Mind & Cosmos: Nagel's Unprincipled Principles

Having finally read Nagel's Mind and Cosmos -- previously discussed briefly here -- I had planned to write a more thorough and complete analysis of it. Other more important duties have precluded that goal. So instead, I plan to write a few shorter articles covering various problems in Nagel's philosophy. Here, belatedly, is my first installment of the promised analysis.

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Nagel's motivation for his philosophy of neutral monism is that material monism provides no basis for key characteristics of human experience, such as mind and consciousness. With this correct assessment, Christian theists will agree -- although we extend the list of features to include invariant abstract objects (such as mathematics and logic) and absolute moral laws. (Nagel's version of neutral monism¹ provides no metaphysical foundation for these either.)

Nagel rejects, therefore, materialism but he equally rejects theism. He wants to invent a "middle ground;" though he doesn't get near a putative "middle." Instead, what he posits is just a new version of attributive monism in which all "matter" (with its many usual physical attributes such as mass, charge, spin and so on) is also endowed with mental attributes. This is just as reductionistic as old-fashioned monism. It's a monism differing in degree, not kind.

Nagel asserts that dualism is not a serious option since it posits an inscrutable and a mysterious (at least more so to "naturalists") interaction between mind and body. To this end, then, Nagel resorts to postulating that all material of the cosmos has a property of mind attached. Every piece of stuff in the cosmos is intrinsically "mental" in some sense, in addition to being material.

This theory is tantamount to adding (in physicist terminology) a "psychic" quantum number to every quantum field. Of course such a psychic interaction has never been observed in particle-scattering experiments. Also, Nagel doesn't touch the issue of the quantity of psychic stuff attached to all matter. To be compatible with quantum field theory, there is a multitude of technical and mathematical issues that Nagel doesn't even begin to address. I won't delve into this in anymore detail at this point, but that alone deprives Nagel's theory of any shred of scientific credibility. Nagel, by mere verbal wishful thinking, expands on his "solution." Nagel postulates that though each particle is not conscious, one can hope to produce conscious brains by assembling enough of this psychically endowed stuff in sufficiently complex arrangements. A major defect of this theory is that the "mind" so produced is a composite of psychically endowed fields, and as such, still subject to bottom-up causation. All of the properties and "twitching" of this composite brain are the result of the interactions of the basic fields/particles. Such a mind is still physically determined. Thus, human rational freedom still does not exist. Such a theory is thereby a contradiction of most atheists' assumption of human autonomy. One can easily write the form of the equation that such a brain, and consequently the attached "mind," must satisfy. One does not need to know the exact details of the functional dependence of this composite mind on its constituents to draw the conclusion that such a brain is causally closed with respect to the underlying matter. Such an "emergent" mind is to the brain as pressure is to molecular motion - and, thus, has no causal autonomy. Case closed.

These, in brief, are some of the problems with Nagel's philosophy, but in a following blog I will look at the contradictory nature of Nagel's superficial rejection of dualism and proposing neutral monism. Nagel's principle, mentioned above, is that dualism is too mysterious and "unexplained" and that monism (and in particular his neutral monism that purports to explain "mind" and mental interactions) is not mysterious. But is it? Hardly. For a hint at what is coming, some might want to ask the question regarding the graphics below: "What exactly is going on at this electron-photon interaction?" (The straight red line is an electron of charge "e" and the black wavy line is an emitted (or absorbed) photon. The diagram represents the fundamental interaction of electrons and light.)

Continue to part 2.

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1 Neutral monism asserts that the ultimate constituents of reality are neither material (as in material monism) nor mental (as in idealism) but a neutral third kind of "stuff." For more details see Neutral Monism at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ^↩

Companion Blog

I'm starting a new blog, Scripta Scientificae pro Christiana Apologeticum, where I'll occasionally post technical writings on the physics and mathematics that bear on presuppositional Christian Apologetics. First off, I'll be giving a more technical discussion on Lawrence Krauss' schlock philosophy and physics which I discussed in Heideggerian Nonsense Redux. For those with a scientific background and mathematical skills, stay tuned.

