Showing posts with label atheism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label atheism. Show all posts

Sunday, March 7, 2021

More Nagelisms

I was perusing blogs awhile back (actually a few years!) when I came upon this quote from Nagel's Mind and Cosmos. Rather than consulting my notes it is just easier to re-quote it here.
First, that the non-teleological and timeless laws of physics--those governing the ultimate elements of the physical universe, whatever they are--are not fully deterministic. Given the physical state of the universe at any moment, the laws of physics would have to leave open a range of alternative successor states, presumably with a probability distribution over them. Second, among those possible futures there will be some that are more eligible than others as possible steps on the way to the formation of more complex systems, and ultimately of the kinds of replicating systems characteristic of life. The existence of teleology requires that successor states in this subset have a significantly higher probability than is entailed by the laws of physics alone--simply because they are on the path toward a certain outcome. Teleological laws would assign higher probability to steps on paths in state space that have a higher "velocity" toward certain outcomes. They would be laws of the self-organization of matter, essentially--or of whatever is more basic than matter. (pp. 92-3)
This is a good summary of Nagel's attempts to reintroduce teleology into the natural universe. Nagel realizes that neo-Darwinism is a fatally flawed theory. The gist of the argument is that naturalism has to reintroduce final causes. Blind chance and mechanistic evolution don't get it. Mixed up in the argument is the typical atheist reliance on chance and probability. The motions of matter are not deterministic.

Okay, for the sake of argument, let's grant that. As theists we deny that the source of "probability" is what the atheist claims it to be -- an ultimate irrational residue of lawlessness. A world in which things happen for "no reason!" But back to the technical issues.

The probability distributions of quantum field theory can be computed with some very precise results for things like scattering amplitudes,half-lives, branching ratios and the like. These probability "amplitudes" are all functions of the basic properties of the physical systems being modeled. And, here's the point: the amplitudes have no teleological aspect. All of physics exhibits non-teleology. The future state(s) of the universe are solely determined by the present state, past and future are irrelevant. This principle falls out rather neatly from the principle of least action -- a very general principle from which all equations of motion can be derived given a Hamiltonian (think, "energy") or Lagrangian function that depends on the constituents of the system and their configurations. Moreover Nagel's plan is to require "... that successor states in this subset [those favoring replicating life] have a significantly higher probability than is entailed by the laws of physics alone--simply because they are on the path toward a certain outcome."

The nail in this coffin is that Nagel imagines some non-physical laws that must alter half-lives, branching ratios and so on, along the way.  After all, according to the atheist myth of macro evolution, the journey to replicating life is via small steps with compounded probabilities. We ought to be able to see such evidence in pre-biotic chemical reactions.  

Embracing such non-physical laws is to accept a new dualism and to abandon the pillar of monism in the atheist's philosophy. Paradoxically, the positing of extra-physical (should we say supernatural!) properties seems not to worry Nagel's new born "naturalism." 

Sunday, May 28, 2017

Mr. Atheist, We Are Not All on an Epistemological Titanic

All worldviews have equal burden of proof. The frequent claim of atheists that Christian theism asserts something positive, i.e. the Triune God, while atheism (contrary to that) does not assert anything positive and has no burden of proof is false. Atheism positively asserts an incoherent plurality of unrelated brute facts which cannot account for themselves or for any fact of human experience whatsoever, be it knowledge, truth, morality, individual rational freedom, immaterial objects, etc. The list goes on and on.

The atheist, by his own contradictory presuppositions, is reduced to the absurdity of absolute skepticism -- all along challenging the Christian to account for knowledge based on the atheist's skepticism.1 The God of Christian theism does account for knowledge. That answer is intelligible and the atheist can understand that answer. The only objection the atheist has is he does not like that answer.

Contrary to the atheist we are not all on an epistemological Titanic. Only the atheist is on that ship.


1 By assuming everyone must be in the same epistemological situation the atheist has ascribed to the fallacy of pretended neutrality. That assumption is question begging.

Monday, December 26, 2016

Another Futile Atheist Argument

Proverbs 17:28 Even a fool is counted wise when he holds his peace...
 
This meme, posted by an atheist whom we will identify as DJ, popped up on my social media when a friend commented on it. It is another example of the shallow thought of atheists -- a shallowness that results in illogical reasoning and self-contradiction. It is this utter shallowness of the "man-on-the-street" atheist that catches himself in self contradictions.


 Proverbs 26:5 Answer a fool according to his folly, Lest he be wise in his own eyes. 

 

First, the meme assumes there is such a thing as "good" and "evil." But "good" and "evil" do not exist in the purely material universe of atheism. All there is are mere chunks of matter undergoing temporal transformations according to the laws of physics. The only laws in a material universe are the underlying laws of physics. There are no moral laws. To put it another way, there is no such thing as "good" solutions of the laws of physics (e.g. a solution of the wave-function of the universe) or "evil" solutions. As has been often stated, there is no "ought" in physics, only what "is." If there are two future solutions, "X" and "Y," of the wave-equation, there is no physical reason the solution "ought" to be "X" rather than "Y;" and vice versa. This meme has to presuppose the existence of good and evil -- but to do so is to assume something that does not exist in the atheist universe; it has to assume theism. Such is the atheist's self-contradiction.

Second, this particular atheist, DJ, once commented in a prior exchange on social media, that the only things that are "real" are those testable by science and accessible via sense perception1 .  This is a big problem for DJ.   I asked him if he had ever seen, tasted, heard, smelled or touched a "moral law."   Of course he had not; and, understandably, he offered no reply.   He was caught in his own trap. Moral laws are not empirically accessible, they are not natural and they are not discoverable in rocks, electric circuits, or test tubes via the scientific method.  By his own standard, "good" and "evil" are not real.

1 The view that knowledge is only obtained through sense perception ("experience") is radical empiricism. I addressed part of this prior exchange in the post "Village Atheism and Magical Configurations of Matter".

Monday, August 29, 2016

Humanism Made Silly by a Humanist

A few months back I came upon this humanist propaganda video. Of course, Humanism is a subjective dogma of atheists. What is funny is that it contains the refutation of Humanism within the narrative. Watch the video.



Did you catch it? In particular, note the self-defeating relativism at 1:15. The self-defeating claim is that there is no single "meaning" of human life. We all create our own, "different strokes for different folks!" Of course, this means there is no meaning. The video (presupposing an objective morality of the "decent folks") then presents a smorgasbord of benign activities that one of the "decent folks" might choose to be "happy." It is a rather self-serving selection! Cherry picking comes to mind. The reference to "drawing," in particular, evoked me to laughing ridicule.

"How can I be happy?" That's an implicit endorsement of a supposed benevolent epicureanism, hedonism, or egoism -- select a "meaning," take your pick. It's all relative. Individual happiness is the supreme goal. Individual happiness is a matter of individual tastes and a matter of personal opinion. That admission raises the following questions.

Conspicuously absent from the activities are such things as sexual promiscuity; marital infidelity; pedophilia; women murdering their unborn children for the sake of future "happiness;" Hitler Youth; Islamic terrorism and so on. All these are activities that make their practitioners happy and their lives "meaningful" according to their subjective tastes conditioned by external influences. No doubt "decent" humanists will reject some of these as acceptable practices. But they have no objective reason to reject any. In the amoral humanist universe, all "standards" are subjective and arbitrary. The video essentially admits as much.

Of course, the humanist will object to the mention of Hitler youth and terrorists (abortionists probably not), since the greatest "value" to a humanist is Humanity. But then, "Humanity" is a rather meaningless term. Its vagueness can be used as a cloak and justification for eugenics, ethnic cleansing and other activities whose goal is the "greater good" of Mankind "on the whole" according to arbitrary principles. Who is to dictate what is "best" for the "universal man," for humanity in the whole? Totalitarianism comes to mind -- the individual is expendable for the sake of "Humanity" in the whole. Of course, the benign benevolent humanism of the video (which leans to a libertarian view with potential anarchistic tendencies) conveniently ignores such philosophical problems that undermine its own foundations. It presumes an objective morality that Humanism cannot provide. To the extent that a Humanist adheres to true morals, he does so by borrowing them from the objective morality of Christian theism.

In summary, if "meaning" and happiness are subject to individual preference (shaped by influences external to the person, according to the video) then nothing is off limits according to Humanism -- including those who reject Humanism as the basis of a "meaning" of life. Humanism is a bankrupt philosophy with no foundations. The video admits as much when it says: "Humanists do not see any obvious purpose to the universe, but that it is a natural phenomenon with no design behind it." The base ingredients of Humanism -- mere chunks of the universe interacting with other chunks of the universe within a Godless and amoral evolutionary universe ruled by "chance" -- provide no ground for any of Humanism's unargued presuppositions.

