic in the debate between totally antithetical worldviews Bahnsen writes:

"The antithesis (in principle) between the philosophical systems of unbelievers and the philosophical system of believers is so broad and basic that it even affects the way they deal with central philosophical notions like logic, possibility, and objectivity (to mention but a few). This observation should not be misunderstood. The presuppositionalist does not say that Christians and non-Christians inevitably accept and operate with completely different, specific laws of logic in their practical exercises of reasoning. Yet they do clearly disagree with each other concerning the nature, source, and authority of the laws of logic. Both worldviews may endorse and utilize the disjunctive syllogism or De Morgan's theorems, but when we inquire into what they are talking about, the evidence that is appropriate or persuasive for their claims (about syllogisms, theorems, etc.), or the necessity of the truths about logic, we get radically different answers -- which almost always betray differing convictions regarding metaphysics." (Greg Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis, The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Philadelphia, 1998. p. 280)^↩

3 It is true that there are some atheists who are not material monists -- but they are few and far between. There are idealistic monists (mind is the fundamental stuff of reality) and there are others usually referred to as "pluralists" who believe in a plurality of co-ultimate things (Roger Penrose, for example). But, in the case of the pluralists, merely asserting the existence of minds and a plurality of immaterial "platonic" entities with no coherent unity among them is question begging and provides no intelligible ground for human knowledge. In addition to being no answer to the problem of the one and the many, no atheist has given the account of what bridges the gap between the particulars of the atheist's material world with its basic chance characteristics and their eternal unchanging realm of universal "platonic" entities. As mentioned above, the existence of human minds in this worldview is also a major problem -- especially on the macro evolutionary account that human minds are no more than material brains assembled by (and thereby still controlled by) random physical processes. The dual atheist principles of human autonomy and the ultimacy of chance are contradictory.

The many problems of a platonistic conception of reality are well known, which explains why few advocate it, and won't be dealt with here. As to the idealists, which were more in vogue during Van Til's time, Van Til's writings, in particular A Survey of Christian Epistemology, provide a wealth of information on the internal contradictions of the idealists. ^↩

The Atheist’s Guide to Reality. The self-destruction of material monism.

A few weeks ago, I was contemplating why there are no atheist works on "systematic atheology"  (at least I was unaware of any.)  After all, there are many Christian works on systematic theology that lay out the basis and scope of Christian beliefs.   My interest in such a "systematic atheology" was that, should such a work appear, the self-contradictory nature of atheism would be laid bare -- straight from the horse's mouth. 

As it turns out, there has been an attempt, of sorts, in The Atheist's Guide to Reality by Alex Rosenberg.  The book lays out the hard-line implications of his particular denomination of atheism: material monism (matter is all there is) with scientism as his epistemological article of faith. Many of the absurdities of atheism are exposed to the light of day.   (And there is a final absurdity that Rosenberg says implicitly, but does not utter, which we will examine below.)  Some of the conclusions that follow from material monism (" a godless material reality" in which the only causation is physical causation) and which Dr. Rosenberg fully embraces are: 

• The only kind of  'mind' is a brain.
• There is no 'free will.' We are all robots moving according to the physical properties of matter.
• There are no objective morals of any sort.  Right, wrong, good and bad, they are all the same.

As Christians, we must say 'bravo' to Dr. Rosenberg!  If physics fixes everything then the above conclusions would be true.  His book is a brilliant self-refutation of atheistic material monism using its own presuppositions. . .and, thus, is TAG (Transcendental Argument for God) in brilliant display.

Dr. Rosenberg takes us down the same path on the implications of material monism that prominent presuppositional apologists Dr. Cornelius Van Til, Dr. Greg Bahnsen, and others have marked out before.   As well, some similar analysis has been posted in this blog.

Dr. James N. Anderson writes in his review of this book: 

"Christian philosophers have been developing and refining arguments for the existence of God since the earliest times, but it’s not often one comes across a convinced atheist making a powerful philosophical case for the existence of God. Yet that’s precisely what we find—quite contrary to the author’s intent—in Alex Rosenberg’s book The Atheist’s Guide to Reality."

Anderson's insightful review can be read at his blog.

I will add just a few observations.  A central tenet of presuppositional apologetics is that all non-Christian philosophical systems of thought (worldviews) are contradictory and reduce to absurdity, which Anderson discusses.  The coup de grace delivered by presuppositional apologetics is that non-Christian worldviews, when examined solely on the basis of their presuppositions, lead to the destruction of truth and knowledge.

Rosenberg's book promotes the conviction that only science leads to truth ("scientism").  He preaches with fervor the "truth" that everything consists of collections of fermions and bosons.  This is a scientific "truth."  Everything that is, or happens, is the result of laws of physics (properties of matter).  But then he asserts, after many chapters:

"Look, if I am going to get scientism into your skull, I have to use the only tools we've got for moving information from one head to another: noises, ink-marks, pixels.  Treat the illusion that goes with them like the optical illusions in Chapter 7.  This book isn't conveying statements.  It's rearranging neural circuits, removing inaccurate disinformation and replacing it with accurate information.  Treat it as correcting maps instead of erasing sentences." (p. 193. emph. added).

There are many falsehoods in that paragraph -- almost as many as there are words. (See Anderson's review, and his remarks on intentionality and aboutness.)   But the final epistemological suicide of material monism lies in these words: "This book isn't conveying statements."  And that is a really strange and fatal statement.  Here's why: statements (or propositions) are the carriers of truth value, which, from the implications of material monism, his book does not contain. . . a conclusion of material monism with which we wholeheartedly agree.