More on TAG

A correspondent has asked, "Is 'logic' a premise of TAG (The Transcendental Argument for God)?"¹

This question underscores the typical unbeliever's inability to grasp the issues in the debate between totally antithetical worldviews. It also suggests a general unfamiliarity with transcendental argumentation -- as it construes TAG as a deductive argument, and it seems to lapse into a standard "deductivist" view of proof, so prevalent among many unbelievers.

First, TAG is not formally a deductive argument. Deductive arguments necessarily presuppose logic. Without logic, deductive arguments could not even get off the ground. So, the answer is, no, logic per se is not a premise of TAG.² In the presuppositional defense of Christianity, we do not presuppose a merely abstract and autonomous logic, nor do we posit it as a premise of a deductive argument leading to a conclusion of a God of indeterminate character or an abstract "God of the philosophers."

Second, when it comes to the issues of the existence of logic, abstract objects, and conceptual reasoning, in general, the point of TAG is that the godless reality of atheism, on the basis of its own metaphysical presuppositions, cannot account for their existence. For instance, the existence of logic and material monism are contradictory. Laws of matter and the ultimacy of chance do not produce mentally free, conscious beings who are capable of abstract thought. Materialism cannot account for the existence of immaterial abstract entities of any type (be it logic, mathematics, or moral laws).³ The existence of logic, then, is a problem, and failure, of the atheist worldview. As I have written before, atheists cannot give a "reason for reason." As such, atheists have no metaphysical ground for their presupposition of logic. Atheists, being "epistemological loafers" as Van Til put it, will not acknowledge this. Even in the face of continued prodding, they continue to use a merely assumed autonomous logic and reason, that is, just "take it for granted." But that is question begging and an intellectually empty response. Yet, on the other hand, they will assert that man and his mind was produced by (and thereby, still ruled by) ultimately random material processes. Atheism -- by asserting the autonomy of man (and thereby, the ultimacy of the human mind) along with the ultimately chance nature of temporal facts -- is self-contradictory. Atheism provides no grounds for any of its beliefs (articles of faith, as it were); it can only be adhered to by a willful intellectual blindness.

The positive presupposition of TAG is the existence of the Triune God of Christianity who has revealed Himself in the Bible, in nature, and within man himself. God is the metaphysical ground from which all human experience is intelligible. Logic (and other abstract objects) is not a problem for the Christian theist. Behind man's reasoning is the mind of God.

To reiterate the point: logic is a problem for atheists and agnostics; it is no problem for the Christian theist.

In response to the correspondent's question, I pointed out the following as an example of presuppositions: The laws of logic are laws of rational thought; as such logic presupposes a thinking mind. In Christian theism, that ultimate mind is the mind of the eternal and personal God. Though this may be wrongly interpreted as if it were a deductive argument, it is not. It is an illustration of a presupposition that underlies and is the metaphysical ground of human logic.

The correspondent responded with the question, "Why can't that mind be mine?" Indeed, that is the question for him to answer based on a presumed godless reality! Many questions come to mind. For example, where or from what did his mind originate? Did immaterial minds irrationally spring forth de novo from matter in motion (If indeed there be minds as opposed to mere physically determined material brains)? Was there a first mind? Or, is there an infinite past of finite individual minds begetting new minds, (coming into being at birth, then vanishing into nothingness at death)? Is his mind ultimate? If not, what produced his mind? Is his mind free from physical determination (i.e., does he have rational freedom and volition)? How many unrelated (material and perhaps non-material) causal principles does the unbeliever invent to account for the existence of minds? Are those causal properties, along with matter and minds, of which they are properties, eternal, uncreated, ultimate constituents of reality?  In addition, for a materialist the question is (a) how all the biochemistry going on in every human skull (different processes in different locations) gives rise to objective non-material abstractions, such as logic, or, if not a materialist, (b) from whence all these contingent minds emerged equipped with innate and invariant logic. Those are just a few problems for starters.

Again, the question remains for atheists and agnostics to answer on the foundation of their metaphysical presuppositions. Answers that millennia of atheist philosophies have failed to supply.

I've already given the Christian answer: Mind is not his alone. The ultimate mind is the mind of the eternal God of Christian theism.