The video ends with "That's Humanism!" What it shows is that Humanism is intellectually foolishness. How appropriate that it was narrated by a comedian, Stephen Fry.

Thursday, December 3, 2015

Friday, October 23, 2015

Village Atheism and Magical Configurations of Matter.

A discussion on social media yielded this claim by a village atheist:
"...but when I die, just like you, I will be nothing more than space dust and all the molecules of matter..."
Such statements are wide-spread and betray the philosophical naivety and unexamined assumptions of the typical village atheist.

Do you see the incoherence of this claim of an atheist material monist? He says he "...will be nothing more." This atheist's language betrays his belief that he is currently something more than molecules.

However, on the material monist view and his assumption of the uniformity of nature he was, is and will always be nothing more than matter. To be perfectly clear, according to material monism, this atheist is at present nothing more than molecules. This is a matter of logical consistency. The atheist's faith commitment to the uniformity of nature requires this conclusion. Of course, it is true that his current configuration of molecules is different than those of a dispersed configuration of those molecules, and as such, they exhibit different properties than the dispersed molecules. This is no more puzzling than Hydrogen molecules and Oxygen molecules having different properties than water when they are combined chemically to produce H2O. But such properties, sometimes termed "emergent," are not autonomous properties.1 All of the properties of water are reducible to the underlying laws of matter by way of the equations of quantum mechanics. The behavior of water is determined by the underlying quantum mechanical properties of the ultimate material constituents (the quantum fields which we have discussed here). This is the case for all configurational properties of matter, they are all reducible to the underlying physics. In fact, according to material monism and the uniformity of nature they must be. This is the scientific ideal of atheistic science -- all of reality must ultimately come within the purview of physical causal laws. After all, it is called material monism, right? Reality is closed with respect to matter and its motions via physical causes. According to the myth of macro-evolution, the physical processes that produced the stars, galaxies, solar systems, planets then ultimately life, then conscious life along with the human intellect, are necessarily, by continuity, the same processes producing the present behaviors of particular molecular configurations called "man." Any "mental" properties of this particular configuration of molecules are determined by the dance of the quantum fields, not the other way around. So much for free rational thought. Ironically, these philosophies and theories are the products of self-styled atheist "free thinkers!"

This atheist, like all village atheists, maintains the mutually incoherent assumptions of human autonomy, uniformity of nature (their principle of necessity) and the ultimate chance character of reality. These are uncritically examined presuppositions of the typical unbeliever. To maintain human autonomy in the face of material monism is to believe that humans are magical configurations of matter. In a solely material universe human autonomy would not exist. Nonetheless, village atheist Richard Dawkins unabashedly believes in atheist miracles.2 "Consistent" atheists like Provine, Rosenberg and Harris (as discussed here, here and here) can clearly see the logical conclusion of their faith in material monism and the uniformity of nature and thereby deny human rational autonomy -- even though it reduces their epistemology and ethics to absurdity. It follows from their presupposition that they know nothing, despite their claim to "scientific" knowledge, and they acknowledge the total amoral character of reality.

1 Philosopher John Searle's favorite example of emergent properties is digestion. He correctly points out that digestion is not a property of elementary particles. However, it is obvious that such an emergent biological property is not autonomous and is reducible to bio-chemistry, then to physics and quantum mechanics. To deny that would be to destroy the continuity of nature and the entire atheist reductionist "scientific" enterprise. Reductionism is a necessary corollary of material monism. And bottom-up physical causation is the only causation in town.
2 Discussed here. Dawkins, by maintaining human autonomy, is apparently unaware that he has implicitly thrown out the uniformity of nature. Hence, human autonomy to Dawkins is an irrational miracle.

Monday, August 17, 2015

Reasoning by Presupposition: The Bahnsen-Smith Debate

I was perusing the apologetic blogs a few months back when I came across a comment by an atheist who claimed Christians never refer to the Bahnsen-Smith debate (although that interchange was more a moderated conversation than a debate). Well, that claim is not true. To rebut that claim, here is a link to the audio of that debate. A transcript of the audio can be found here. Another post of the dialog can be found here. This dialog is well worth studying to understand Bahnsen's use of the presuppositional apologetic. Apparently, that atheist thought Smith bested Bahnsen in that encounter. Incredible! Such an opinion, as we will see below, betrays superficiality and an unstudied philosophic naivete. Smith,and a caller-in named Max, clearly had no clue as to what hit them. Bahnsen's irenic answers rebutted all of Smith's claims.

One particular point, that has prompted the title of this article, was when Max charged that Bahnsen merely presupposed God.  Of course, it is not the case that we merely do so (as if, the presupposition of Christianity is a fideistic and unargued assumption). Bahnsen's reply that atheists presuppose atheism was priceless.  This is a perennial blind spot of atheists -- they think they are devoid of presuppositions and are staunch advocates of non-circular reasoning. Nothing could be further from the truth.  Atheists, in fact, argue presupposing atheism (consequently, this atheist's charge against Christians commits the fallacy of special pleading, sometimes called "the double standard fallacy"). However, the fact that both sides have presuppositions does not reduce the debate to a stand off. Not all presuppositions are "created equal." The problem for the atheists is that they have a multitude of unintelligible contradictory assumptions and viciously circular arguments, none of which are mutually coherent, and none which they can make good. This fact renders the atheist's presupposition(s) false and destroys his pretense to knowledge of any sort. This fact is evident in the many debates of presuppositionalists with atheists. Some atheists will even admit (on the basis of their assumptions, of course!) there is no certain knowledge or express doubt that knowledge is possible (not realizing the inherent self contradiction in such claims -- since they must know something in order for their language to intelligibly express their doubt. To put it ironically: "Why should anyone listen to someone who believes he doesn't know what he's saying?") On the other hand, the Christian presupposition is intelligible and provides the necessary grounds for knowledge and for the intelligibility of all of human experience. So again, there is no "stand off."

Here are a few more of the high points in the dialog:
  • Max claimed reason is "natural!"  Another priceless moment.  Bahnsen pressed the point that abstract entities are not natural.1  All Max said by way of "rebuttal" was a repeated "Oh boy!"  Bahnsen challenged atheists to live according to their presuppositions -- something they never do.
  • Smith assimilated physical causation and logical laws (logical "law of identity" for instance).  Bahnsen succinctly pointed out that such is a major philosophical error.2  For starters, matter does not move according to abstract laws of rational thought (logic) -- matter obeys inviolable physical laws based on the properties of matter. The material universe is completely oblivious to abstract laws of logic. Laws of logic are standards of rational thought -- laws that can be violated by flawed reasoning.  As we have mentioned repeatedly, laws of logic presuppose minds with rational freedom (independent of material causation) and mental causal efficacy -- something totally antithetical to a universe composed solely of matter moving according to chance and causally inviolable physical laws. (In the materialist universe the only causality is, de facto, physical.) To put it another way, laws of logic are necessary and non-contingent; on the other hand, the physical world is contingent and the laws of physics are not necessary. (If they were, empirical science and experiment would be unnecessary.) This is usually stated succinctly by the phrase "logic says nothing about the contingent world." We should also point out that physicists can construct a multitude of consistent theoretical models of the material universe with existing and hypothetical entities, differing mathematical structures, different causal interactions, different values of fundamental constants, and so on. All of which show that the actual physical reality in which we live is not necessitated by logic. To summarize, logic and physics are categorially distinct. Contra Smith, logic cannot be reduced to physics.
  • Smith trotted out the tired and fallacious "Euthyphro dilemma" to counter Christian moral claims.  Bahnsen succinctly rebuffed Smith by pointing out that Christian moral claims are rooted in the character of God Himself.  In Christian theism, God is ne plus ultra3. There is no "super-reality" above God; no laws above God.4  
In summary, Bahnsen  began the dialog by engaging Smith on the three fundamental areas of philosophy: (1) What exists? What is real? What are the constituents of reality? (Metaphysics/ontology); (2) How does one know what one knows? (Epistemology) and (3) How should we lead our lives? (Ethics).  Beyond Smith's philosophical naivete and reasoning errors, Smith, like all atheists, did not even begin to provide intelligible answers, based on his godless reality, in any of these areas. Smith's materialist atheism is: (1) metaphysical irrationalism (espousing the ultimate chance nature of reality); (2) provides no self-attesting theory of knowledge (rendering knowledge impossible, and thereby, Smith has no ground from which to criticize anyhthing); and (3) provides no basis for the existence of absolute morality or ethical truth (morality is not a property of material systems).  All through the debate, Smith argued in vicious circles and merely assumed the existence of human rational freedom (which is incompatible with the assumption of material monism), logic, moral laws, abstractions, conceptual reasoning -- all of which inexplicably spring out of chance and physical (material) causation (or, alternatively as in platonistic pluralism, are an incoherent plurality of independent and ultimate brute entities suspended in the "void").  As Bahnsen pointed out, all of these are problems in Smith's atheist universe, but not for Christianity. (In fact, Smith is assuming facts that are borrowed from Christian theism.) Smith's atheist presuppositions thus have been shown to be incoherent and self-contradictory on the atheist's own ground, while the Christian presupposition and Christianity is vindicated.  