So then, Rosenberg has told us that his book contains no capacity to convey truth or knowledge (and that applies, as well, to: "This book isn't conveying statements.").  This is futility and the destruction of knowledge.  Nonetheless, Rosenberg tells us that "scientism" yields "truth," when by his own mouth he implies it doesn't.  Rosenberg's false metaphysics (material monism) supplies no basis for Rosenberg's false epistemology (scientism).

If material monism were true, then it would be false.  It is, therefore, false.

And that is the end of the matter.

Philosophical Houses of Glass

As the saying goes, "People living in circular philosophies should not toss circular objections" -- or something like that.

A frequent charge against Presuppositional Apologetics is that it is a circular argument -- it presupposes Christian theism in order to prove Christian theism. 

This objection comes from atheists -- who live in an irrational and circular philosophy -- but, amazingly, also comes from Christians. 

This objection has been put forward by "Classical" Christian apologist Professor William Lane Craig.  Craig writes in Five Views on Apologetics (p. 232-3):

"As commonly understood, Presuppositionalism is guilty of a logical howler: it commits the informal fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, for it advocates presupposing the truth of Christian theism in order to prove Christian theism…A Christian theist himself will deny that question-begging arguments prove anything…But at the heart of presuppositionalism lies an argument, often not clearly understood or articulated, which is very powerful. This is an epistemological transcendental argument…"

C.L. Bolt, on Choosing Hats has posted an analysis of William Lane Craig's objections to presuppositionalism (quoted above) in his post, William Lane Craig's Inconsistent Objections to Presuppositional Argument.  In summary, C.L. Bolt points out the glaring inconsistency of Craig's objection: Craig claims on one hand that TAG has never been "spelled out" adequately but then asserts that TAG is circular ("guilty of a logical howler"). 

To add to the perplexity, in Craig's criticism above, he pays a somewhat begrudging compliment to presuppositionalism, viz.

"But at the heart of presuppositionalism lies an argument, often not clearly understood or articulated, which is very powerful. This is an epistemological transcendental argument…"

So then, apparently TAG has been spelled out sufficiently for Craig to recognize the power of TAG.  If TAG is powerful, then one wonders how it is committing a "logical howler!"  Craig cannot have his cake and eat it too, as another famous saying goes.

But there is a deeper hidden inconsistency in Craig's objections. When Craig says presuppositionalism is guilty of a "logical howler" we should ask, "To what logic is he appealing?"  If he is presupposing logic as constituted in man by God, then he is presupposing Christian theism and is guilty of the same "logical howler."  If he is not, then he is presupposing "neutral" logic --  in that case Craig is presupposing atheist logic, contrary to his Christian profession  --   either way Craig's assertion is incoherent.   Of course, we know this because presuppositionalism, contra Craig's "classical" apologetic, is consistently Christian.  On the other hand, Craig's "classical" apologetic is blatantly anti-theistic.  As Van Til repeatedly illustrated in his writings, Craig's apologetic adopts the unbeliever's standards of objectivity and the unbeliever's commitment to his autonomous reasoning as the ultimate authority.  So then, Craig is not only arguing in a vicious circle, he is arguing from within the unbeliever's viciously circular presuppositions. 

Bahnsen has addressed this false charge of circular argument repeatedly.  Let me conclude with Greg Bahnsen's, succinct analysis from Pushing the Antithesis (p.123-5).  Here is a corrected quote (omitted text is enclosed in brackets):

"Before moving to our next response against the anti-metaphysical bias, you should be aware of a possible response that the unbeliever will bring against you.  He will complain that you are engaging in circular reasoning or the informal logical fallacy of begging the question.  That is, since we assert that God is self-verifying, we are assuming God in order to prove God.  However, we should note in response to this objection:
  (1)  We are not engaged in special pleading for the Christian worldview.  We are simply asking which system makes human experience intelligible.  For sake of argument, we will grant the unbeliever his system with whatever foundations he adopts in order to see if it can justify its truth claims.  But then he will have to grant us ours (for sake of argument) to see if we can justify our truth claims.  By the very nature of our God as the self-existing, eternal Creator, our worldview self-justifies its starting point.  (We will later explain this two-step procedure of worldview critique.)
(2) All systems must ultimately involve some circularity in reasoning.  For instance, when you argue for the legitimacy of the laws of logic, you must employ the laws of logic.  How else can you justify laws of logic?  This is a transcendental issue, an issue that lies outside of the temporal, changing realm of sense experience.  Laws of logic do not change: they are universal, invariant, abstract principles.
(3) "Circularity" in one's philosophical system is just another name for 'consistency' in outlook throughout one's system.  That is, one's starting point and final conclusion cohere with each other.  Here it is more fully explained:

The "circularity" of a transcendental argument is not at all the same as the fallacious 'circularity' of an argument in which the conclusion is a restatement (in one form or another) of one of its premises.  Rather, it is the circularity involved in a coherent theory (where all the parts are consistent with or assume each other) and which is required when one reasons about a precondition for reasoning.  [Because autonomous philosophy does not provide the preconditions for rationality or reasoning,] its "circles" are destructive of human thought--i.e. "vicious" and futile endeavors.

(4) The unbeliever has no defensible standard whereby he can judge the Christian position.  His argument either ends up in infinite regress (making it impossible to prove), has no justification (rendering it subjective), or engages in an unjustifiable same-plane circularity (causing it to be fallacious).  Without a self-verifying standard, he has no epistemological way out.  And only the Christian worldview has such a self-verifying standard.