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1 The historical connection of logic to TAG stems from Greg Bahnsen's use of the presuppositional apologetic in his debate with atheist Gordon Stein where Stein couldn't support the existence of, or use and reliability of, logic on the basis of his materialism. This was a defining moment for public awareness of presuppositionalism. In a way, it is a bit unfortunate that the debate paved the way for some, including Christians, to think that the existence of logic is the only or main element of TAG (thereby focusing attention mainly on logic in conjunction with TAG). But such is not the case. TAGs challenge to unbelief is that it cannot make sense (on its own presuppositions) of any fact of human experience. Thus, one can start with logic, or language, or mathematics or moral laws (among others) to expose the unbeliever's internal contradictions and refute the unbeliever's worldview or total view of reality. ^↩

2 What is at issue in the debate between Christians and unbelievers is not merely "logic," but the conception of logic that each participant in the debate holds. Logical reasoning is necessary -- for both parties -- in the encounter of belief with unbelief. When we reason with unbelievers we, of course, employ our God-given capacity for logical thinking. The unbeliever will likewise employ logic in the debate while all along denying God. However, the unbeliever typically does not question his capacity to reason, nor ask what is the metaphysical ground of the human ability to think and reason according to abstract laws of logic. The "logic" to which the unbeliever appeals (and which is his ultimate authority) is an autonomous "logic" that exists in a void. So an appeal to a common conception of "logic" is illusory. The totally antithetical conceptions of logic (among a host of other things) are at the core of the debate. Van Til addresses this issue:

"It appears then that if there is to be any intelligible encounter between the Christian and the non-Christian, it must be in terms of the two mutually exclusive visions that each entertains. To appeal to the law of contradiction and/or to facts or to a combination of these apart from the relation that these sustain to the totality-vision of either, the believer or the unbeliever, is to beat the air. It is well to say that he who would reason must presuppose the validity of the laws of logic. But if we say nothing more basic than this, then we are still beating the air. The ultimate question deals with the foundation of the validity of the laws of logic. We have not reached bottom until we have seen that every logical activity in which any man engages is in the service of his totality-vision." (Emph. added) Cornelius Van Til, The Case for Calvinism. The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Philadelphia, 1964. (Quoted from The Works of Cornelius Van Til, Logos Digital Edition).

As to the question of logic in the debate between totally antithetical worldviews Bahnsen writes:

"The antithesis (in principle) between the philosophical systems of unbelievers and the philosophical system of believers is so broad and basic that it even affects the way they deal with central philosophical notions like logic, possibility, and objectivity (to mention but a few). This observation should not be misunderstood. The presuppositionalist does not say that Christians and non-Christians inevitably accept and operate with completely different, specific laws of logic in their practical exercises of reasoning. Yet they do clearly disagree with each other concerning the nature, source, and authority of the laws of logic. Both worldviews may endorse and utilize the disjunctive syllogism or De Morgan's theorems, but when we inquire into what they are talking about, the evidence that is appropriate or persuasive for their claims (about syllogisms, theorems, etc.), or the necessity of the truths about logic, we get radically different answers -- which almost always betray differing convictions regarding metaphysics." (Greg Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis, The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Philadelphia, 1998. p. 280)^↩

3 It is true that there are some atheists who are not material monists -- but they are few and far between. There are idealistic monists (mind is the fundamental stuff of reality) and there are others usually referred to as "pluralists" who believe in a plurality of co-ultimate things (Roger Penrose, for example). But, in the case of the pluralists, merely asserting the existence of minds and a plurality of immaterial "platonic" entities with no coherent unity among them is question begging and provides no intelligible ground for human knowledge. In addition to being no answer to the problem of the one and the many, no atheist has given the account of what bridges the gap between the particulars of the atheist's material world with its basic chance characteristics and their eternal unchanging realm of universal "platonic" entities. As mentioned above, the existence of human minds in this worldview is also a major problem -- especially on the macro evolutionary account that human minds are no more than material brains assembled by (and thereby still controlled by) random physical processes. The dual atheist principles of human autonomy and the ultimacy of chance are contradictory.