Postscript

During the call-in section, Smith responded to a question regarding the Bible. Smith responded, "Well, I mean there are some decent things in the Bible, sure. There are some elegantly expressed moral maxims, that sort of thing." (emph. added.) Bahnsen, probably due to lack of time, didn't respond to this but the reply to this sort of remark is: "On what standard does Smith rely to determine morals?" Would he claim that standard is absolute and knowable? On Smith's view the moral statements of Christ would be no more authoritative than those of any other; merely subjective opinion and non-absolute. The fact that Smith likes some of them is not a basis for absolute morality. Some people like Coke, others Pepsi. Smith, like all unbelievers, is his own ultimate, and arbitrary, standard.

1 Abstract entities, such as the laws of logic, are immaterial and not extended in space. As, such they are not empirically accessible; they are not natural objects perceived by the senses. For example, the law of deduction called "modus ponens" cannot be seen with the eyes. The question of the reality of abstract entities (especially universal and invariant concepts such as mathematics and logic) and conceptual knowledge lies at the root of the well known failures of rationalism, on the one hand, and empiricism, on the other, to provide a foundation for human knowledge. Both schools ended in skepticism regarding human knowledge. One should also consider that the modern phrase "logical empirical method" merely linguistically conjoins the two philosophical schools and thereby glosses the problems of both without solution, yet admits the distinction between the abstract and the natural. Stated in other terms, this dichotomy is also the distinction of deduction (necessary truths of reason) versus induction (contingent truths derived from generalizations of particular sense data). Bahnsen's point is that the atheist "universe" provides no intelligible account for either reason (human rational autonomy and conscious thought independent of material causation, existence and reality of universal laws of logic, etc.) or empirical knowledge/induction (given the atheist's commitment to ultimate chance and the irrational nature of the universe as embodied in quantum mechanics). On the atheist view, there is no bridging of the gap between the immaterial transcendent and unchanging truths of, say, logic or arithmetic, and the immanent and ever changing world of material flux. The problem that the atheist has with providing a justification of induction is well known -- it is a principle that cannot be deduced nor inductively derived (which is vicious circular reasoning and question begging). On the other hand, the transcendent God of Christian theism provides the intelligible answer to both deduction/reason (man is created in the image of God, the ultimate rational being and the source of man's reason -- behind the mind of man is the mind of the eternal God) and induction (God has created and faithfully sustains the cosmos ("...in Christ all things consist." Colossians 1:16-7). Further the existence of universal abstract entities, in that they are the contents of thought, are not eternal self-existent things existing in a mind-independent platonic world of ideas, but rather, the thoughts of the eternal God. They are real; and man, as the rational image of God, is to "think God's thoughts after Him," as Van Til has said.
2 Smith fallaciously used the example of the "Law of Identity" as "support" for his claim. Rather than the law of identity, one might think that the material conditional of logic ("if P then Q") would provide a more plausible support. However, it is generally known that the material conditional does not represent the concept of causality. See, for example, Paradoxes of Material Implication (in particular, see the example of switches in a series circuit in the section on "Simplification"), Material Conditional; and Causality (section titled, "Causality contrasted with conditionals"). Incredibly, Rudolph Carnap (a logical positivist) makes the philosophical error of representing causal laws via the material conditional in chapters 1 and 20 of An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.
3 Latin, literally,"no more beyond."
4 Amazingly, Michael Martin also fatuously uses a version of the "Euthyphro dilemma" in his flawed TANG ("Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God").  The Euthyphro dilemma presupposes a mythological platonic reality of ultimate abstract moral laws to which all the "gods" and man are equally subject (and of which laws they somehow have knowledge) -- as such, it is contrary to the claim of Christian theism that God is ultimate.  Thus Martin's counter does not apply -- it is a straw man. It is a logical fallacy of the most egregious type to assume the truth of "not A" to refute "A." TANG as a refutation of TAG is an utter failure. TANG is not even analogous to TAG. To be analogous, TANG would need to show: (1) that the Christian conception of God is contradictory and (2) that atheism (whether materialist or platonic pluralism) provides the necessary and coherent conditions for all of human experience -- including intelligible accounts of possibility of knowledge and existence of moral absolutes.  This, of course, is something that neither Martin nor millennia of failed atheist philosophy and science has done.  In short,  TANG is not a transcendental argument and Michael Martin does not understand transcendental argumentation (at least, he fails to understand TAG). 

Friday, October 24, 2014

More on TAG

A correspondent has asked, "Is 'logic' a premise of TAG (The Transcendental Argument for God)?"1

This question underscores the typical unbeliever's inability to grasp the issues in the debate between totally antithetical worldviews. It also suggests a general unfamiliarity with transcendental argumentation -- as it construes TAG as a deductive argument, and it seems to lapse into a standard "deductivist" view of proof, so prevalent among many unbelievers.

First, TAG is not formally a deductive argument. Deductive arguments necessarily presuppose logic. Without logic, deductive arguments could not even get off the ground. So, the answer is, no, logic per se is not a premise of TAG.2 In the presuppositional defense of Christianity, we do not presuppose a merely abstract and autonomous logic, nor do we posit it as a premise of a deductive argument leading to a conclusion of a God of indeterminate character or an abstract "God of the philosophers."

Second, when it comes to the issues of the existence of logic, abstract objects, and conceptual reasoning, in general, the point of TAG is that the godless reality of atheism, on the basis of its own metaphysical presuppositions, cannot account for their existence. For instance, the existence of logic and material monism are contradictory. Laws of matter and the ultimacy of chance do not produce mentally free, conscious beings who are capable of abstract thought. Materialism cannot account for the existence of immaterial abstract entities of any type (be it logic, mathematics, or moral laws).3 The existence of logic, then, is a problem, and failure, of the atheist worldview. As I have written before, atheists cannot give a "reason for reason." As such, atheists have no metaphysical ground for their presupposition of logic. Atheists, being "epistemological loafers" as Van Til put it, will not acknowledge this. Even in the face of continued prodding, they continue to use a merely assumed autonomous logic and reason, that is, just "take it for granted." But that is question begging and an intellectually empty response. Yet, on the other hand, they will assert that man and his mind was produced by (and thereby, still ruled by) ultimately random material processes. Atheism -- by asserting the autonomy of man (and thereby, the ultimacy of the human mind) along with the ultimately chance nature of temporal facts -- is self-contradictory. Atheism provides no grounds for any of its beliefs (articles of faith, as it were); it can only be adhered to by a willful intellectual blindness.

The positive presupposition of TAG is the existence of the Triune God of Christianity who has revealed Himself in the Bible, in nature, and within man himself. God is the metaphysical ground from which all human experience is intelligible. Logic (and other abstract objects) is not a problem for the Christian theist. Behind man's reasoning is the mind of God.

To reiterate the point: logic is a problem for atheists and agnostics; it is no problem for the Christian theist.

In response to the correspondent's question, I pointed out the following as an example of presuppositions: The laws of logic are laws of rational thought; as such logic presupposes a thinking mind. In Christian theism, that ultimate mind is the mind of the eternal and personal God. Though this may be wrongly interpreted as if it were a deductive argument, it is not. It is an illustration of a presupposition that underlies and is the metaphysical ground of human logic.

The correspondent responded with the question, "Why can't that mind be mine?" Indeed, that is the question for him to answer based on a presumed godless reality! Many questions come to mind. For example, where or from what did his mind originate? Did immaterial minds irrationally spring forth de novo from matter in motion (If indeed there be minds as opposed to mere physically determined material brains)? Was there a first mind? Or, is there an infinite past of finite individual minds begetting new minds, (coming into being at birth, then vanishing into nothingness at death)? Is his mind ultimate? If not, what produced his mind? Is his mind free from physical determination (i.e., does he have rational freedom and volition)? How many unrelated (material and perhaps non-material) causal principles does the unbeliever invent to account for the existence of minds? Are those causal properties, along with matter and minds, of which they are properties, eternal, uncreated, ultimate constituents of reality?  In addition, for a materialist the question is (a) how all the biochemistry going on in every human skull (different processes in different locations) gives rise to objective non-material abstractions, such as logic, or, if not a materialist, (b) from whence all these contingent minds emerged equipped with innate and invariant logic. Those are just a few problems for starters.

Again, the question remains for atheists and agnostics to answer on the foundation of their metaphysical presuppositions. Answers that millennia of atheist philosophies have failed to supply.

I've already given the Christian answer: Mind is not his alone. The ultimate mind is the mind of the eternal God of Christian theism.


1 The historical connection of logic to TAG stems from Greg Bahnsen's use of the presuppositional apologetic in his debate with atheist Gordon Stein where Stein couldn't support the existence of, or use and reliability of, logic on the basis of his materialism. This was a defining moment for public awareness of presuppositionalism. In a way, it is a bit unfortunate that the debate paved the way for some, including Christians, to think that the existence of logic is the only or main element of TAG (thereby focusing attention mainly on logic in conjunction with TAG). But such is not the case. TAGs challenge to unbelief is that it cannot make sense (on its own presuppositions) of any fact of human experience. Thus, one can start with logic, or language, or mathematics or moral laws (among others) to expose the unbeliever's internal contradictions and refute the unbeliever's worldview or total view of reality.

2 What is at issue in the debate between Christians and unbelievers is not merely "logic," but the conception of logic that each participant in the debate holds. Logical reasoning is necessary -- for both parties -- in the encounter of belief with unbelief. When we reason with unbelievers we, of course, employ our God-given capacity for logical thinking. The unbeliever will likewise employ logic in the debate while all along denying God. However, the unbeliever typically does not question his capacity to reason, nor ask what is the metaphysical ground of the human ability to think and reason according to abstract laws of logic. The "logic" to which the unbeliever appeals (and which is his ultimate authority) is an autonomous "logic" that exists in a void. So an appeal to a common conception of "logic" is illusory. The totally antithetical conceptions of logic (among a host of other things) are at the core of the debate. Van Til addresses this issue:
"It appears then that if there is to be any intelligible encounter between the Christian and the non-Christian, it must be in terms of the two mutually exclusive visions that each entertains. To appeal to the law of contradiction and/or to facts or to a combination of these apart from the relation that these sustain to the totality-vision of either, the believer or the unbeliever, is to beat the air. It is well to say that he who would reason must presuppose the validity of the laws of logic. But if we say nothing more basic than this, then we are still beating the air. The ultimate question deals with the foundation of the validity of the laws of logic. We have not reached bottom until we have seen that every logical activity in which any man engages is in the service of his totality-vision." (Emph. added) Cornelius Van Til, The Case for Calvinism. The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Philadelphia, 1964. (Quoted from The Works of Cornelius Van Til, Logos Digital Edition).
As to the question of logic in the debate between totally antithetical worldviews Bahnsen writes:
"The antithesis (in principle) between the philosophical systems of unbelievers and the philosophical system of believers is so broad and basic that it even affects the way they deal with central philosophical notions like logic, possibility, and objectivity (to mention but a few). This observation should not be misunderstood. The presuppositionalist does not say that Christians and non-Christians inevitably accept and operate with completely different, specific laws of logic in their practical exercises of reasoning. Yet they do clearly disagree with each other concerning the nature, source, and authority of the laws of logic. Both worldviews may endorse and utilize the disjunctive syllogism or De Morgan's theorems, but when we inquire into what they are talking about, the evidence that is appropriate or persuasive for their claims (about syllogisms, theorems, etc.), or the necessity of the truths about logic, we get radically different answers -- which almost always betray differing convictions regarding metaphysics." (Greg Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis, The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Philadelphia, 1998. p. 280)

3 It is true that there are some atheists who are not material monists -- but they are few and far between. There are idealistic monists (mind is the fundamental stuff of reality) and there are others usually referred to as "pluralists" who believe in a plurality of co-ultimate things (Roger Penrose, for example). But, in the case of the pluralists, merely asserting the existence of minds and a plurality of immaterial "platonic" entities with no coherent unity among them is question begging and provides no intelligible ground for human knowledge. In addition to being no answer to the problem of the one and the many, no atheist has given the account of what bridges the gap between the particulars of the atheist's material world with its basic chance characteristics and their eternal unchanging realm of universal "platonic" entities. As mentioned above, the existence of human minds in this worldview is also a major problem -- especially on the macro evolutionary account that human minds are no more than material brains assembled by (and thereby still controlled by) random physical processes. The dual atheist principles of human autonomy and the ultimacy of chance are contradictory.

The many problems of a platonistic conception of reality are well known, which explains why few advocate it, and won't be dealt with here. As to the idealists, which were more in vogue during Van Til's time, Van Til's writings, in particular A Survey of Christian Epistemology, provide a wealth of information on the internal contradictions of the idealists.

Thursday, September 25, 2014

Heideggerian Nonsense Redux: Nonsense is still nonsense and nothing still yields nothing.

I received a reply to this prior post which began by providing this link to the Wikipedia page on Krauss' book A Universe from Nothing -- whose title itself is philosophical sophistry. The writer supplied this without analysis to my discussion of Heidegger's question.  Unfortunately, there are some (Richard Dawkins, for one1) who believe Krauss has something relevant to say to that question.  As we will see, Krauss has nothing to say about that question. As discussed below, Krauss is both a philosophical charlatan and also, on occasion, exhibits incompetence in his physics descriptions .  Krauss' book is rather old news, and I suspect my interlocutor probably did not "drill down to" David Albert's devastating critique of the book: On the Origin of Everything.

In any event, Krauss' book certainly adds nothing to the philosophical discussion of Heidegger's nonsense.

As it turns out, even Krauss is not so dim as to believe that something comes from absolutely nothing -- even though he promotes this idea in cloaked words, as if that were the case (so much so that Richard Dawkins foolishly takes the bait). Krauss, in his lecture here, remarks (my punctuation added): "By 'nothing' I don't mean nothing I mean 'nothing' " Exactly so. (Of course, putting scare quotes in the title would not be as sensational.) The quantum vacuum of quantum field theory (QFT) is called the particle vacuum: it is the ground state of the fields (and that is something) in which no particles are detectable. The Wikipedia entry states: "[I]t is a mistake to think of any physical vacuum as some absolutely empty void." David Albert has remarked on this in his review of  "A Universe from Nothing" (supra). I have made similar analysis on Hawking here: Hawking's "The Grand Design" -- a new sub-Platonic Cosmogony for Itching Ears and here: More on Hawking's Grand Design.

To summarize: In quantum field theory, the fields are everywhere, particles are not.  One can have fields with no particles, but not particles without the fields. The fields are fundamental; they are the matrix of the particles. Particles are the quantized manifestation of excitations of the field -- i.e. discrete vibrations of the field.

It bears repeating.  The main point is that in all physical theories, the material is presupposed by atheists as eternally existent -- there is no explanation for their existence. The quantum fields are merely posited as uncreated and eternal. Krauss should have titled his book: A Universe from "Nothing"  -- but the scare quotes would be less sensational and no doubt "scare off" some potential book buyers. As titled, it is a marketing hook that certainly aids in attracting the naively gullible atheists, of which, Richard Dawkins is one. Richard Dawkins interprets Krauss' "nothing" to be literally nothing but yet a sophisticated something (!) (as we see in this humorous video in which Dawkins earns his dunce's cap. "The fool has said in his heart there is no God").

In closing, I point out that Krauss believes his mythology so deeply that it even seduces him into loose statements in his lectures. Here is an example from the video above at time 21:28 where he displays a simulation of his so-called "empty" space between quarks. He says the simulation shows the fields "popping in and out of existence." It shows no such thing.  As presented (by what it "shows" and what it omits) the simulation is an example of atheist propaganda. (If that simulation shows fields popping in out of existence, then this video shows a drum head popping in and out of existence! Absurdity!)  There is another remark around 18:00 where he describes this "empty" space as that which you get if you remove "absolutely everything" --  well, Krauss' subsequent discussion contradicts that.  The quantum fields are still there; so much, for "absolutely everything." Krauss is absolutely wrong.