The many problems of a platonistic conception of reality are well known, which explains why few advocate it, and won't be dealt with here. As to the idealists, which were more in vogue during Van Til's time, Van Til's writings, in particular A Survey of Christian Epistemology, provide a wealth of information on the internal contradictions of the idealists. ^↩

Heideggerian Nonsense Redux: Nonsense is still nonsense and nothing still yields nothing.

I received a reply to this prior post which began by providing this link to the Wikipedia page on Krauss' book A Universe from Nothing -- whose title itself is philosophical sophistry. The writer supplied this without analysis to my discussion of Heidegger's question.  Unfortunately, there are some (Richard Dawkins, for one¹) who believe Krauss has something relevant to say to that question.  As we will see, Krauss has nothing to say about that question. As discussed below, Krauss is both a philosophical charlatan and also, on occasion, exhibits incompetence in his physics descriptions .  Krauss' book is rather old news, and I suspect my interlocutor probably did not "drill down to" David Albert's devastating critique of the book: On the Origin of Everything.

In any event, Krauss' book certainly adds nothing to the philosophical discussion of Heidegger's nonsense.

As it turns out, even Krauss is not so dim as to believe that something comes from absolutely nothing -- even though he promotes this idea in cloaked words, as if that were the case (so much so that Richard Dawkins foolishly takes the bait). Krauss, in his lecture here, remarks (my punctuation added): "By 'nothing' I don't mean nothing I mean 'nothing' " Exactly so. (Of course, putting scare quotes in the title would not be as sensational.) The quantum vacuum of quantum field theory (QFT) is called the particle vacuum: it is the ground state of the fields (and that is something) in which no particles are detectable. The Wikipedia entry states: "[I]t is a mistake to think of any physical vacuum as some absolutely empty void." David Albert has remarked on this in his review of  "A Universe from Nothing" (supra). I have made similar analysis on Hawking here: Hawking's "The Grand Design" -- a new sub-Platonic Cosmogony for Itching Ears and here: More on Hawking's Grand Design.

To summarize: In quantum field theory, the fields are everywhere, particles are not.  One can have fields with no particles, but not particles without the fields. The fields are fundamental; they are the matrix of the particles. Particles are the quantized manifestation of excitations of the field -- i.e. discrete vibrations of the field.

It bears repeating.  The main point is that in all physical theories, the material is presupposed by atheists as eternally existent -- there is no explanation for their existence. The quantum fields are merely posited as uncreated and eternal. Krauss should have titled his book: A Universe from "Nothing"  -- but the scare quotes would be less sensational and no doubt "scare off" some potential book buyers. As titled, it is a marketing hook that certainly aids in attracting the naively gullible atheists, of which, Richard Dawkins is one. Richard Dawkins interprets Krauss' "nothing" to be literally nothing but yet a sophisticated something (!) (as we see in this humorous video in which Dawkins earns his dunce's cap. "The fool has said in his heart there is no God").

In closing, I point out that Krauss believes his mythology so deeply that it even seduces him into loose statements in his lectures. Here is an example from the video above at time 21:28 where he displays a simulation of his so-called "empty" space between quarks. He says the simulation shows the fields "popping in and out of existence." It shows no such thing.  As presented (by what it "shows" and what it omits) the simulation is an example of atheist propaganda. (If that simulation shows fields popping in out of existence, then this video shows a drum head popping in and out of existence! Absurdity!)  There is another remark around 18:00 where he describes this "empty" space as that which you get if you remove "absolutely everything" --  well, Krauss' subsequent discussion contradicts that.  The quantum fields are still there; so much, for "absolutely everything." Krauss is absolutely wrong.

Krauss should know better. The quantum fields do not pop in and out of existence. The fields exist eternally (in the atheist's philosophy) and everywhere. The amplitude of the fields (like the displacement of the vibrating strings on a violin or the membrane of a drum head) vary with time and position according to the relativistic wave equations, but that does not mean the fields are popping in and out of existence (anymore than the node on a violin string means the string has popped out of existence at the node). Krauss has made the embarrassing mistake of blurring objects and attributes of objects. One should also consider the simulation itself.   In describing the fields between the quarks, the simulation has program variables that hold the values of the fields at each instant and at each spatial point between the quarks -- those values can be zero at some points and times while the simulation is running.  But that does not mean the variables (and the fields they describe) in the program cease to exist!²   Those variables are programmed to obey a numerical representation of the relativistic field equations.  Well to be fair, if you observe Krauss' chartmanship you will have noted that the slide title is "Empty space not empty." That is loose (and self contradictory as written), but fits his atheist talking point. The slide should read: "Empty" Space is not Empty -- or, better: Space is not empty.

Finally, Krauss is wrong on so many levels when he talks about "empty" space. Consider: the four-dimensional space-time itself is something (even if it is a four-dimensional slice of a higher-dimensional "bulk" as in string theory -- the bulk, too, is something). The four-dimensional space is described by the metric (gravitational) field of general relativity. This field itself has the properties of distinguishing between the three spatial dimensions and time. It also mysteriously, and without explanation, encodes the value of the fundamental speed of light!  Finally, we should mention that the omnipresent Higgs field is also in Krauss' so-called "empty" space.  From the Wikipedia

  "The Higgs Field is an invisible energy field that exists everywhere in the universe" (emph. added).

So then, Krauss' "empty" space is most certainly something filled with a plurality of more unexplained eternal things interacting via equally mysterious "quantum interaction vertices." Krauss has swept a lot of mystery dirt underneath his atheist rug called "nothing." Unfortunately, Krauss' atheist philosophy is the stuff that passes as "science" and that permeates the writings of many of the current crop of pop celebrity atheist scientists; and fervently believed by many of the gullible public.

 "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools... Who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator." (Romans 1:22,25)

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1 Richard Dawkins mistakenly states that Krauss has answered the theologian's "trump card": "Why something rather than nothing?" But no competent Christian apologist raises that question. Certainly no presuppositionalist would ask that question. That question, as stated, is nonsense.^↩
2 One should consider: If absolutely everything was removed between the quarks, as Krauss remarked, then there would be nothing for the program variables to simulate. There would be no need for a program, period!^↩

They Don't Know What They Are Talking About!

In presuppositional apologetics, we show that the presuppositions, or the fundamental beliefs, of all who reject Christian theism are riddled with self-contradictions.  Their metaphysical assumptions ("view of what exists and is real") provide no coherent foundation for their epistemology ("how they know") and ethics ("how they should live their lives"); and, considered jointly, their metaphysics, epistemology and ethics are mutually incoherent. This is a fact that most unbelievers do not confront, as they refuse to engage in self-reflection and critical examination of their beliefs. Even when confronted with these contradictions, unbelievers, unless convicted of their sin by the Spirit of God, will continue to irrationally hold to their self-styled "rational" unbelief, rather than turning to the only rational position, Christian theism.

For instance, unbelievers -- on the basis of the presupposed properties of a godless universe -- cannot give coherent accounts of their "knowledge," in general, or of their moral judgments.

In particular, when it comes to morals, the unbeliever has no basis whatsoever for making moral pronouncements.  This follows directly from the typical belief of the so-called "scientific" worldview that only science yields knowledge.   This viewpoint is called scientism.  In that epistemology (based on the so-called "logical-empirical approach"), only things that are empirical or can be logically deduced are known¹.  Ipso facto, that belief excludes moral knowledge.

First, moral laws are not perceived via the senses (empirically).  One cannot see, touch, taste, hear or smell moral laws. Moral laws (like laws of logic) are immaterial, they are not natural. They are not discovered "in a test tube."  Second, moral laws are not logical tautologies.  Thus, by the atheist's espoused (and non-self attesting) epistemology, moral laws are inaccessible to human knowledge.  Moral laws are unknowable and unknown. This reduces the atheist to absolute moral skepticism.

The result is that for the unbeliever, moral pronouncements are arbitrary and matters of subjective opinion.  Moral laws are, then, just social constructions, whether by custom or legislation. In the case of legislation, they are established by power -- either a consensus of a majority in democracies (political power then determines the morality of the age) or by brute force in totalitarian regimes and dictatorships. There are American secular norms; there are Islamic fascist norms, communist norms, Nazi norms -- all of which, inter alia, are arbitrary.