Krauss should know better. The quantum fields do not pop in and out of existence. The fields exist eternally (in the atheist's philosophy) and everywhere. The amplitude of the fields (like the displacement of the vibrating strings on a violin or the membrane of a drum head) vary with time and position according to the relativistic wave equations, but that does not mean the fields are popping in and out of existence (anymore than the node on a violin string means the string has popped out of existence at the node). Krauss has made the embarrassing mistake of blurring objects and attributes of objects. One should also consider the simulation itself.   In describing the fields between the quarks, the simulation has program variables that hold the values of the fields at each instant and at each spatial point between the quarks -- those values can be zero at some points and times while the simulation is running.  But that does not mean the variables (and the fields they describe) in the program cease to exist!2   Those variables are programmed to obey a numerical representation of the relativistic field equations.  Well to be fair, if you observe Krauss' chartmanship you will have noted that the slide title is "Empty space not empty." That is loose (and self contradictory as written), but fits his atheist talking point. The slide should read: "Empty" Space is not Empty -- or, better: Space is not empty.

Finally, Krauss is wrong on so many levels when he talks about "empty" space. Consider: the four-dimensional space-time itself is something (even if it is a four-dimensional slice of a higher-dimensional "bulk" as in string theory -- the bulk, too, is something). The four-dimensional space is described by the metric (gravitational) field of general relativity. This field itself has the properties of distinguishing between the three spatial dimensions and time. It also mysteriously, and without explanation, encodes the value of the fundamental speed of light!  Finally, we should mention that the omnipresent Higgs field is also in Krauss' so-called "empty" space.  From the Wikipedia
  "The Higgs Field is an invisible energy field that exists everywhere in the universe" (emph. added).
So then, Krauss' "empty" space is most certainly something filled with a plurality of more unexplained eternal things interacting via equally mysterious "quantum interaction vertices." Krauss has swept a lot of mystery dirt underneath his atheist rug called "nothing." Unfortunately, Krauss' atheist philosophy is the stuff that passes as "science" and that permeates the writings of many of the current crop of pop celebrity atheist scientists; and fervently believed by many of the gullible public.
 "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools... Who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator." (Romans 1:22,25)

1 Richard Dawkins mistakenly states that Krauss has answered the theologian's "trump card": "Why something rather than nothing?" But no competent Christian apologist raises that question. Certainly no presuppositionalist would ask that question. That question, as stated, is nonsense.
2 One should consider: If absolutely everything was removed between the quarks, as Krauss remarked, then there would be nothing for the program variables to simulate. There would be no need for a program, period!

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

They Don't Know What They Are Talking About!

In presuppositional apologetics, we show that the presuppositions, or the fundamental beliefs, of all who reject Christian theism are riddled with self-contradictions.  Their metaphysical assumptions ("view of what exists and is real") provide no coherent foundation for their epistemology ("how they know") and ethics ("how they should live their lives"); and, considered jointly, their metaphysics, epistemology and ethics are mutually incoherent. This is a fact that most unbelievers do not confront, as they refuse to engage in self-reflection and critical examination of their beliefs. Even when confronted with these contradictions, unbelievers, unless convicted of their sin by the Spirit of God, will continue to irrationally hold to their self-styled "rational" unbelief, rather than turning to the only rational position, Christian theism.

For instance, unbelievers -- on the basis of the presupposed properties of a godless universe -- cannot give coherent accounts of their "knowledge," in general, or of their moral judgments.

In particular, when it comes to morals, the unbeliever has no basis whatsoever for making moral pronouncements.  This follows directly from the typical belief of the so-called "scientific" worldview that only science yields knowledge.   This viewpoint is called scientism.  In that epistemology (based on the so-called "logical-empirical approach"), only things that are empirical or can be logically deduced are known1.  Ipso facto, that belief excludes moral knowledge.

First, moral laws are not perceived via the senses (empirically).  One cannot see, touch, taste, hear or smell moral laws. Moral laws (like laws of logic) are immaterial, they are not natural. They are not discovered "in a test tube."  Second, moral laws are not logical tautologies.  Thus, by the atheist's espoused (and non-self attesting) epistemology, moral laws are inaccessible to human knowledge.  Moral laws are unknowable and unknown. This reduces the atheist to absolute moral skepticism.

The result is that for the unbeliever, moral pronouncements are arbitrary and matters of subjective opinion.  Moral laws are, then, just social constructions, whether by custom or legislation. In the case of legislation, they are established by power -- either a consensus of a majority in democracies (political power then determines the morality of the age) or by brute force in totalitarian regimes and dictatorships. There are American secular norms; there are Islamic fascist norms, communist norms, Nazi norms -- all of which, inter alia, are arbitrary.

So far, we are discussing the self-contradiction of those who believe in "morality;" albeit an unknowable, subjective, non-absolute code of conduct.  Of course, this means there really is no morality in any sense; there is only legality as encoded in arbitrary legislation and conformity (or non-conformity) to changing social customs dictated by individual tastes.   Today's "evil" may be tomorrow's "righteousness."  This further means the unbeliever has no basis for making a "legal/moral" dichotomy or the claim that there are "unjust laws" ("That may be legal but it is morally suspect").

In addition, we should mention that those who espouse the epistemology of scientism typically hold to some form of materialism.  In that case, not only are moral judgments unknown, but morals would not exist.  Morality does not exist (or inhere) within the laws of physics. So metaphysically, there is no foundation for morals in a materialist universe.  It has oft been correctly stated that one cannot argue from "what is the case" (mere descriptions of the natural state, which is all science ever does) to "what ought to be."  There is no "ought" in the laws of physics.  All that "is" follows solely from physical processes obeying inviolable physical laws.  In the atheist universe, everything "does what comes naturally."  No "wrong" ever occurs; "right" and "wrong" are not properties of matter.  Everything is merely matter in motion. [We should add that no mental freedom, volition, or rationality would occur either, as all "thoughts" and vocalization of such would also be the inviolable results of "what comes naturally."] The moral theory of the atheist is bankrupt, both metaphysically and epistemologically.

In conclusion, all of the above destroy the pretense of atheists and agnostics who claim to make "moral" pronouncements. When you hear a proponent of scientism make pronouncements on moral judgments, just remind him (that on his own terms): "You don't know what you are are talking about."




1 Of course, this presupposition of scientism is neither an empirical observation nor a logical tautology. It is, therefore, not a scientific statement and, thus, not an object of knowledge. It is self-refuting. 

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

The Atheist’s Guide to Reality. The self-destruction of material monism.

A few weeks ago, I was contemplating why there are no atheist works on "systematic atheology"  (at least I was unaware of any.)  After all, there are many Christian works on systematic theology that lay out the basis and scope of Christian beliefs.   My interest in such a "systematic atheology" was that, should such a work appear, the self-contradictory nature of atheism would be laid bare -- straight from the horse's mouth. 

As it turns out, there has been an attempt, of sorts, in The Atheist's Guide to Reality by Alex Rosenberg.  The book lays out the hard-line implications of his particular denomination of atheism: material monism (matter is all there is) with scientism as his epistemological article of faith. Many of the absurdities of atheism are exposed to the light of day.   (And there is a final absurdity that Rosenberg says implicitly, but does not utter, which we will examine below.)  Some of the conclusions that follow from material monism (" a godless material reality" in which the only causation is physical causation) and which Dr. Rosenberg fully embraces are: 
  • The only kind of  'mind' is a brain.
  • There is no 'free will.' We are all robots moving according to the physical properties of matter.
  • There are no objective morals of any sort.  Right, wrong, good and bad, they are all the same.

As Christians, we must say 'bravo' to Dr. Rosenberg!  If physics fixes everything then the above conclusions would be true.  His book is a brilliant self-refutation of atheistic material monism using its own presuppositions. . .and, thus, is TAG (Transcendental Argument for God) in brilliant display.

Dr. Rosenberg takes us down the same path on the implications of material monism that prominent presuppositional apologists Dr. Cornelius Van Til, Dr. Greg Bahnsen, and others have marked out before.   As well, some similar analysis has been posted in this blog.

Dr. James N. Anderson writes in his review of this book: 
"Christian philosophers have been developing and refining arguments for the existence of God since the earliest times, but it’s not often one comes across a convinced atheist making a powerful philosophical case for the existence of God. Yet that’s precisely what we find—quite contrary to the author’s intent—in Alex Rosenberg’s book The Atheist’s Guide to Reality."
Anderson's insightful review can be read at his blog.

I will add just a few observations.  A central tenet of presuppositional apologetics is that all non-Christian philosophical systems of thought (worldviews) are contradictory and reduce to absurdity, which Anderson discusses.  The coup de grace delivered by presuppositional apologetics is that non-Christian worldviews, when examined solely on the basis of their presuppositions, lead to the destruction of truth and knowledge.