So far, we are discussing the self-contradiction of those who believe in "morality;" albeit an unknowable, subjective, non-absolute code of conduct.  Of course, this means there really is no morality in any sense; there is only legality as encoded in arbitrary legislation and conformity (or non-conformity) to changing social customs dictated by individual tastes.   Today's "evil" may be tomorrow's "righteousness."  This further means the unbeliever has no basis for making a "legal/moral" dichotomy or the claim that there are "unjust laws" ("That may be legal but it is morally suspect").

In addition, we should mention that those who espouse the epistemology of scientism typically hold to some form of materialism.  In that case, not only are moral judgments unknown, but morals would not exist.  Morality does not exist (or inhere) within the laws of physics. So metaphysically, there is no foundation for morals in a materialist universe.  It has oft been correctly stated that one cannot argue from "what is the case" (mere descriptions of the natural state, which is all science ever does) to "what ought to be."  There is no "ought" in the laws of physics.  All that "is" follows solely from physical processes obeying inviolable physical laws.  In the atheist universe, everything "does what comes naturally."  No "wrong" ever occurs; "right" and "wrong" are not properties of matter.  Everything is merely matter in motion. [We should add that no mental freedom, volition, or rationality would occur either, as all "thoughts" and vocalization of such would also be the inviolable results of "what comes naturally."] The moral theory of the atheist is bankrupt, both metaphysically and epistemologically.

In conclusion, all of the above destroy the pretense of atheists and agnostics who claim to make "moral" pronouncements. When you hear a proponent of scientism make pronouncements on moral judgments, just remind him (that on his own terms): "You don't know what you are are talking about."

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1 Of course, this presupposition of scientism is neither an empirical observation nor a logical tautology. It is, therefore, not a scientific statement and, thus, not an object of knowledge. It is self-refuting. ^↩

Douglas Wilson's Review of Thomas Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos"

Wilson wrote:

"Mind & Cosmos is subtitled 'Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False.' When a book with this kind of subtitle comes out, written by a philosopher of Nagel’s caliber, and published by Oxford University Press, there should be no astonishment that it caused a stir. I wanted to note two very admirable traits of this book, and then engage at a couple of places where I think engagement could be profitable."

You can read Wilson's full review here.

I think I'll be adding this book to my reading list.  The "almost certainly false" is rather amusing.  Nagel raises the right question concerning the failure of materialism:  inability to account for consciousness, cognitive capacities, values and morals.  So, I'm curious to see what false "hope" he holds out for materialism -- but such qualification is typical of the skepticism of unbelieving professional philosophers  (it certainly keeps the profession going, for what that's worth).

Perusing the "Search Inside" feature at Amazon, I noted that Nagel (p. 4,5) is leaning to "neutral monism,"  a view posited by radical empiricist Ernst Mach.  Neutral monism is, at heart, a mere terminological shift -- it is just another more complicated version of attributive monism.  Some assert that neutral monism is the same as, or a very near kin of, idealism, phenomenalism, or panpsychism.   In any case, none of these can account for actual values and absolute morals (let alone unity/diversity, universals/particulars, individuals, space and time, among many others).

I plan to write on this version of "monism" in a future post. 

Update: The promised follow-up can be found here.

Van Til on the Antithesis of Christian and anti-Christian Philosophy

The following excerpt from "My Credo" (in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical discussions on the theology and apologetics of Cornelius Van Til. 1971, E. R. Geehan, Ed. The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company: Nutley, NJ.) is Van Til's summary of the presuppositional apologetic.

Paragraphs B.4, C.4 and C.5 are a concise description of the approach of the transcendental argument.  Paragraph B.4.a is the positive argument ("The God of Christian theism is the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of all of human experience").  Paragraph B.4.b summarizes the negative argument (self destruction of anti-Christian philosophy, "Christian theism is true because of the impossibility of the contrary").   The outline also includes the summary of all anti-theistic philosophies:  they presuppose the dialectic of "regularity" (necessity) and "chance" and the antithetical presupposition of human autonomy¹.

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"B. My understanding of the relationship between Christian and non-Christian, philosophically speaking.