Rosenberg's book promotes the conviction that only science leads to truth ("scientism").  He preaches with fervor the "truth" that everything consists of collections of fermions and bosons.  This is a scientific "truth."  Everything that is, or happens, is the result of laws of physics (properties of matter).  But then he asserts, after many chapters:
"Look, if I am going to get scientism into your skull, I have to use the only tools we've got for moving information from one head to another: noises, ink-marks, pixels.  Treat the illusion that goes with them like the optical illusions in Chapter 7.  This book isn't conveying statements.  It's rearranging neural circuits, removing inaccurate disinformation and replacing it with accurate information.  Treat it as correcting maps instead of erasing sentences." (p. 193. emph. added).
There are many falsehoods in that paragraph -- almost as many as there are words. (See Anderson's review, and his remarks on intentionality and aboutness.)   But the final epistemological suicide of material monism lies in these words: "This book isn't conveying statements."  And that is a really strange and fatal statement.  Here's why: statements (or propositions) are the carriers of truth value, which, from the implications of material monism, his book does not contain. . . a conclusion of material monism with which we wholeheartedly agree.

So then, Rosenberg has told us that his book contains no capacity to convey truth or knowledge (and that applies, as well, to: "This book isn't conveying statements.").  This is futility and the destruction of knowledge.  Nonetheless, Rosenberg tells us that "scientism" yields "truth," when by his own mouth he implies it doesn't.  Rosenberg's false metaphysics (material monism) supplies no basis for Rosenberg's false epistemology (scientism).

If material monism were true, then it would be false.  It is, therefore, false.

And that is the end of the matter.

Monday, July 29, 2013

Varieties of Anti-theism

In the not too distant past, my favorite agnostic asserted strongly that he was not an anti-theist.  In the context of the discussion, I knew he was talking of militant atheists, such as Dawkins, Hitchens, et al., and that he was not of their ilk.

That definition of anti-theism is very narrow.  My preference is to refer to Dawkins as a "militant atheist," and reserve anti-theism for any position or thought that stands in opposition ("anti") to theism.   That is how I have used the word in my essays.

For a comprehensive survey of "anti-theism" refer to this wikipedia entry, particularly the section titled, "Opposition to the idea of God."   There, the Chambers Dictionary defines anti-theism as:  "1. doctrine antagonistic to theism; 2. 'denial' of the existence of a God; 3. opposition to God."

Within the broader definition of anti-theism in the first definition, agnosticism and even some religious positions/postures are anti-theistic.

A particular case of the latter is the concession to the "myth of neutrality" on the part of Christian "evidentialist" apologists who debate atheists on the supposed "neutral" ground of "reason" in an attempt to "reason" to a probable God.  However, to debate in that way is to presuppose that reason exists in a possibly godless reality -- that presupposition is anti-theistic.  By adopting the epistemological standards of the unbeliever, the evidentialist violates Prov. 26:4, "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him."

Here is the late Dr. Greg Bahnsen's discussion of the "myth of neutrality":

[Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic Readings and Analysis, p. 146.]
"... the epistemological disagreements between believers and unbelievers [can] not be resolved in a neutral fashion, as though the issue of God's existence and character ... [can] be treated as secondary ­ and thus temporarily set aside without any commitment one way or another ­ while abstract philosophical issues [are] debated and settled. It is often, but vainly, imagined that once we come to agreement on our epistemology, we can apply those epistemological standards to the questions of whether God exists, whether miracles occur, whether the Bible is true, etc. By contrast, Van Til taught that abstract epistemological neutrality is an illusion and that, given the kind of God revealed in the bible, imagined neutrality is actually prejudicial against God.
"If God exists and is as the Christian world view claims, then His existence has an undeniable bearing on how we understand the process of knowing, the standards of truth and evidence, ultimate authority, and other crucial matters in epistemology.
"There is no pristine, religiously neutral, abstract 'reason' to which all men first swear their allegiance, only then to turn to such secondary matters as man's nature, moral character, relation to God, destiny, etc. The kind of man who is doing the reasoning already determines something about the way in which he thinks about reason and engages in reasoning. Thus Van Til stated, 'It is impossible to speak of the intellect per se, without taking into consideration whether it is the intellect of a regenerated person or of a non-regenerated person.'
"Van Til simply called for honesty and realism here. The metaphysical situation and object of knowledge (e.g., God's existence, the relation of created things to Him), as well as the psychological/moral situation and the subject of knowledge (i.e., man as a knower, someone using reasoning ability), cannot be ignored as we develop our views of knowing. 'Reason' is simply an intellectual tool, rather than an ultimate standard of knowledge (more authoritative even than God), and as such will be affected by the regenerate or unregenerate condition of the man using it. A person's epistemological behavior and commitments are ethical in character. According to Van Til, one's theory of knowledge is not neutral, but subject to moral assessment in terms of the ultimate authority to which one submits and which one attempts to honor."

Monday, July 25, 2011

Invasion of the Atheist Robots, Part II

In my previous blog posting regarding the logical consequences of material monism, I showed that it is self-contradictory because it asserts that all of human experience is merely the compelled effects of the physical properties of matter.  I also mentioned my latest discovery in the blogosphere of Sam Harris' assertion that he is a robot -- a mindless automaton of the universe.  But there are more.

A second example of an atheist robot is found in the writings of Stephen Hawking.    A material monist, such as Hawking,  believes there are no "minds," just physical brains.  So then, it is no surprise, when in the following link, (Hawking: There is No Heaven), Hawking declares that we are merely "meat computers," i.e., we are just like our familiar desktop computers, except that our brains are composed of meat rather than silicon.

To my knowledge, Hawking has not disavowed man's free agency, though he openly sacrifices his rationality on the altar of the goddess Tyche ("chance").  Hawking states in the above article, "Science predicts that many different kinds of universe will be spontaneously created out of nothing. It is a matter of chance which we are in."

Science predicts no such thing.

We have already pointed out previously (herethat the "nothing" of Hawking is most definitely something. It is a configuration of quantum fields (which is something) that have a total energy balance of zero -- but to say that a configuration of matter with zero energy (and even the reference point for zero energy is conventional) is "nothing" would be akin to saying the assets of a person with net worth zero is "nothing" in spite of the fact that it is merely that the value of his many assets is equal to the amount of his debts.  It is remarkable what nonsense such brilliant men will utter!

Then we also have Hawking's appeal to "chance."  "Chance," of course, is the correlate of lawlessness, the unexplained, or stuff from the surd.  As it turns out, no physical experiment has shown the existence of "chance."    Atheists worship it nonetheless.   Be that as it may, if it were "chance" that decided in which universe Hawking found himself, it is also "chance" that dictates his every action -- Hawking can have no waivers.  It would follow that Hawking's "reasoning" itself would be the result of random events dictated by quantum dynamics.   He would not be a "free thinker"-- as many atheists tout -- but a mindless robot uttering random propositions dictated by lawless "chance."  So much then for Hawking's rationality and denial of God.

The same analysis applies to all self-contradictory freedom-denying atheist "robots."  On the atheist worldview, there is no transcendent reality -- the material universe is all there is.  In this case, man is nothing more than a part of the material universe and thus totally governed by material laws. Mindless matter grants no waivers. 

In Christianity, on the other hand, there is an ultimate reality that transcends the world -- the Transcendent Triune God.  Only on the presupposition of theism is man free from physical determinism, since he is the creation of a transcendent living Triune God who has created the physical world and has created man with a nature that is not totally physical -- but physical and spiritual.   Man's created spirit is not ruled by material laws and his will is independent of those laws.   It is the seat of rationality, of self, and of the will.  Christian theism is the only worldview that accounts for all of human experience, that breaks the shackles of material monism, and accounts for the rationality of man.

Monday, June 27, 2011

Invasion of the Atheist Robots

In recent postings, I have written on the logical consequences of material monism.  Material monism is self-contradictory -- it asserts that all of human experience is merely the compelled effects of the physical properties of matter.  But this is the same as the assertion that things turn into their opposites -- by way of magic.  Examples are: life from lifeless matter, minds from mindlessness, logic and mathematics from a-logical and a-mathematical matter, and morals from amoral matter.  And for some, freedom emerges from physical compulsion.

There are two types of these "rational" monists.

The first type of monist  (of which Richard Dawkins is an example), is one who asserts that he is free. We have dealt with that conceit here.  The other group (of which William Provine is an example, discussed here) follows the logical consistency of their presuppositions, reject the miracle of Dawkins, and deny that they are free.  This follows easily, since once a mechanism. . .always a mechanism.  Thus, they use their rationality to deny their freedom, and so deny their own rationality.  In short, they use rationality to deny rationality!

In perusing the blogosphere, it appears that the ranks of atheists promoting man as a mere robot without freedom from physical determinism are swelling.

The newest self-proclaimed robot I have discovered is Sam Harris.  Harris's rejections can be found here:
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/free-will-why-you-still-dont-have-it/
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/morality-without-free-will/

In both of those essays,  Harris supposes he is engaging in a rational argument. . .but one compelled by physics!  Remarkable!  In the second article above, Harris argues for morality compelled by physics!  Yet another absurd miracle!  To say that a purely material system (such as Harris in Harris's atheistic materialism) is logically and morally obligated to act a certain way is absurd.  Matter is only "obliged" to act according to physical laws. Because of this, robots cannot exhibit moral or rational acts.  Nonetheless, Harris asserts that he is a robot.  And all of this is arrived at via a viciously circular argument rooted in the metaphysical bias of material monism.

A particularly muddled remark occurs at the end of the first article, viz., "the illusion of free will is itself an illusion." 

Here by Harris's analysis, we have a supposedly rational conclusion which is itself an illusion compelled by physics.  But what could it mean?  If the illusion is an illusion, then on the normal meaning of the word "illusion," the "false appearance of free will" is itself a false appearance -- normal usage would either take Harris as contradicting himself or suggesting a rather nonsensical infinite regress of illusions. He has committed a faux pas -- perhaps though (in analogy with his illusion illusion), he would prefer he had committed a faux faux pas.


The issue of human freedom from physical causation extends deeper than ethical issues, such as the repudiation of moral choices and human responsibility. Even Searle in Rationality in Action has written, inconsistently with his naturalism, that rationality presupposes free will.  To state it briefly: Naturalism cannot even account for the illusion of rationality, as there would be no “reason.” Yet, Harris expects us to rationally follow his reasoning -- or maybe he doesn't.  Could it be that Harris is not the author, but rather a mindless robot?

But such is the absurdity to which atheism descends -- rather than worshiping their Creator, they worship "omnipotent" matter by way of their prideful faith in the "rationality" of  "omnipotent" science. A rationality and science which is inexplicable in a purely material reality.

Romans 1:18-19  For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who suppress the truth in unrighteousness,  because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it evident to them.

Romans 1:25  For they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen.

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

Conversations with Atheist Unbelievers

"For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.  Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men;" (2 Cor. 5:10-11a)

In our apologetic endeavors in conversation with unbelievers, we both defend the faith and proclaim the truth of God to lost souls. The true situation is that we are both creatures of God and that the unbeliever is in need of a Savior. The conversation is meaningful, rational and intelligible.

To the atheist unbeliever, we are all matter-in-motion, assembled by chance, a mere piece of the universe, yet (somehow) free from the universe -- in need of nothing. In this case, the conversation would be meaningless and unintelligible.

Our apologetic is built on the fact that we are both creatures of God, and we should not compromise this truth by way of a method that lends credence to the unbeliever's pretension to the contrary.  On the atheist's view, the fact of a rational conversation itself is inexplicable.

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

Philosophical Houses of Glass

As the saying goes, "People living in circular philosophies should not toss circular objections" -- or something like that.

A frequent charge against Presuppositional Apologetics is that it is a circular argument -- it presupposes Christian theism in order to prove Christian theism. 

This objection comes from atheists -- who live in an irrational and circular philosophy -- but, amazingly, also comes from Christians. 

This objection has been put forward by "Classical" Christian apologist Professor William Lane Craig.  Craig writes in Five Views on Apologetics (p. 232-3):
"As commonly understood, Presuppositionalism is guilty of a logical howler: it commits the informal fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, for it advocates presupposing the truth of Christian theism in order to prove Christian theism…A Christian theist himself will deny that question-begging arguments prove anything…But at the heart of presuppositionalism lies an argument, often not clearly understood or articulated, which is very powerful. This is an epistemological transcendental argument…"
C.L. Bolt, on Choosing Hats has posted an analysis of William Lane Craig's objections to presuppositionalism (quoted above) in his post, William Lane Craig's Inconsistent Objections to Presuppositional Argument.  In summary, C.L. Bolt points out the glaring inconsistency of Craig's objection: Craig claims on one hand that TAG has never been "spelled out" adequately but then asserts that TAG is circular ("guilty of a logical howler"). 

To add to the perplexity, in Craig's criticism above, he pays a somewhat begrudging compliment to presuppositionalism, viz.
"But at the heart of presuppositionalism lies an argument, often not clearly understood or articulated, which is very powerful. This is an epistemological transcendental argument…"
So then, apparently TAG has been spelled out sufficiently for Craig to recognize the power of TAG.  If TAG is powerful, then one wonders how it is committing a "logical howler!"  Craig cannot have his cake and eat it too, as another famous saying goes.

But there is a deeper hidden inconsistency in Craig's objections. When Craig says presuppositionalism is guilty of a "logical howler" we should ask, "To what logic is he appealing?"  If he is presupposing logic as constituted in man by God, then he is presupposing Christian theism and is guilty of the same "logical howler."  If he is not, then he is presupposing "neutral" logic --  in that case Craig is presupposing atheist logic, contrary to his Christian profession  --   either way Craig's assertion is incoherent.   Of course, we know this because presuppositionalism, contra Craig's "classical" apologetic, is consistently Christian.  On the other hand, Craig's "classical" apologetic is blatantly anti-theistic.  As Van Til repeatedly illustrated in his writings, Craig's apologetic adopts the unbeliever's standards of objectivity and the unbeliever's commitment to his autonomous reasoning as the ultimate authority.  So then, Craig is not only arguing in a vicious circle, he is arguing from within the unbeliever's viciously circular presuppositions. 

Bahnsen has addressed this false charge of circular argument repeatedly.  Let me conclude with Greg Bahnsen's, succinct analysis from Pushing the Antithesis (p.123-5).  Here is a corrected quote (omitted text is enclosed in brackets):
"Before moving to our next response against the anti-metaphysical bias, you should be aware of a possible response that the unbeliever will bring against you.  He will complain that you are engaging in circular reasoning or the informal logical fallacy of begging the question.  That is, since we assert that God is self-verifying, we are assuming God in order to prove God.  However, we should note in response to this objection:
  (1)  We are not engaged in special pleading for the Christian worldview.  We are simply asking which system makes human experience intelligible.  For sake of argument, we will grant the unbeliever his system with whatever foundations he adopts in order to see if it can justify its truth claims.  But then he will have to grant us ours (for sake of argument) to see if we can justify our truth claims.  By the very nature of our God as the self-existing, eternal Creator, our worldview self-justifies its starting point.  (We will later explain this two-step procedure of worldview critique.)
(2) All systems must ultimately involve some circularity in reasoning.  For instance, when you argue for the legitimacy of the laws of logic, you must employ the laws of logic.  How else can you justify laws of logic?  This is a transcendental issue, an issue that lies outside of the temporal, changing realm of sense experience.  Laws of logic do not change: they are universal, invariant, abstract principles.
(3) "Circularity" in one's philosophical system is just another name for 'consistency' in outlook throughout one's system.  That is, one's starting point and final conclusion cohere with each other.  Here it is more fully explained:
The "circularity" of a transcendental argument is not at all the same as the fallacious 'circularity' of an argument in which the conclusion is a restatement (in one form or another) of one of its premises.  Rather, it is the circularity involved in a coherent theory (where all the parts are consistent with or assume each other) and which is required when one reasons about a precondition for reasoning.  [Because autonomous philosophy does not provide the preconditions for rationality or reasoning,] its "circles" are destructive of human thought--i.e. "vicious" and futile endeavors.
(4) The unbeliever has no defensible standard whereby he can judge the Christian position.  His argument either ends up in infinite regress (making it impossible to prove), has no justification (rendering it subjective), or engages in an unjustifiable same-plane circularity (causing it to be fallacious).  Without a self-verifying standard, he has no epistemological way out.  And only the Christian worldview has such a self-verifying standard.


Sunday, April 17, 2011

The Abolition of Morality, the Abolition of Man

In issue #82 of Philosophy Now, there is a series of articles on atheistic moral theories. These are categorized as the familiar "moral relativism" and "moral skepticism."  These theories deny objective or absolute morality and embrace subjective and relative moral judgment ("different strokes for different folks").

Nevertheless, at bottom, all of these atheistic theories have a common presupposition of human autonomy and, thereby, a teleological (action for the sake of an end) basis for their ethos -- be it the variety of pragmatism, utilitarianism, relativism, errantism, or fictionalism.   All of the discussion depends upon man having the ability to be guided by utilitarian goals (an act is "good" based on what it achieves) and ability to choose among alternative actions according to subjective (dependent upon the subject) or relative rules (such as mere societal conventions). 