1. Both have presuppositions about the nature of reality:

a. The Christian presupposes the triune God and his redemptive plan for the universe as set forth once for all in Scripture.
b. The non-Christian presupposes a dialectic between “chance” and “regularity,” the former accounting for the origin of matter and life, the latter accounting for the current success of the scientific enterprise.

2. Neither can, as finite beings, by means of logic as such, say what reality must be or cannot be.

a. The Christian, therefore, attempts to understand his world through the observation and logical ordering of facts in self-conscious subjection to the plan of the self-attesting Christ of Scripture. 

b. The non-Christian, while attempting an enterprise similar to the Christian’s, attempts nevertheless to use “logic” to destroy the Christian position. On the one hand, appealing to the non-rationality of “matter,” he says that the chance-character of “facts” is conclusive evidence against the Christian position. Then, on the other hand, he maintains like Parmenides that the Christian story cannot possibly be true. Man must be autonomous, “logic” must be legislative as to the field of “possibility” and possibility must be above God.

3. Both claim that their position is “in accordance with the facts.”

a. The Christian claims this because he interprets the facts and his experience in the light of the revelation of the self-attesting Christ in Scripture. Both the uniformity and the diversity of facts have at their foundation the all-embracing plan of God.
b. The non-Christian claims this because he interprets the facts and his experience in the light of the autonomy of human personality, the ultimate “givenness” of the world and the amenability of matter to mind. There can be no fact that denies man’s autonomy or attests to the world’s and man’s divine origin.

4. Both claim that their position is “rational.”

a. The Christian does so by claiming not only that his position is self-consistent but that he can explain both the seemingly “inexplicable” amenability of fact to logic and the necessity and usefulness of rationality itself in terms of Scripture.
b. The non-Christian may or may not make this same claim. If he does, the Christian maintains that he cannot make it good. If the non-Christian attempts to account for the amenability of fact to logic in terms of the ultimate rationality of the cosmos, then he will be crippled when it comes to explaining the “evolution” of men and things. If he attempts to do so in terms of pure “chance” and ultimate “irrationality” as being the well out of which both rational man and a rationally amenable world sprang, then we shall point out that such an explanation is in fact no explanation at all and that it destroys predication.

 C. My proposal, therefore, for a consistently Christian methodology of apologetics is this:

1. That we use the same principle in apologetics that we use in theology: the self-attesting, self-explanatory Christ of Scripture
2. That we no longer make an appeal to “common notions” which Christian and non-Christian agree on, but to the “common ground” which they actually have because man and his world are what Scripture says they are.
3. That we appeal to man as man, God’s image. We do so only if we set the non-Christian principle of the rational autonomy of man against the Christian principle of the dependence of man’s knowledge on God’s knowledge as revealed in the person and by the Spirit of Christ.
4. That we claim, therefore, that Christianity alone is reasonable for men to hold. It is wholly irrational to hold any other position than that of Christianity. Christianity alone does not slay reason on the altar of “chance.”
5. That we argue, therefore, by “presupposition.” The Christian, as did Tertullian, must contest the very principles of his opponent’s position. The only “proof” of the Christian position is that unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of “proving” anything at all. The actual state of affairs as preached by Christianity is the necessary foundation of “proof” itself.
6. That we preach with the understanding that the acceptance of the Christ of Scripture by sinners who, being alienated from God, seek to flee his face, comes about when the Holy Spirit, in the presence of inescapably clear evidence, opens their eyes so that they see things as they truly are.
7. That we present the message and evidence for the Christian position as clearly as possible, knowing that because man is what the Christian says he is, the non-Christian will be able to understand in an intellectual sense the issues involved. In so doing, we shall, to a large extent, be telling him what he “already knows” but seeks to suppress. This “reminding” process provides a fertile ground for the Holy Spirit, who in sovereign grace may grant the non-Christian repentance so that he may know him who is life eternal."

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1 The atheist "robots," such as Rosenberg, Provine and Harris, deny human autonomy but inconsistently claim rationality and possession of "truth." In other words, they assert that it is true that they are devoid of free agency (i.e. "robots." cf. Invasion of the Atheist Robots) yet claim this conclusion is rationally and logically derived.^↩