But!  Since atheistic monism and human autonomy are antithetical, none of these philosophical discussions are rational. They are irrational at their very core! On their worldview, man cannot make choices, but only acts as he must.  Therefore, the teleology that their moral theories assume is merely a phantom.

Of particular note is the article by Richard Garner titled, "Morality, the Final Delusion."  Garner bites the bullet and compares the existence of morality with the existence of God.  Taking his lead from Richard Dawkins, he is bold enough to say that belief in morality is the "Morality Delusion!"  Thus we see that in the end, the atheist makes his bold assertions concerning his metaphysics using the supposed power of "his" autonomous reason. But such "rationality" -- which, again on his worldview, can only be the irresistible effect of matter obeying the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics -- is not reason following resistible fundamental laws of logic.  There are no fundamental laws of logic in a universe ruled solely by the fundamental laws of physics.

The atheist's irrational faith in his rational autonomy is the final and only area of philosophy he will maintain to the bitter end.  It would be remarkable if Garner would logically assert the concept of the "Logic Delusion!"  To assert such is obviously delusion in itself.  But it is the inescapable consequence of monism.  Such are the pretensions and self-contradictions of atheism.

Thursday, March 31, 2011

Remarks on Transcendental Arguments

Choosing Hats posted a link to a new web site discussing transcendental argument (TAs).  That posting, which can be found here, has prompted me to add my proverbial 2 cents to the discussion.

In reflecting on TAG (Transcendental Argument for God) and its use over the years, I have come to realize that many are unable to recognize a transcendental argument.  There are probably several reasons for this, but one reason may be that most people who have exposure to logic are reared on the classic syllogistic form. TAs are not properly syllogistic and thus cannot be written as such.  (Though syllogistic schema have been employed.)

 
Transcendental arguments have a self-reflective property.  Typically, they consist of statements for which the speaker is under pain of self contradiction when uttered.  Some perennial examples are the so-called liar's paradox: "I always lie."  That statement, if true, would necessarily be false, and so it must be false.  The person speaking such is a liar -- just not a constant one!  Another example, pronounced a few months ago by my favorite agnostic, is: "There are no answers to Big Questions." That statement is an answer to a "Big Question," and thus self-refuting.   Finally, Descartes' dictum, "I think, therefore I am" is, in my mind, more forceful when stated transcendentally as,"I don't exist" --  a blatant self-contradiction.


The above TAs I will call "first-order" transcendental arguments, since they consist of statements that are directly self-referencing and self-refuting.   This type of argument is sometimes called "retortion."   TAs were recognized as destructing the very foundations of Logical Positivism which scoffed at "metaphysical" inquiry (one should raise an eyebrow immediately) and tried to base its epistemology (without metaphysics!) on the premise that all truth is either empirical or logically derived (i.e., tautology).   All else was metaphysical nonsense. The problem, of course, is that the foundational premise of Logical Positivism is neither a tautology nor an empirical truth.  Thus, Logical Positivism is metaphysical nonsense of the very sort they decried.  

Let's consider TAG.  In a nutshell, TAG is the statement that "There is no God" is self-refuting.  This is not direct retortion since it is not directly self-refuting, but the unbeliever carries a host of beliefs that would only be true in the Christian worldview, and thus when he utters "there is no God," he should abandon any of his beliefs that are only true in Christianity.  Some examples of those beliefs would be morality, the invariant laws of logic, justice, human independence from physical determination, and so on.  The list is long.  The unbeliever's worldview is ontologically, epistemological and ethically self-contradictory.  Since the unbeliever holds to contradictory thought, his worldview is irrational.

The fact that the unbeliever adheres to belief in the concepts mentioned above is another aspect of transcendental arguments: the idea of the stolen concept.


The unbeliever rails against God using beliefs -- such as morality -- that would not exist in the atheist world.  The claim that Christianity holds to beliefs that are immoral is an old line of attack, and one which Bertrand Russell attempted in "Why I Am Not a Christian."   It is a fallacious and self-defeating argument which also has been continued by some of the "new atheists," such as Christopher Hitchens, who attempt to use the concept of "evil" to deny God.  These arguments fail because "evil" would not even exist in an atheistic world, for there would be no such thing (!). As Bahnsen pointed out against Russell's "Why I Am Not a Christian" (and which holds equally against Hitchens et al.):


     "On what basis, then, could Russell issue his moral evaluations and judgments? In terms of what view of reality and knowledge did he assume that there was anything like an objective criterion of morality by which to find Christ, Christians, and the church lacking? 

       Russell was embarrassingly arbitrary in this regard. He just took it for granted, as an unargued philosophical bias, that there was a moral standard to apply, and that he could presume to be the spokesman and judge who applies it." [Always Ready, p.156]

In fact, I recently corresponded with an agnostic who railed against God because he thought it seemed "unjust" that God would send a "good" atheist to hell.  His example was an atheist who did all sorts of "good" but only failed to believe in Christ.  That example is, of course, a specious argument since it conveniently ignores the issue of the evil acts of the hypothetical perfect atheist.  But regardless of that glaring oversight, the question that must be pressed is where does an agnostic's idea or standard of absolute "good," "evil" and "justice" come from?  There simply is no such thing in the atheistic world -- they are "stolen" concepts (or as Van Til said, "the borrowed capital of Christian theism") and thus that argument fails!


Then we have the case of Prof. William Provine, a material monist, who thinks he is "rationally" asserting that there is no human free will. Provine, as I previously pointed out, is consistent with his material monism when he reasons that human beings -- being no more than physical systems propelled by inviolable physical forces --  cannot be autonomous.  Yet, rationality presupposes freedom to be guided by violable laws of logic.   We have the picture of irrational physical forces compelling  "free" and "rational" actions -- actions that Provine has claimed are not possible!  Thus, Provine is self-refuting by way of a TA.  


I recently discovered that Epicurus stated the original transcendental refutation of Provine many years ago. Epicurus stated that one cannot rationally deny free will, since rationality (i.e., adherence to laws of logic) presupposes free will.  The argument as stated on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (
link) is:

"Transcendental arguments can be characterized as demonstrations that the skeptic’s articulation of her own position is self-defeating in some way. These arguments imply that the skeptic cannot even coherently articulate a given position. Epicurus is reported to have argued that, without free choice, one assents to propositions only because one is determined to do so. Without free choice, then, it would be impossible to rationally assent to any proposition—that is, to assent to it because one has good reasons to think it is true, rather than because one must. The proposition that one has no free choice is thus self-stultifying, in that, if true, it cannot be warranted. This reasoning implies the following argument:

    (1) I am able to rationally assent to the proposition that there is no free choice.
    (2) I could not rationally assent to any proposition if there were no free choice.
    (3) Hence, there is free choice."

"That which cannot be true, must be false," and that is exactly what atheism is!  It asserts an impossibility.  It is a world that fails ontologically, ethically, and epistemologically. It is a world without rationality, ethics, or human freedom, yet the atheist presupposes such must be.  And since atheism is impossible, then agnosticism, too, is untenable.  The agnostic should immediately abandon his skepticism regarding God, since the skeptical agnostic essentially asserts that God's existence is unknowable and, thereby, it is possible that there is no God.  We might wonder just what metaphysical law of "possibility" exists that would demand such! If the only possibilities are dictated by the physics of material monism, then one has a most baldly vicious circular argument.


We also have the skeptic.  The global skeptic claims "nothing is knowable," and as shown above, he has been summarily defeated by a first-order transcendental argument. "I don't know anything" is refuted by the unintelligibility of the utterance.  So, what we really have is the relentless unbeliever who doubts everything except the power of his autonomous reason from which he launches his skeptical attacks.  He ought to wonder why his own reason is immune (!), and if he will admit that it is not, he ought to wonder why he busies himself with his skeptical arguments against Christian theism, all the while acting as if "his" reason is the ultimate authority!  In the last case, we see another person who should shut his mouth.  The fact that he does not is a testimony to foolish pride of the agnostic's heart and his reliance on his supposed self-sufficient autonomy.


In summary, all unbelievers have a prideful, irrational adherence to the power of their own autonomy and their autonomous reason. But such autonomous rationality would not exist in a reality wherein all acts are no more than the compelled effects of ultimate irrational quantum mechanical chance events. According to the atheist, man himself is nothing more than a manifestation of that ultimate irrationality and, thereby, the metaphysical equivalent of "sock puppets."